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Abstract
The aim of this study is to discover and analyse the history and dis­
course of the Tunisian Islamic movement al-Nahda, within the context 
of post-independence Tunisian history and the progression of thought 
within contemporary Islamic movements. As such, the study is both 
historical and analytical. It tries to give an accurate reading of the 
emergence, rise and recent eclipse of al-Nahda, as well as a compre­
hensive analysis of its political, social and intellectual discourse.
The importance of the study comes from the fact that it may be 
considered the first academic research done in English on the Tunisian 
Islamic Movement. Up to now, it has received only scant treatment in 
English sources. Even in Arabic or in French sources are rare, and are 
usually written by either sympathisers or opponents of the movement.
The history and the ideas of the movement are analysed in six 
chapters. The first concentrates on studying the reasons and factors be­
hind the emergence of the movement; the second on the politicisation 
of the movement and the implications of that politicisation for its pri­
orities and discourse; the third on the three major confrontations be­
tween the movement and the Tunisian regime that culminated in 1991 
in the banning of all al-Nahda's activities inside Tunisia.
The basic concepts of a political Islam in the movement's litera­
ture are explored and analysed in chapter four, in particular the Isla­
mists' belief in the comprehensiveness of Islam and their rejection of 
secularism. Chapter five then concentrates on studying the detailed 
proposal put forward by the leader of al-Nahda for the definition of a 
modem Islamic state. Chapter six addresses the Islamists’ cultural 
agenda and their insistence on an Islamic identity for Tunisia, with 
particular reference to the perceived polarisation between Westemisa-
2
tion and Islamisation.
The thesis also contains an appendix comprising some of the 
movement's most important documents translated from Arabic.
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NOTE ON THE TRANSLITERATION OF 
ARABIC CHARACTERS
Consonants
(■ ’ except when initial J* d
o b J, t
O ta z
o tha t
i
£ j t g h
c h f
C kh 3 q
d J k
i dh J 1
J r r m
j z j n
o* s Jb h
AU* sh J w
u* s y
Long vowels Diphthongs
j
a
u
I
Short vowels
j
J+
%
j
b
aw
ay
iyy
uw
a; at(construct state)
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Note on the system of translation and transliteration
All translations from the Arabic and French are mine, unless otherwise 
indicated.
The standard system of transliteration has been used for Arabic 
terms, names and sources throughout the thesis, with minor modifica­
tions; the initial hamza has been omitted, as has the final ‘h’ of the ta ’ 
marbuta.
All Arabic names of persons originating from the countries of the 
Maghreb have been transliterated according to the French system; 
therefore shin becomes ‘ch’ (as in the name Ghannouchi), and the qaf 
is rendered as a ‘k ’. In instances where these individuals have au­
thored sources in Arabic, their names have been transliterated in the 
notes according to the Arabic system of transliteration; thus Ghannou­
chi becomes ‘al-Ghannushi’. If these same individuals have also writ­
ten works in French or English, they will be referred to in these cases 
in accordance with the French system.
Certain Arabic words and names of personalities that are of com­
mon usage in English are not transliterated, for example ‘Islam’, 
‘Qur’an’, and Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser.
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Introduction
The aim of this study is to discover and analyse the history and dis­
course of the Tunisian Islamic movement al-Nahda, within the context 
of post-independence Tunisian history and the trends of thought within 
contemporary Islamic movements. As such, the study is both historical 
and analytical. It attempts to give an accurate reading of the emer­
gence, rise and recent eclipse of al-Nahda, as well as a comprehensive 
analysis of its political, social and intellectual discourse.
The importance of the study comes from the fact that it may be 
considered the first academic research done in English on al-Nahda; 
up to now, the movement has received only scant treatment in English 
sources. The most elaborate work to date on this subject is Francois 
Burgat and William Dowell’s The Islamic Movement in North Africa.’ 
As the title suggests however the Tunisian case is only a part of a wid­
er North African interest; Burgat originally published his findings in 
French in his book LIslamisme au Maghreb: la Voix du Sud,2 where 
he reviewed the history of the Islamic movement not only in Tunisia 
but also in Algeria, Libya and Morocco. Nonetheless, his research into 
al-Nahda may be considered the most thorough thus far among French 
sources.
Even in Arabic, books published about the Tunisian Islamic 
movement are very rare. Of the few published, one is entitled al- 
Nahda, and was written by the government official Abd Allah Imami, 
who studied the movement under the rubric of terrorist organisations 
in the Islamic world.3 A second is al-Ittijah al-Islami wa Bourguiba: 
Muhakamat man li man? (“The Islamic Trend and Bourguiba: Who is 
Trying Whom?”), written by Waleed al-Mansouri from within the
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ranks of al-Nahda, refuting the government’s main charges at the ma­
jor trials of 1987 and published in 1988. These two books formed part 
of the political war between the Tunisian regime and al-Nahda and do 
not constitute objective sources for academic research. I may add to 
this category my own book, entitled Ashwaq al-Hurriyya, which I 
based on a collection of al-Nahda documents and published in order to 
draw attention to the plight of Islamist detainees in Bourguiba’s jails.4
Although the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front has attracted more 
attention in the Maghreb as a whole since 1990, it was the Tunisian Is­
lamic movement that played the role of the champion of Islamism in 
the region during the eighties, gaining more fame and attracting more 
scrutiny than any other Islamic organisation in the Maghreb. However, 
this scrutiny has come mostly from the media, rather than from aca­
demics.
In this sense, carrying out academic research in English into al- 
Nahda may claim some originality from this fact alone, in that it may 
achieve the following: to encourage other researchers to give closer at­
tention to an important part of the Maghreb, and to a movement that 
has given the impression of adapting to modernity and the changing 
times, and which succeeded in the late eighties in commanding strong 
sympathy among many democrats and liberals in the Arab world, and 
even in the West, which is supposedly seen as an ideological opponent 
of Islamism in general.
But there are also other factors that give this study its signifi­
cance. Most important is that it aims to expose and analyse the efforts 
of the Tunisian Islamists at answering some of the major questions 
facing those who are engaged in contemporary Islamic thought, and 
specifically the role of Islam in modem public life. Probably the first
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question leading to this wider debate is how a political movement 
gains its Islamic identity or nature: is it simply because it calls itself Is­
lamic? Is it because of its programmes, or intentions, or because of the 
religious affiliations of its leaders and members?
As the conflict intensifies between Islamic movements and their 
governments, Tunisia itself being one of the most striking cases, ques­
tions are raised with regard to this claim to Islamicity, especially by 
opponents of Islamic movements who accuse them of manipulating re­
ligion for political ends, and who call for Islam to be above partisan 
politics. But this question is not only about politics, but also about es­
sential matters of faith and understanding of Islam. This is particularly 
true when studying the view of Islamic movements, in this case al- 
Nahda, of their societies and their religious mission. Being an “Islam­
ic” movement poses a very important question: is the society itself Is­
lamic? If it is not, should Islamists obey its rules? The answer to these 
questions may prove vital in reassessing the political role of religion in 
the Arab world, and the political and cultural divisions that arise from 
it.
Another angle from which to assess the religious nature of the po­
litical action and discourse of the Islamists is by studying their pro­
grammes. As al-Nahda, and most similar Islamic movements, stress 
that their reforming mission is as comprehensive as Islam itself, this 
research offers an opportunity to assess the contribution of Tunisian 
Islamists to enhancing the compatibility between Islam and modernity, 
a question that has often been raised before by the major Muslim 
thinkers and reformists of the modem period, such as Jamal al-DIn al- 
Afghanl, Khayr al-Din al-TunisI, Muhammad ‘Abduh, ‘Abd al- 
Rahman al-Kawakibi, Sayyid Qutb and others.
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This study attempts to explore and analyse the kind of “Islam” 
proclaimed by Tunisian Islamists, whether it reflects a classical under­
standing of religion, or a modem activist one that resembles that of 
contemporary Middle Eastern Islamic movements. The discourse of 
al-Nahda offers a useful opportunity in this context, especially be­
cause of the detailed project its leader elaborated on the definition of a 
modem Islamic government, one of the most important issues of heat­
ed debate between Islamists and their opponents in the Muslim world.
But if al-Afghani and ‘Abduh were essentially individuals who 
tried to answer the questions of modernity by intellectual discourse, 
al-Nahda and other political Islamic movements are different in that 
they are ready to organise their supporters and make a serious attempt 
to capture political power and bring about the sought-after Islamic 
state. That is why in addition to analysing the intellectual input of al- 
Nahda, this study tries to answer another equally significant question 
about the means employed by the Islamic movement. This provides an 
opportunity to study the activist aspect of the movement: how their 
political tactics reflect their religious credentials, and how the Western 
concept of a political party is used in a religious context, to the point 
of becoming an alternative social refuge for a misguided, or even a 
jahili society. Other important issues in this regard are the openness or 
secrecy of the movement, the role of the internal organisation 
(tanzim), and the combination of civil and military plans to acquire 
political power. It is also in this context that the study tries to analyse 
the characteristics of the people who adhered to the movement’s 
message and joined the tanilm  in order to serve the aim of building an 
Islamic state.
To answer these questions, I have opted for a flexible methodolo­
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gy that recognises the multi-dimensional nature of the issue. Essential­
ly, I have used a doubletrack method, by studying both the history and 
the discourse of the movement. I have attempted to offer what may be 
seen as an objective and up-to-date account of al-Nahda's history. This 
is a delicate task because of the conflicting nature of the available 
sources, which come mainly from either the movement itself or from 
its opponents. Even secondary sources were usually supportive of one 
party or the other. To write the history of al-Nahda is to some extent 
to write the history of independent Tunisia, and that involves looking 
at various political, social and cultural factors, and analysing the posi­
tions of various players on the scene, including the government, the 
leftist opposition, and the trade unions, but without losing sight of the 
subject of this study. Even in its historical context, the research is con­
cerned with analysing the history of ideas within the movement, how 
they emerged and how they have evolved and changed in line with 
changing political circumstances.
These ideas become the prime interest of the second half of the 
thesis. My method was to read the most important texts of the move­
ment and analyse them in their Tunisian and pan-Islamic context. I es­
pecially concentrated on some key questions related to the meanings 
of “Islamicity” for al-Nahda, and on evaluating their contribution to 
reconciling the given teachings of religion to the changing times and 
needs of Muslims. This was achieved by examining the movement's 
discourse on three major topics: the comprehensiveness of Islam, the 
nature of the Islamic state and the Islamic identity of Tunisia.
In the appendices, I have chosen to translate six telling docu­
ments of the movement and its leader. There are the manifestos of 
1981 and 1988; an insight into the movement’s thought about intema-
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tional relations in 1988, and a memorandum in which the movement 
gave its account of its last confrontation with the government. There 
are also two statements from Ghannouchi: one in 1991 on the Gulf 
war containing his analysis of what he saw as the real aims of the 
Western Alliance that opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the other 
in 1993 published as a long dedication in his book al-Hurriyyat al- 
‘A m m afi al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, which offers an insight into the polit­
ical and religious connections of the man.
Most of the written material examined in this thesis is that of 
Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the main founder of al-Nahda and its most 
prominent leader from the outset. He was both the political and relig­
ious leader of the movement, as well as an intellectual who expressed 
himself most openly about the main challenges that have faced the Is­
lamists during the last three decades or so. There are a few documents 
officially declared to be in the name of the movement, and a few con­
tributions by other less prominent members of the leadership; most of 
these have been examined in the study. The two most important names 
in the latter category are Abd al-Fattah Morou who was Secretary 
General of the movement until 1991, and Abd al-Majid al-Najjar, who 
was more active on the intellectual side as a professor of theological 
studies. I have used some of their statements and writings where ap­
propriate, although it should be mentioned that Morou resigned from 
the party in 1991, and al-Najjar announced in 1995 that he no longer 
had any links whatsoever with al-Nahda.
I have mostly used published material, and in a few cases unpub­
lished documents that I have obtained during the last few years. In the 
historical section of the thesis, I was also able to verify facts from 
Ghannouchi himself as he was, and still is, living in London. I should
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mention here also that I have benefitted from the fact that I was a 
member of the movement from 1978 to 1992, which covers most of 
the period under study in this thesis. I served as a leader of the student 
wing of the movement in the eighties and worked with the main Polit- 
bureau inside and outside the country. In the 1987 major trial of the 
movement, I was sentenced in absentia to twenty years in jail. Earlier, 
in 1983, I spent more than six months in jail with some prominent 
members of the leadership of the time. I was also one of two members 
of the movement who managed to speak directly with President Zein 
al-Abidine ben AH, the other being Ghannouchi. In this instance, I 
phoned him directly from London in 1988, to seek assurances about 
the future of the movement and permission for myself and two other 
prominent leaders, Morou and Hammadi al-Jebali, to return to the 
country from exile.
I have tried to benefit from my long and close relationship with 
the movement in a positive way, that is to say in verifying certain his­
torical facts and intellectual statements. However, I have been careful 
not to use this previous relationship to give away confidential informa­
tion that I only knew of due to my association with the movement. 
This was not my aim at any point in the six years during which I was 
writing my research. In fact, there is almost nothing significant about 
the history of the movement here that has not been revealed in one 
way or another, either by al-Nahda itself, or by the government. Even 
on writing about the aborted military coup that the movement planned 
to execute in 1987,1 referred to statements given by some of the key 
personalities involved to Francois Burgat, and not just to my knowl­
edge as a member of the movement.
I have tried to be as objective as possible; not only was this an ac­
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ademic obligation, but a true desire to exercise an impartiality which I 
was not able to have when I was an activist for the movement. These 
last few years have given me the chance to look back at a history that 
has affected my life and the lives of thousands of my colleagues. My 
aim was not to defend it or to dissociate myself from it. My aim was to 
understand it, and I hope that this thesis will testify to that.
Notes
1 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993).
2 (Paris: Karthala, 1988).
3 (Tunis: al-Dar al-Tunisiyya li-l-nashr, 1992).
4 (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1989).
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1The Emergence of the Tunisian Islamic Movement
The history of the contemporary Islamic movement in independent Tu­
nisia is basically that of the movement now known as al-Nahda. 
Founded initially as al-Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), the 
movement changed its name in 1981 to Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami 
(The Islamic Trend Movement), and in 1988 changed its name once 
more to Harakat al-Nahda (The Renaissance Movement). Although 
some of its founders resigned in 1978 and formed a new group under 
the title al-Islamiyyun al-Taqaddumiyyun (The Progressive Islamists), 
and a second group resigned in 1991 and tried to form a new political 
party, the core of the Tunisian Islamic movement remained loyal to al- 
Nahda, making it one of the main opposition parties in the country.1 
This chapter will analyse the economic, political, religious and cultural 
factors that were behind the emergence of the movement.
The first cell of al-Jama(a al-Islamiyya was set up in 1970. At 
that time, Tunisia was embarking on a new era of economic liberalisa­
tion after the failure of the socialist experiment led by Ahmad Ben Sa- 
lah, a former minister who, under the supervision of Bourguiba, had 
been responsible for the country’s economic sector.
Economic and political factors
Ben Salah was an influential leftist figure in the Tunisian General 
Workers’ Union (UGTT), which had played an important role in the 
national struggle for independence, achieved formally on March 20, 
1956. In this same year the UGTT organised its sixth congress and
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proposed a complete economic programme, suggesting a centrally- 
planned and centrally-oriented economy, managed by a council presid­
ing over the ministries of reconstruction, agriculture, public works, 
post, telegram and telephone, finance, the central bank and the nation­
al economy.
According to Ben Salah, only the state could possibly preside 
over such a revolutionary economic plan, which aimed at dismantling 
the economic system created by colonial France and ending exploita­
tion in all of its forms. This vision was presented as an alternative to 
what Ben Salah then described in one of his speeches to congress as 
“the liberal anarchy” that still reigned over Tunisia’s social and eco­
nomic plan.2
A centrally-planned economy was the mood of the fifties and six­
ties in the majority of the newly-independent countries of the Arab 
world, which found their main international ally in the Soviet Union, 
in their fight against the colonial policies of Western European coun­
tries, particularly France and Great Britain. Although at the beginning 
of his term as Prime Minister in 1956 and as the first President of inde­
pendent Tunisia in 1957 Bourguiba was not enthusiastic about the 
UGTT programme, he did not totally rule out the possibility of em­
bracing Ben Salah’s vision.
Indeed it took Bourguiba another four years to ensure that his po­
sition was not in danger from the ambitious Ben Salah, whom he had 
brought into the government in as early as 1957 to be Minister of La­
bour and Health. In 1961 Bourguiba told the Tunisian people that the 
country needed “a new conception of national solidarity; a form of so­
cialism.”3 He went on to explain the ideological basis for this impor­
tant change of direction: “The Prophet's companions in the first centu­
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ry of Islam were socialists before the term was invented. They regard­
ed themselves as members of the same family. So let’s return to the or­
igins of Islam, as the employed is a brother to his employer.” He add­
ed, however, “Although I've opted for socialism, I'm still opposed to 
the idea of class struggle.”4
Ben Salah was thus promoted to the post of Secretary of State for 
Planning and to be a member of the ruling party’s political bureau in 
1961. Three years later the party changed its name from The Neo De- 
stour to the Socialist Destour party, all to emphasise its new socialist 
strategy.
A National Council for Planning had also been created in the year 
of Ben Salah’s change in office. Under his supervision, it devised an 
economic programme for the country’s development, with a view to 
its completion within a ten-year period between 1962 and 1971. It also 
identified four essential and desired objectives, being the decolonisa­
tion of the economy, the promotion of the human being by ameliorat­
ing his financial situation, a reform of the country’s traditional struc­
ture, and auto-development, meaning the bringing about of a decrease 
in foreign debts and the involvement of the entire country in central 
decisions.5
This programme was the brainchild of an influential group within 
the ruling Destour party. As Eva Beilin writes in “Tunisian Industrial­
ists and the State”, the programme’s publication “marked the ascen­
dance of the dirigiste wing of the political elite, an elite committed to 
setting Tunisia on a ‘socialist’ path to development.” 6
Aside from the abovementioned goals, Tunisian socialism was 
also shaped around cooperatives that had been set up in the agrarian 
sector. Unfortunately this was a policy that did little more than to de­
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prive farmers from the right to own their land, and in fact made them 
workers on land that had originally been their own, but had been con­
fiscated by the state. The official view concerning this policy was arro­
gant; it was argued that the farmers could not be given land as they 
were “illiterate, used to archaic methods of exploitation”, besides 
which they were seen as “reactionaries and obstacles to progress”.7
A new law was announced which made illegal every kind of land 
exploitation except that by the cooperative units of agricultural pro­
duction. Thus, ironically, the peasants were the first to experience the 
injustices of the new socialist dream; people saw their properties con­
fiscated by the state and found themselves working for the new coop­
eratives for two litres of cooking oil, one kilogram of sugar and a few 
kilograms of semolina each week.
In the first instance, the government did not have the courage to 
implement this new law in the relatively more prosperous areas of the 
country, especially in the centre and northern coastal regions from 
which the majority of the ruling political elite, including Bourguiba 
and Ben Salah, came. However, when it was finally decided at the be­
ginning of 1969 to extend the system to all parts of the country, the 
hardship in the other regions in which the system had already been im­
plemented was impossible to hide.
As has been the case with almost all socialist economies the 
world over, the abolition of private ownership to the benefit of the 
state brought with it corruption and inefficiency. Most of the money 
reserved for the programme in Tunisia was to be “lost” before reach­
ing its final destination. What made things worse was that almost forty 
per cent of investments came from foreign loans, mainly from the 
United States. As for efficiency, below is a description of the altema-
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tive administration which was supposed to replace that of the illiterate 
peasants:
For every cooperative a director and a technical director 
were appointed. They were rarely of peasant origins.
They came from cities, and were unable to distinguish 
between a potato and a tomato. They did not have any 
idea about agronomy or climatology. On the other hand, 
those illiterate peasants knew their environment very 
well. 8
The disastrous results of this corrupt and inefficient system were 
soon to lead to a public outcry. Not only had people been dispossessed 
of their properties and exploited by their government, but national rev­
enues had slumped and foreign debts had became a heavy burden on 
the entire country. Beilin has summarised the reasons for Ben Salah's 
ensuing fall as including “a clash of political personalities, the discon­
tent of the rural bourgeoisie who were threatened by Ben Salah's plan 
to subject their land to cooperative control, the fiscal crisis faced by 
the state, and the bad luck of consecutive years of drought and poor 
harvests”.9
Thus the people began to express their anger and resentment, and 
Bourguiba soon realised that the socialist experiment was not only 
threatening the country’s stability and prosperity, but also his own po­
sition as the undisputed leader of the nation. He therefore acted swiftly 
to save himself from blame. In September 1969, Ben Salah was 
stripped of all his ministerial posts except for education, which he lost 
the following November. In March 1970 he was arrested and accused 
of high treason, and in the May of that same year he was condemned 
to ten years’ imprisonment and hard labour. Six months later Hedi 
Nouira, a liberal, was installed as the new Prime Minister.
In 1973 Ben Salah escaped from prison and fled to Switzerland,
20
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from where he began to issue statements condemning President Bour­
guiba for acting against the people in the interests of a privileged class. 
He also established himself as leader of the radical Popular Unity 
Movement (MUP), which had been declared illegal in Tunisia itself.10
During Ben Salah's radical decade in power there had been one 
very important incident on both the Arab and international scenes: the 
Six-Day War between the Arab states and Israel, in which the Arabs 
had been ignominiously defeated. If the Ben Salah experience had 
proven to be fatal for the fortunes of socialism in Tunisia, the defeat in 
the war against Israel had had a similar effect on the ideology of Arab 
Nationalism, spearheaded by the then Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd 
al-Nasser, and which had hitherto had wide appeal all over the Arab 
world, including Tunisia. The result of the war was clear and simple: 
pan-Arabism had failed the crucial test against Israel, and it no longer 
qualified to lead Arab efforts towards freedom, unity and progress.
These two ideological failures were to prove to be very impor­
tant, at least for the few founding members of al-Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya, 
as we may see from the words of one of them, Dr. Ehmida Enneifar, 
talking to the French scholar Francois Burgat:
In Tunisia, there was first of all the departure of Ben 
Salah’s team. The end of the experience was very brutal; 
the minister was imprisoned. But what was more 
important for a number of youths was that they had seen 
that the same government could be on the left and then 
suddenly change direction clearly to the right, with 
resolutely liberal economic options. Many of them were 
completely disoriented. The whole matter backfired on 
the Tunisian state because the ruling party had insisted 
firmly on a precise project by which to build a modem 
state; later on we came to realise that what took place 
was not only a change of government, but was largely a 
proof of the absence of that project. Those who joined 
the Islamists’ ranks were those who found nothing to be 
attached to, right or left; they were uprooted.11
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The essence of this testimony is that the change from the coopera­
tive socialism of Ben Salah to the economic liberalism of Hedi Nouira 
led to an ideological and identity crisis for many of those young Tuni­
sians who could, at the time, afford to think and argue about politics. 
These were essentially students, university or secondary school teach­
ers, who were better-off financially than the majority of the impover­
ished peasant population. Each student at that time would receive a 
monthly grant of forty Tunisian Dinars (almost eighty U.S. dollars), 
with which he could help his family; the salary of a teacher was even 
better. On campus there had been an active student movement led 
largely by Marxist groups, but the failures of socialism had helped to 
open the way for the new, but deep-rooted influence of Islamic cul­
ture. According to Paul Balta, it was a “sizeable vacuum” in which Is­
lamic ideology “could infiltrate without problem”.12
Enneifar also mentions the 1967 defeat as a factor which may 
help to explain the emergence of the Tunisian Islamic movement:
It was at that time that a number of intellectuals, 
including Ghannouchi and myself, began to meet. Very 
quickly, the question of religion was raised with 
insistence, because we could not find another way by 
which to proceed. Neither the Arab nor the Tunisian 
nationalists’ ideas were able to offer an answer, nor 
even [those of] the West itself, which for a long time 
had appeared to us to possess absolute solutions.13
Referring to the 1968 student riots in French universities during the 
de Gaulle presidency, Enneifer comments that on his arrival in Paris, 
he thought he would find “a country in which questions were clearly 
defined or answered”; on the contrary, he argues, “What I found was 
the same disarray that we had. I realised then that it was not only a Tu­
nisian or Arab, or Muslim problem. Even the West was passing 
through a dangerous era of general reflection about its way of life.”14
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In Tunisia at that time, as was the case in almost all the Arab 
world, political and ideological trends were very much geared towards 
the search for a successful theory that would bring progress and pros­
perity, and which would bring the country onto equal terms with the 
powerful nations of the West. The search for such a theory was yet an­
other factor leading to the meeting of the first founding members of 
the Tunisian Islamic movement, particularly following Ben Salah's 
failures.
Writing in 1974, Ghannouchi asserted that “the fundamental 
question for our society and educational system is about the [sort of] 
model person we want: what his beliefs are, his philosophy, and how 
he [differentiates between] good and evil”, adding: “If we were to ask 
those who plan our education about these matters, would they find an 
answer? Would they agree on an answer? The answer is most certainly 
‘no’.”15
Both Enneifer and Ghannouchi seemed to be mainly concerned 
with the political and ideological dimensions of the failed socialist ex­
perience, but for a number of researchers and analysts it is the eco­
nomic factor that takes precedence in explaining the emergence and 
evolution of al-Jamd‘a al-Islamiyya; an analysis which may also be 
seen to apply to Nouira’s liberal experiments. The basic argument be­
hind the economic explanation is that the failure of both socialism and 
liberalism to deliver economic prosperity for a wide section of society 
led many of those affected to heed the Islamists’ message. The Tuni­
sian sociologist Elbaki Hermassi argues that personal sensitivity to 
what amounted to an economic threat made young Tunisians particu­
larly susceptible to the charges of economic injustice, corruption, 
Western domination and exploitation held forth by Islamist groups
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against the government.16 He also suggests that “the Islamist move­
ment thrived on the ideological looseness of the post-independence 
state and has had the capacity to attract many of those left behind by 
economic growth.”17
This argument is duplicated by Marion Boulby, another research­
er on Tunisia’s post-independence history, who writes that “the failure 
of Bourguibism to translate into employment of the educated youth 
cost the Tunisian regime dearly in terms of its own legitimacy. It is 
against this background that we note the development of Islamic revi­
val.”18
Susan Waltz notes also that of the three theses (political, econom­
ic and cultural) which may be seen to explain the emergence of the Tu­
nisian Islamic Movement, “the economic one appears to be enjoying 
the greatest popularity.”19 She also refers to the contention that the cur­
rent Islamist movement, “is the most recent segment of an ongoing 
conflict between nationalist interests and the bazaar sector, who in pro­
tection of their traditional way of life seek to eliminate the new indus­
trial ethics emphasising consumerism, women's emancipation, and 
promotion of culture and leisure.”20
The Tunisian academic Dr. ‘Abd al-Majid al-Sharfi has defended 
the same theory, albeit in different terms. He argues that the new Is­
lamic movements recruited young people marginalised by the un­
accomplished modernisation process, and that those who have re­
sponded to the Islamists’ message are the unemployed youth and those 
who migrated from their villages to the big cities, only to see their fi­
nancial hopes dashed by failing economic policies. Proposing a solu­
tion to the “Islamist threat”, al-Sharfi points clearly to an economic so­
lution: “In the end we must be aware that neither speeches nor strong
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rational arguments will solve the problem of activist Islam. The solu­
tion depends on the continuous breaking with an unjust international 
economic order.”21
Religious and cultural factors
Whatever merits the economic and political explanation behind the 
emergence of al-Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya may have, Islamist leaders insist 
that their action was in fact a religious and cultural response to anti- 
religious and pro-Western policies. By way of explanation, Ghannou- 
chi has illustrated Bourguiba’s “attitude” towards Islam:
In 1957, once in power, he prohibited the use of the 
hijab and once uncovered a woman and tore her veil in 
public. Later, in 1981, a law was passed forbidding 
women employed in government offices or those enter­
ing universities and colleges to wear the hijab. In 1957, 
he forbade polygamy.22 These civil laws are still in 
force. In I960, Bourguiba prohibited fasting in 
Ramadan, alleging that it was harmful to the country’s 
economy . . .  In 1974 he stated that the Qur’an was self­
contradictory and ridiculed the miracles of the Prophet 
Moses . . .
In Ghannouchi’s opinion, Bourguiba is little more than an “enemy” of 
Islam, but it is also interesting to see how other, more impartial re­
searchers view him, and to examine how Bourguiba himself assesses 
his approach to Islam.
One observation which reflects the judgement of many Western 
and Arab writers about Bourguiba is that of Douglas K. Magnuson, a 
teacher at the Bourguiba Institute of Modem Languages in Tunis. He 
remarks:
In the years after independence, Bourguiba embarked on 
a series of bold initiatives of religious reform affecting 
law, family life, education, and personal religious prac­
tice.
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His disassembling of the infrastructure of institutional 
Islam in Tunisia was so complete that social observers 
in the 1960s questioned whether Tunisia might have en­
tered a post-Islamic or de-Islamicized age. 2
The “bold initiatives” to which Magnuson refers are many. On March 
2, 1956, Bourguiba abolished the traditional ‘habits’ or waqf sector, 
which was founded on charity donations to mosques and religious 
schools, and which helped to maintain a level of financial indepen­
dence for many Islamic scholars and institutions. The state confiscated 
all habits properties and made it illegal for anyone to offer new habits.
On August 3 in that same year, Islamic courts (<al-majalis al- 
sharHyya), which used to preside over family law cases, were abol­
ished to the benefit of new liberal laws that outlawed polygamy, 
among other things. This was backed by Bourguiba’s campaign 
against the hijab, which he described as a "sinister shroud that hides 
the face", even outlawing the veil in the classroom and going so far as 
to describe it as “an odious rag”.25
In the first two years of independence Bourguiba closed the Zei- 
touna University, which had hitherto been a historical centre of Islam­
ic learning, established in the second century of Islam and built before 
the famous al-Azhar mosque-university in Cairo and al-Qarawiyyln in 
Fez. For Bourguiba, Zeitouna University was not at all needed for the 
building of the new state; on the contrary, it was seen as a dangerous 
obstacle both ideologically and politically.
On February 5, 1960, as Ghannouchi has remarked, Bourguiba 
appealed to the Tunisian people to stop observing the fast during the 
month of Ramadan because he claimed that it affected their capacity to 
work. Four years later he was seen on television drinking orange juice 
on the first day of Ramadan, encouraging people to break their fast for 
the sake of increased economic production. He told his people this was
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not contradictory to Islam, but that he was simply taking a “progres­
sive” approach, which sacrificed fasting for the sake of a more impor­
tant form of jihad , which was to develop the country’s economy and 
prosperity.26
In order to replace Zeitouna University, Bourguiba set up a mod­
em system of education similar to that of the French, and appointed an 
official Mufti who had no real power whatsoever to criticise any offi­
cial policies. However, according to the new constitution adopted in 
1959, Islam was declared the official state religion and it was decreed 
that the president must be a Muslim.
It may be argued, however, that Bourguiba’s real values came 
largely from sources other than Islam: “a child of the Enlightenment, 
educated in law and political science at the Sorbonne, Bourguiba took 
his political inspiration from Rousseau, Lamartine and Hugo. His goal 
was the recreation of Tunisia as a modem state according to the princi­
ples of the French Revolution.”27
These were some of the facts which, as previously mentioned, led 
many people to question whether Tunisia may have entered a post- 
Islamic or de-Islamicised age. According to Habib Boulares, former 
Minister of Culture and Information, Bourguiba wanted a modem 
country above all, “which implies engaging the country in the course 
of development, industrialisation and the widening of education”, 
while adding that Bourguiba never hesitated to “follow the path of the 
West”.28 Boulares confirms also that Bourguiba envisaged the Tuni­
sian state as “one freed of all shackles. This supposes the breaking of 
ties with old-fashioned habits, archaic traditions and structures of the 
p a s t. . .  and even certain forms of worship”. 29
Boulares argues that all this does not mean that Bourguiba was an
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“enem y” o f  Islam:
Bourguiba learned the lessons of the experiment led by 
Kemal Attatiirk thirty years earlier. He never fought 
against Islam itse lf. . . Without claiming the title “Com­
mander of the Faithful”, Bourguiba insisted that the 
president of an Islamic state should be both a temporal 
and spiritual leader, by presiding personally over the 
ceremonies of the 27th night of Ramadan ana the birth­
day of the Prophet . . .  He was always careful to justify 
each of his positions with a verse from the Qur’an, a 
saying from the Prophet’s sunna or by an opinion from 
one of the past scholars and authorities. 30
This is the same argument presented by the Tunisian writer Moh- 
sen Toumi, in an attempt to deny the notion that Bourguiba was an en­
emy of Islam, laying stress on the fact that Tunisia is a Muslim coun­
try and that its president must be a Muslim. “We have a habit of 
speaking about secularism when analysing the measures taken by 
Bourguiba after independence,” he argues. “It is a misinterpretation . .
. because we ended up with the opposite result; the president became a 
kind of first imam playing the role of the country’s spiritual leader."31
This final analysis of Bourguiba’s attitude towards Islam comes 
from the perspective of those liberal and mainly leftist Tunisian writ­
ers who support Bourguiba’s approach, and who feel it necessary to 
defend his achievements in the face of a new, radical wave of Islam- 
ism with which they can find almost no common ground. A more ex­
plicit testimony indicative of this trend is that of Hamma al- 
Hammami, leader of the extreme-left Tunisian Communist Workers’ 
Party, who argues that Islam was in fact one of the pillars of the re­
gime's ideology. He asserts that most of the social laws adopted by 
Bourguiba derive from sharVa laws, and that it was the government it­
self that paid for all religious activities in the country, because this 
served its own interests of defending the upper classes and exploiting
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the working classes.32
The Tunisian left were well aware that portraying Bourguiba as a 
religious leader would be useful in opposing the Islamists’ call for a 
more religious political and social order in the country. Aside from the 
outright condemnation of critics such as Ghannouchi, and the sympa­
thetic tendencies of liberals and secularists, Bourguiba’s attitude to Is­
lam is slightly more complex and difficult to define. He was not a 
communist preaching against materialism, nor was he a disciple of Is­
lamic reformers such as Jamal al-DIn al-Afghani or Muhammad ‘Ab- 
duh. In fact the model he tried to implement in Tunisia was Western 
— a la frangaise — and he believed he could achieve this without 
breaking totally with Islam.
Naturally, his project could not follow the course of traditional or 
historical Islam, so he aimed to define a form of Islam that would be 
compatible with the needs of modem realities, and which could be 
achieved through ijtihad. Bourguiba supported this concept by assert­
ing that Islam in fact “liberated the mind and recommended the re­
thinking of laws in order to adapt them to human evolution.”33
Paul Balta notes that Bourguiba devoted many of his speeches to 
the necessity of reviving ijtihad. It is recorded that Bouguiba once 
said: “Islam has neither the Church nor monastic orders. Religious de­
cisions are taken democratically by the community aided by scholars. 
Politicians have an imperative to bring about religious evolution suita­
ble to the modem world . . .”34
Ijtihad, an Islamic legal term, means “exerting oneself to form an 
opinion (iann) in a case (qadiyya) or as to a rule Qiukm) of law. This is 
done by applying analogy (qiyas) to the Qur’an and the sunna”.34 By 
the same token, the mujtahid is “one who by his own exertions forms
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his own opinion, being thus exactly opposed to the muqallid, ‘imita­
tor’ . . .” 35
This definition in itself implies that any mujtahid is both an ex­
pert in Islamic rules and laws and a practising worshipper. Bourguiba 
may not have possessed these qualities, but insisted that he was eligi­
ble to make his own ijtihad as the Muslim leader of a Muslim country. 
Even in the case of his bold actions regarding fasting, one of the five 
pillars of Islam, he was adamant to rationalise this in terms of Islamic 
reference. In a speech given in Tunis on February 18, 1960 he argued 
that, similar to the cases of sickness or jihad, which constitute legal 
reasons for a Muslim to break his or her fast, the fight against under­
development and the struggle for economic prosperity is indeed also a 
form of jihad  and thus should give grounds for legal abstention. He 
then went on to say: “In my capacity as head of a Muslim state, I too 
can speak in the name of Islam. The whole world knows what I did for 
Islam, at a time when some now-prudent professors showed [little 
more than] complacency towards the colonial regime.”36
This was the kind of rhetoric Bourguiba used in order to promote 
his ideas, although they appear to be clearly contradictory to estab­
lished Islamic notions, going so far as to present himself as a defender 
of Islam when his dispute with the Islamists became more dangerous 
and serious. For Ghannouchi and his friends, however, who began to 
form their Islamic movement in 1970, there was no acceptable excuse 
for the actions of the national leader. They were confident, Ghannou­
chi claims, that Bourguiba had been “active in fighting Islam and im­
posing on Tunisia all the values and ways of life of materialistic West­
ern society.”37
It was thus both a religious and cultural challenge which brought
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Ghannouchi and his friends together, or at least this was the funda­
mental motivation behind their actions. Hermassi acknowledges this 
factor when he says:
As far as the emergence of the [Islamic] movement is 
concerned, there is a very obvious reason that is rarely 
taken into account or given the interest it deserves. It is 
the fact that, of all the Arab countries, Tunisia was 
unique in the public manner in which its modernist 
elites attacked institutional Islam and dismantled its ba­
sic institutions in the name of systematic social and cul­
tural reform — the result was to dismantle the whole old 
cultural order. Besides that, this project was based on 
the resolution of the political leadership and was helped 
by the majority of the new graduates, and was accompa­
nied by a very negative and contemptuous position to­
wards traditional Islam. Was it for this reason and others 
that a few people gathered in 1970 around a magazine 
called al-Ma‘nfa  to exchange views about their aliena­
tion and that of their religion? Yes, there is no doubt 
about this matter. 38
The movement’s first founders
Among those who began to meet in 1970 to discuss their alienation 
and their religion were a number of young graduates from Arab or Tu­
nisian universities, who shared the role of founding what is now the 
Tunisian Islamic movement. Among them were the three leading per­
sonalities who shaped the movements’ form and ideology, being, in 
order of importance, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, Abdelfattah Mourou and 
Ehmida Enneifar.
Ghannouchi was bom in 1941 to a poor family of ten children in 
al-Hamama, thirty kilometres west of Gabes, one of the main cities in 
south-east Tunisia. He says of his education:
I completed my secondary education in the old Zeitouna 
madrasa, before it was closed down by the Tunisian 
government. I am of the generation of Zeitouna students 
during the early years o f  independence. I remember we 
used to feel like strangers in our own country. We had 
been educated as Muslims and as Arabs, while we could
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see the country being totally moulded in the French cul­
tural identity. For us, the doors to any further education 
were closed since the university had been completely 
Westernised. At that time, those wanting to continue 
their studies in Arabic had to go to the Middle East. I 
was one of those who decided to complete their studies 
in the Middle East. I registered at the faculty of philoso­
phy and letters in Damascus specialising in philosophy, 
ana graduated four years later. 39
As a young student, Ghannouchi was influenced by Arab nationalist 
ideas:
When I began my university studies in 1964, the trend 
in the country was Arab nationalism, so I adhered to that 
for a period of time. Its content was scientific socialism, 
very close to Marxism. Consequently, during my first 
years of university I was a secularist. In my inner self, 
however, I did not cease to be a believer. I used to fast 
during the month of Ramadan but did not fulfil the 
prayers and other requirements of religion. I had always 
understood being an Arab and being a Muslim as insep­
arable realities, such as it is understood among our peo­
ple in North Africa. In the Middle East, however, tnere 
are Christian Arabs and others belonging to various non- 
Islamic sects. There the concept of Arabism is very of­
ten in opposition to Islam. 40
However his affiliation to Arab nationalism did not last for long. 
He explains:
When I came in touch with the other activists in the uni­
versity who did not share the ideas of nationalism — the 
Islamists — I began a dialogue with them which pro­
gressively weakened the hold of Arab nationalism on 
my mind. After some time I realised that Arab national­
ism was in opposition to Islam, while Arab sentiments 
and identity (in which I had been educated) and Islam 
were one and the same thing. At that time, I was a mem­
ber of the Nasserite Nationalist party of Syria, but once I 
learned its true meaning I chose to abandon it and adopt­
ed Islam in its totality. Progressively, I felt more and 
more inclined to fight all those secular tendencies in 
each of their manifestations. 41
Ghannouchi’s statement shows clearly how the movement of ide­
as was taking effect on the sixties generation in the Arab world. Arab 
nationalism was the ideology of the time, Marxism was its social theo­
ry, while on the opposite side stood the Islamists, who were de­
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nounced by Nasser as reactionaries and enemies of his revolution. 
Meanwhile, inspired by the experience and ideas of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, Ghannouchi moved from the nationalist to the Islamist 
camp.
From exile in London in 1992, Ghannouchi spoke about what 
happened after his conversion to the ideas of the Islamists:
In June 1966, I finally renounced the Arab nationalist 
and secularist theories, and adopted comprehensive Is­
lam. In 1968 I moved to Paris after getting my BA in 
Damascus, and there my relationship with Ehmida En- 
neifer became closer. I had already known him in Syria 
because he was a Nasserite Arab nationalist, but there 
had been few chances for us to meet and discuss politi­
cal and ideological matters. In Paris, together with a few 
other friends, Enneifer and I found time to discuss a 
great number of issues. It was there that he distanced 
himself from Nasserism and became closer to Islam-
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Ghannouchi had gone to Paris to study for a higher degree in phi­
losophy, but was obliged to go back home only one year later due to 
family circumstances. During his time in Paris, he had made contact 
with an Islamic group called Jama ‘at al-Tabligh, and had become in­
fluenced by their methods. Once home, he embarked upon a career as 
a secondary school teacher of philosophy. He explains:
I was fully converted to the views of the contemporary 
Islamic movement when I returned to my country. I set­
tled in the capital and soon met Abdelfattah Mourou 
who used to attend the lessons of Sheikh Ahmed Ben 
Milad, a Zeitouna scholar. He was then still a student in 
Tunis, as was another in the first group we formed: Sa­
leh Ben Abdallah. Fadhel Baldi also joined us; he was 
one of the students in the secondary school. Mourou was 
at that time strongly influenced by Sufi madaniyya law, 
but he quickly became more inclined to the activist as­
pect of modem Islamism. I kept in contact with Enneifar 
in Paris and exchanged letters with him. In one, he in­
formed me that he had adopted Islamic views fully and 
pledged to join us when he came back. He returned in 
1970 and became an influential member of the founding 
group. 43
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According to Ghannouchi, Mourou and Enneifer possess differ­
ent qualities:
Mourou and Enneifer were the two most active mem­
bers. Mourou has some unique interpretations of the 
Holy Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet (peace be 
upon him), especially in matters of spiritual education.
As an ex-Sufi he emphasised this dimension in the first 
generation of our movement, and received a very posi­
tive response. I myself learned a lot from him.
Enneifer represented the modem intellectual who 
used to read the French newspapers because of his 
fluent French. He has an intellectual ability to analyse 
various issues and was aware of what was taking place 
in the political arena. He was not a good orator, but he 
did have an organised way of thinking and arguing and 
an ability to organise his work, which had a considera­
ble effect on our movement. 44
Mourou had been a student in the faculty of law from which he 
graduated as a judge before starting his own business as a lawyer. En­
neifer returned to Tunis to become a teacher of Arabic language and 
literature in secondary schools. Both men came from the capital, Mou­
rou from a modest family in the old quarter of Bab Souikha, and En­
neifer from a well-known religious and old aristocratic family. Togeth­
er with their friend Ghannouchi they began to develop the organisation 
of the new Islamic movement.
Embarking on a religious mission
In an interview with Arabia magazine, Ghannouchi talks of how the 
movement’s work truly started in the 1970s, when a small group of 
young men formed in the capital. He says that at that time “it was dif­
ficult to find a young man praying, especially if he was from the so- 
called educated people. As for girls, it was almost impossible to see 
any dressed as a Muslim”.45
He explains that the group had two levels of activity, promoting
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conferences and gatherings in secondary schools, and organising les­
sons on Islam in the mosques. Sometimes they would go out onto the 
streets to call people to Islam, in the manner of Jama'at al-Tabligh*6 
This group, originally founded in India in 1927 by Muhammad Ilyas 
ibn Muhammad Isma‘il Qandahlawl (1884-1943), served as an inspira­
tion for the fledgling Tunisian Islamic movement. Qandahlawl had 
feared that the minority Muslim community in India might lose its re­
ligious identity within the larger Indian society, and had founded his 
group in order to revive Islamic beliefs among Muslims and to encour­
age them to observe Islamic teachings, to concentrate on acquiring Is­
lamic knowledge and to worship Allah. The group did not favour in­
volvement in politics, believing that if individuals observe Islamic 
teachings this would inevitably lead to an Islamic society.
As for its methods, Jama*at al-Tabligh insisted that its members 
must travel out of their provinces and even their countries to practise 
missionary activities, which they called al-khuruj. On arriving at a city 
or a village, they would invite people from their homes, from the 
streets and cafes to the mosque, where their senior leader would give a 
lecture on Islamic teachings. From India, the Jama*a message spread 
to almost all the Islamic world and to Islamic communities in the 
West.
There were few indications at that time that Ghannouchi and his 
friends would have a realistic chance of success with their missionary 
activity, or da ‘wa, but to even their own astonishment, the movement 
began to attract more and more young members. They decided to join 
the official Association for the Safeguard of the Holy Qur’an, initiated 
in 1970 by a group of traditional scholars who had succeeded in main­
taining a good relationship with the government, and which was recog­
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nised and supervised by the department of religious affairs. For the Is­
lamists, it was a good official cover for their early work,47 as they 
could use the association’s facilities to organise meetings and give lec­
tures on Islamic affairs. The government, however, soon expressed its 
dissatisfaction with these new, enthusiastic members and ordered them 
out of the association. They then concentrated further on giving lec­
tures in the various mosques around the country.
The movement at that time concerned itself mainly with strictly 
religious issues, and the political interest was still very vague. As En­
neifer argues, “We really did not know what we were aiming towards. 
We generally disagreed with the government, but we did not have a 
well-defined plan of action.”48
Calling people to observe the basic requirements of Islam, espe­
cially to attend the five daily prayers and to be proud of both their Is­
lamic history and identity, were the main objectives of the Islamic 
movement at that time, which is why the methods of Jama*at al- 
Tabligh were deemed to be so appropriate. From 1970 to 1973, mem­
bers of the movement travelled in groups to various villages around 
the country, “calling people from the streets, cafes and shops to listen 
to lessons on Islamic consciousness” and reminding them of their re­
ligious obligations.49
Magnuson has noted that it is also essentially the individual that 
the al-Tabligh message and methods target, and that, “their goal as a 
group is to create salih (righteous, virtuous, godly) individuals, as a 
means of arriving at a true Muslim society.”50 The influence of the al- 
Tabligh group and its founders on its Tunisian followers was pro­
found, even to the point of influencing how the Tunisian preachers 
dressed. In general, men’s dress in Tunisia is a combination of West-
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em and traditional styles, whereas da ‘wa men, by contrast, dressed in 
a manner that was modelled on the dress of Pakistanis and other East­
ern Muslims. In fact, Tunisians often mistook da ‘wa men for foreign­
ers.51
Such was the behaviour of the most committed followers of the 
methods of Jama‘at al-Tabligh. Others, such as Ghannouchi and his 
colleagues, employed these methods but were not totally satisfied with 
them. Although he had participated in the activities of the Jama ‘at al- 
Tabligh group in Paris, where he had led the prayers for some time be­
cause he was an active preacher,52 on his return from France Ghannou­
chi chose to immerse himself further in the literature of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
Originally there had only been a few members of al-Jama ‘at al- 
Tabligh in Tunisia, and it had agreed to join hands with al-Jama‘a al- 
Islamiyya because their main task in common was strictly religious. 
Ghannouchi, however, became increasingly preoccupied with the com­
prehensive view of Islam insisted upon by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Cooperation between the two groups lasted until 1973, when police in­
tervened to disperse a meeting of some ninety Islamists gathered in 
Sousse, preaching the da‘wa in the tablighi manner. Ghannouchi, 
Mourou and Enneifer were arrested and interrogated at the local police 
station, where they all insisted that they were du‘at (preachers); Mou­
rou even claimed that they belonged to a 1400 year-old party, referring 
to the Islamic religion itself.
Eventually the three were released and ordered to leave Sousse 
for their homes. In Ghannouchi’s view, this represented a turning- 
point:
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We realised that the methods of al-Tabligh may work in 
Pakistan or India, or even France where democratic tra­
ditions exist. But none of this was available in Tunisia.
We decided to stop using tablighi methods and to con­
centrate on the two main methods of da ‘wa: public lec­
tures or printed publications on the one hand, and organ­
ising a number of regular, small and secret meetings in 
our homes to increase our knowledge of Islam and its 
teachings on the other. 53
These meetings were to be the basic cells of the flourishing move­
ment, and were adapted from the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In fact, from 1973 onwards, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
would prove to be decisive on almost all levels.
By contrast, the influence of the al-Tabligh group faded almost 
completely. Besides the security risks that its methods posed to the Tu­
nisian Islamists, there was also the fact that the scope of its activities 
and its insistence on dealing with individuals failed to answer the wid­
er questions that were prevalent in the Islamists’ minds. The Islamic 
movement was opposed to the regime, even if it could not argue its 
case in detail, but the tablighi message could not adapt to embrace 
wider social and political issues. Those in the movement soon realised 
that they had to either stick by this method or adopt a new approach. 
They chose the latter.
It was during that same period (the early seventies) that Anwar 
Sadat of Egypt began to release the hundreds of Islamists imprisoned 
by his predecessor Nasser, which gave a new impetus to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s message and the propagation of its literature around the 
Arab world. Books by the Muslim Brotherhood were also made availa­
ble in Tunis, where the first international exposition of books was held 
in 1973.
“It was precisely this movement which was to influence us,” says 
Enneifer, “and which pushed us to be engaged more directly in politi­
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cal action as well as in setting up an underground organisation of sorts. 
We then started to form secret groups to provide it with an education, 
but always with a special spiritual dimension.”54 It was Enneifer who 
had the chance to meet some of the recently freed Muslim Brother­
hood leaders in Mecca during the Hajj season of 1973, bringing back 
to his friends their advice, encouragement and good wishes.
Another important step was taken forward by the movement at 
around the same time. In 1972, Ghannouchi and his friends contacted 
Shaykh Abdelkader Ben Slama from the old Zeitouna establishment, 
and asked for his permission to re-launch al-Ma‘rifa magazine, of 
which he had published only one issue in 1962, but of which he still 
had ownership. Shaykh Ben Slama accepted the offer, and the found­
ing group of Islamists began to put into action all their intelligence and 
creativity.
Their re-launch issue was swiftly confiscated by the authorities, 
because it criticised the abolition of the Islamic calendar from official 
publications and the use of the Western calendar to decide the start 
and end of Ramadan.55 However, through al-Ma ‘rifa the group was 
able to voice its concerns and to call people to the true and comprehen­
sive Islam in which they believed. The magazine’s subject matter was 
largely concerned with generalities, although Ghannouchi attempted 
some rather rudimentary analysis. He wrote in the tenth issue in 1973:
Our country suffers from a number of fundamental 
problems, without them being thoroughly examined and 
analysed, such as the problem of morals, the problem of 
self-confidence, the problems of sex, individualism and 
the lack of readiness to offer help and sacrifice for oth­
ers, cultural imitation, the problem of economic devel­
opment and its relationship with morality, etc. These 
problems result from our historical, political and educa­
tional circumstances and from the effect of international 
circumstances on our own situation. It is necessary that 
we have our own criteria by which our circumstances
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should be judged. [By this] I mean a special culture and 
a special analysis of the universe, the numan being and 
life. 56
Ghannouchi then went on to condemn the Western values of the Tuni­
sian education system and ended his article by describing an alterna­
tive culture, with, “Islam as its content and the Arab language as its 
framework.”57
Such was the ideology of the movement up to 1978 —  these were 
young Islamists brought together largely by, “general ideas, thoughts, 
and the trend of preaching about Islam,” as Ghannouchi has described 
it, reflecting back from his time in prison in 1982.58 This was sufficient 
for that period in the movement’s history, however; its members were 
busy spreading their message throughout the country, and as a result 
were receiving a positive response, as Salah al-Din al-Jourshi, another 
famous name from that era, explains:
In the beginning we intended to address all sections of 
society . . .  But our experience showed that those who 
reacted most positively to our ideas and recommenda­
tions were youths. This is why there was up to a seventy 
per cent majority of pupils and students in the move­
ment. The other result of our experience was the wide­
spread, positive response from the rural sectors. When­
ever a teacher invited his pupils to observe Islam and the 
da ‘wa line, he found that those coming from rural areas 
were the most responsive. They then adhered to the 
da ‘wa and carried out its message. 59
With the efforts and the dynamism of its predominantly youthful 
membership, the Islamist movement was almost guaranteed success, if 
only short-term. However, the potential for conflict and confrontations 
with its opponents was in evidence from the outset.
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2The Politicisation Process
The Tunisian Islamic movement's first real base was at the University 
of Tunis. As we have seen, young, enthusiastic students responded 
with zeal to the Islamists’ message, and congregated in the colleges 
and faculties of what was then the sole university in Tunisia, concen­
trating themselves mainly in and around the capital. It was there that 
what Ghannouchi has described as “the struggle between Islamists and 
Marxists”1 began.
Conflict on campus
Marxist elements had dominated the Tunisian student movement since 
the late sixties, but had been unable to gain control of the official Gen­
eral Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) due to governmental opposi­
tion. This led the UGET to split up at its eighteenth annual congress in 
1971, into pro-government and Marxist alignments. The Marxists then 
formed a new temporary committee to prepare for an extraordinary 
congress, a goal they failed to achieve throughout the ten years that 
they claimed to be the “sole representatives” of Tunisia’s students 
(1971-1981).
The university campus had hitherto been the stage on which the 
theoretical aspects of Marxism were played out, often in the most ex­
treme manner. Atheism was the mood of the era, French was the lan­
guage of public meetings and discussions, and it was very rare to find 
a student who observed the daily prayers or who fasted during
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Ramadan. It was what has been described as the era of “/# gauche 
laXque”.2
Initially, Islamist students concerned themselves mostly with 
opening small mosques in each faculty and dormitory, from which 
they organised their meetings and discussed how to Islamise the uni­
versity as a whole. The books of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
writer Sayyid Qutb, who was executed by Nasser in 1966, exercised a 
strong ideological influence on the young Tunisian Islamists at that 
time. The result, according to Ghannouchi, was a surge of
enthusiasm for Islam and disapproval of the current situ­
ation, traditional culture, the West and all that was 
around generally. What helped those ideas to be seen as 
absolute truths were the corrupt system and the medioc­
rity of Islamic knowledge in our society, and the scar­
city of graduates in the humanities compared to those 
with technological and scientific backgrounds. 3
Driven by the desire to carry the message of Islam to their col­
leagues, Islamist students attempted to participate in the public debates 
on campus, organised usually by the Marxists. The latter were unable 
to find a place in their ideology for a “feudal” theory which they 
thought had been buried long ago, indeed the Marxists clearly insisted, 
as one of their leaders wrote, that the Islamic trend was “ideologically 
an obscurantist movement” and “one of the most reactionary contem­
porary religious movements” at that time. It was argued that this was 
due to “its opposition to all scientific thought, and its understanding of 
the world built upon reactionary, metaphysical and idealistic con­
cepts”.4
Inevitably, peaceful cohabitation between the two movements 
was difficult to achieve, but there was, nonetheless, a positive result to 
this interaction, as Lamchichi explains: “Out of this ideological but
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very often physical and violent, confrontation between Islamists and 
leftist movements, Islamic movements were to learn methods of action 
specific to the secular left: political meetings, mural newspapers, clan­
destine magazines, debates, analysis and polemical politics.”5
The leftist groups combined their efforts on December 26 1977 to 
warn the then still small group of Islamists not to challenge their polit­
ical dominion. They attacked a general meeting that had been organ­
ised by the Islamists in the faculty of science, armed with knifes. The 
police did not intervene and a number of Islamists suffered grave inju­
ries. The last major attack which the Marxists succeeded in executing 
was on March 30, 1982, against the Islamists in the Faculty of Arts in 
Mannuba, in the suburbs of Tunis. Dozens of Islamists were injured, 
but they succeeded in capitalising on the incident by involving the me­
dia, which reported what had happened and published various con­
demnations of violence by different national parties and writers.
By resisting the violence of the Marxists, who still believed that 
revolutionary violence against “obscurantism” was the best way by 
which to maintain their tight grip on the student movement, the Isla­
mists were also “intellectually” affected. Here follows Ghannouchi's 
account of what took place:
The Islamist students’ movement fought ferocious bat­
tles against the Marxist forces, which had a complete 
system by which to analyse the present and the past and 
to plan for the future, against the backwardness of con­
temporary Islamic thought in these fields. This led the 
Islamists to absorb a great deal of the Marxists’ views in 
the midst of the fight against them. Those views were 
made easier to absorb by similarly revolutionary Iranian 
ideas, which presented vague concepts which could be 
filled by Marxist theories. All this led to confusion in 
the fields of thought and behaviour. Although these 
modem views enhanced the importance of political and 
social matters, they made Islam politically and socially 
militant, aiming all its arrows towards its opponents 
from other classes and parties, rather than preaching
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compassion and mercy towards people, including one’s 
opponents. 6
These disturbances were to prove very significant in the history 
of the Tunisian Islamic movement. Students were gradually expressing 
more interest in political, rather than merely religious, issues. At the 
same time, their politics were becoming more and more radical in their 
opposition to the regime, as they attempted to match the radicalism of 
the leftists. Representing a majority in the movement’s membership, 
the students in fact forced the leadership to increase its interest in poli­
tics, and, to a certain extent, allow them to share the responsibility of 
directing the movement. Here is Enneifer’s testimony about the situa­
tion in the movement both before and after the emergence of the stu­
dent contingent:
[Before] our ideological project was unclear; we used to 
speak about the first centuries of Islam, but that was all 
only very general . . . [Things] started to become more 
precise when the first pupils from secondary schools 
passed into the university. This entered them into con­
tact with people who were different to those of the 
groups of the left and the extreme left. The university 
thus played a central role. Since 1977 we can even say 
that there was a reversal of roles: the university became 
the locomotive of the movement. 7
What should be mentioned here is that there was one important 
factor which served to assist the Islamist students. Within their facul­
ties they were free to function as a political movement, therefore they 
were able to openly oppose the regime and publish official statements 
signed in the name of al-ittijah al-islami, commenting on domestic 
and international issues. They were even able to mock the president, 
and to call for a revolution to bring his regime down.8 Because the 
government had in fact lost all hope of regaining direct control over 
student politics inside the university, the only opposition to the Isla­
mists therefore came from the left, which in fact helped the Islamists
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to win more sympathy from the student body.
Enjoying their freedom, the Islamist students became increasing­
ly politicised, and began to demand that the entire movement move in 
that direction. As Hermassi explains, they were keen to address what 
they saw as the “general crisis” in Tunisian society, being a state-wide 
crisis affecting the political, economic and cultural sectors. For these 
young people, facing moral and spiritual laxity and bleak future pros­
pects, their condemnation extended not only to the state but even to so­
ciety, which they condemned as a jahili society.9
Instead of the predominantly religious and cultural issues that 
Ghannouchi, Mourou, Enneifer and their colleagues discussed in their 
lectures or articles in al-Ma ‘rifa, the Islamist students were more con­
cerned with expressing their outright rejection of the regime and prop­
agating anti-imperialist literature, espousing a social view supporting 
labour forces against capitalists, and freedom fighters around the 
world. For every position taken by the Marxists, the Islamists insisted 
on proposing an alternative. In this context the students may be seen to 
have played a significant role in politicising al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, 
and compelling its leadership to become much more involved in the 
political affairs of the country.
The government’s role in the emergence of the movement
As a result of these various factors — the influence of al-Tabligh 
movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, and the struggle against the 
Marxists at the university — the Tunisian Islamic movement gradually 
took shape. For some historians and analysts, however, the emergence 
of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya was not such a straightforward develop­
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ment, arising simply in response to economic failures and extreme sec­
ularism. Rather, they suggest that the Islamic movement was support­
ed and encouraged, if not invented, by Bourguiba’s regime itself, as a 
means by which to oppose the rising leftist groups in the seventies. 
Here is Mohsen Toumi's version of events:
It was in its capacity as a religious authority that the Tu­
nisian government, from 19/0 [onwards], began to en­
courage Islamist demonstrations. It assigned to Islamists 
a prime target, the University of Tunis, to counter the 
leftist students there, whether they were leftists from the 
ruling Destour party or communists from the extreme 
left. It required tnem also to confront the left in all social 
fields, and gave them the means [by which to do so].
From the beginning of the decade, the first associations 
for the preservation of the Qur’an appeared. In 1971 the 
first Islamic circles appeared in Tunis’s mosques. In 
1972, al-Ma‘rifa magazine went on the market in a new, 
well-printed format. Clashes in the faculties multiplied. 
Gradually the Islamists’ demonstrations spread from the 
university . . .  to the entire Tunisian society. 10
This version reduces the entire history of the Tunisian Islamist 
Movement to little more than a simple plot by the regime, by which to 
counter the leftist groups. What is more, this theory was a cornerstone 
of Marxist propaganda both in and outside the university, in an at­
tempt to discredit the Islamists and refute their claims of being oppo­
nents of the government. The leader of the communist labour party, 
Hamma al-Hammami, spoke of an alliance:
The Islamists’ hostility towards leftist groups . . . was 
the basis of an alliance with the government to fight the 
influence of those groups, especially among the youth, 
and to absorb social discontent and redirect it in a differ­
ent direction, and in doing so to avoid making radical 
changes to the status quo. On this platform, the govern­
ment arranged numerous facilities for the Islamists: 
mosques were open to their activists from which to give 
lectures from their highest podiums, while the press be­
longing to the ruling party helped them to puolish al- 
Ma ‘rija and al-Mujtama ‘ magazines, which specialised 
in fighting progressive thought and publicising obscu­
rantist views. 1
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There is a sharp contrast between this view and that of Hermassi, 
who, as we saw in chapter one, stressed that “the Islamist movement 
thrived on the ideological looseness of the post-independence state”, 
adding that it “has had the capacity to attract many more of those left 
behind by economic growth, or to talk like Max Weber, of the prole­
tarian intelligentsia who despair of the nationalist and socialist dis­
course”.12
Here Hermassi analyses the Islamist phenomenon from the per­
spective of a sociologist, whereas Toumi and al-Hammami have both 
attempted to address the issue from a political, rather than a historical, 
point of view. What is more, they have attempted to offer a feasible 
explanation to the question that has haunted many young Marxists in 
Tunisia and elsewhere in the Arab world: how could Islamism become 
the strongest ideological and political force of opposition to the regime 
in place of the Marxist forces? After all, according to Marxist rhetoric, 
Islamists are “allies of the exploiting classes and enemies of history's 
progress.”13
The Islamists, of course, refute these accusations concerning their 
“cooperation” with the government.14 Facts mentioned earlier, such as 
their dismissal from the Association for the Preservation of the Holy 
Qur’an in as early as 1971, and their problems in Sousse with the po­
lice in 1973, indicate that there was no such cooperation. Rather, it 
may be safe to assume that the authorities did not initially realise the 
potential threat of these young Islamic activists. The reasons for this 
are twofold: in the late sixties the policies of Bourguiban modernism 
were seen by many as highly oppositional to traditional and contempo­
rary Islam, thus precluding any chance of an imminent surge of Islam­
ism. And then there is another factor — a rule common to the politics
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of the Arab world in general — being that the first priority for every 
regime is to stay in power. In order to achieve this, it will resort to all 
sorts of repression against any opposition movement that threatens to 
take power and change the political system. However, if a movement 
of opposition is seen to be weak and incapable of threatening the stat­
us quo it will not necessarily be repressed.
In the seventies, when the Islamists formed their first circles, all 
indicators suggested that Islamism as a social and political factor 
could not re-emerge to play an important role on the political scene. 
Therefore the government did not feel threatened by Ghannouchi and 
his colleagues, thus giving the Islamic movement the chance to grow 
and improve its methods of work in relative peace and security. Indeed 
the only serious enemy recognised by the government in the seventies 
was the leftist movement, whether in the university, or in the trade un­
ions, or even within certain circles of the ruling party itself, especially 
those who were still sympathisers of Ben Salah’s socialist vision. Thus 
the security forces concerned themselves largely with addressing the 
Marxist threat, and to that end they arrested hundreds of leftist mili­
tants and sent them to prison, or into the desert for military training.
When the political climate changed dramatically in the late sev­
enties and at the beginning of the eighties, the government’s security 
rules were obliged to change: the Islamists became “the enemy” and 
measures against the Marxists were accordingly relaxed. When Ghan­
nouchi, along with the entire Islamist leadership, were sentenced to 
long terms of imprisonment in July 1981, Bourguiba gave an audience 
to Mohamed Harmal, the leader of the Tunisian communist party, and 
gave him authorisation to work as a legal party.
Beside the fact that the government first underestimated the po­
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tential political threat of the Islamists, and that its security forces were 
busy pursuing the leftists, there is a final point worth mentioning here, 
being that the emergence of Islamic political movements and the dis­
course of political Islam in Tunisia was not an isolated case. Indeed 
during the seventies it was a prevalent phenomenon in the entire Is­
lamic world, notably after the release of the Muslim Brotherhood lead­
ers in Egypt.
The impact of the liberal experiment
The real turning point towards politicisation came in 1978, again in re­
sponse to the negative effects of economic and social failures. The pol­
icies of Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, which had initially seemed as 
though they would be capable of rectifying the problems created by 
Ben Salah’s programme, still failed to satisfy the needs of large sec­
tions of Tunisian society. This time, their anger could not be re­
pressed.
Nouira (1911-1993) had been an active member of the Destour 
party both during the struggle for independence and after it. Like 
Bourguiba, he was bom in the coastal city of Monastir, and also 
graduated as a lawyer from Paris. He returned to Tunisia in 1937 to 
take on an active militant role in Bourguiba’s party and in the trade un­
ions. In the first government formed after independence he was ap­
pointed as finance minister; he also became the first governor of the 
Central Tunisian Bank in 1958. During the ’sixties he had been some­
what unenthusiastic about Ben Salah’s socialist departure, but he suc­
ceeded in keeping a low-profile post in the government because of his 
close relationship with Bourguiba. Thus, when Ben Salah failed, he 
was soon to emerge as the saviour, and was able to implement the so­
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lution he so strongly supported: a market economy.15 Nouira argued 
that it was mainly for the private sector, Tunisian or foreign, to stimu­
late the economy, and not for the state alone.
Various incentives for investors (especially regarding the pay­
ment of taxes) were approved in two decrees passed in April 1972 and 
August 1974.16 But this period of economic revival turned out to be 
short lived; the private sector invested mainly in the textile and con­
struction industries, and was unable to fulfil the rising demand for 
jobs. Wealth continued to be concentrated in the hands of a minority, 
and poverty again increased.
In 1975, an official report showed that while 7.6 per cent of the 
population spent more than TD400 per person per year, 32.5 per cent 
spent less than TD80. Also, foreign debts rose by 50 per cent between 
1972 and 1976, from TD392 million to TD588 million.17 Salaries were 
effectively frozen for the large number of civil servants in education 
and public administration.
Employees affected by the new hardships soon resorted to strikes, 
as a means by which to vent their anger. The government found itself 
unable to tolerate these manifestations of popular protest and the situa­
tion deteriorated badly, to the point that the executive committee of 
the Tunisian General Workers’ Union decided to call a general strike 
throughout the entire country on January 26, 1978. This day was to lat­
er go down in Tunisian history as the “26th of January Uprising”, or 
“Black Thursday”.
The economic plan of Hedi Nouira had alienated wide sections of 
the middle class who, according to Hermassi, had traditionally been 
long-time supporters of the regime. Thus the government lost a large 
part of their support base, and a mood of low confidence prevailed in
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the economic sector, which had been overrun by opportunists. This 
mood soon spread to the education sector; education as a value and 
teachers lost respect, and “relations became based on gain and inter­
est”.18
Young graduates also began to articulate their dissatisfaction, again 
weakening government support, and on the morning of “Black Thurs­
day” pupils from secondary schools and university students joined the 
workers in their general strike. En masse they took to the streets, while 
the army was called in in an attempt to restore order. The result of the 
confrontation was graver than anyone had anticipated: according to of­
ficial statements fifty-one protesters died and some four hundred were 
injured, whereas Toumi has estimated figures of around two hundred 
dead and at least one thousand injured.19
The consequences of the general strike were such that it was al­
most impossible for anyone in Tunisia to be indifferent towards or un­
affected by the turn of events. Speaking about the reactions of the Isla­
mists, Ghannouchi writes:
We remained on the sidelines of these violent events 
and did not take part in any of them. We had no unionist 
activity because we were somehow prejudiced [in think­
ing] that unionism was alien to us. Social confrontation 
between rich and poor is a Marxist formula which did 
not correspond to our understanding of life. Later, we 
realised that Islam also has a say in that confrontation 
and that as Muslims we could not stay indifferent to it.
Islam gives support to the oppressed. From that point 
we began to develop a consciousness and sensibility to­
wards social realities. The Islamists started to participate 
in the trade union movement’s activities and nowadays 
represent a very powerful force in this field. 20
As is admitted here by the movement’s leader, and as will be­
come clear through a charting of its recent history, al-Jama(a al- 
Islamiyya was to a large extent the fruit of its founders’ experiments,
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trials and errors. As none of its founders had formulated a clear social 
or political Islamic theory, and none could be truly described as relig­
ious scholars, their course of action was to rely largely on their ener­
gies and their reactions to events around them — in the university, in 
society, or in the greater Islamic world as a whole. Thus the events of 
the January Uprising served as a catalyst, and compelled the Islamist 
movement to publish its first political statement. According to Enneif- 
er, “it was an unsigned statement, drafted by Ghannouchi and re­
viewed by us together. It was entitled ‘Before the Fall of the Iron Cur­
tain’, meaning that at that moment we were primarily concerned that 
the country might fall into leftist hands. We thought Islam in Tunisia 
was in danger and that the left was going to seize power”.21
The statement supported what it called “the legitimate demands” 
of the workers, but also condemned the violence of the demonstrators 
and warned against being “dragged into a civil war in Tunisia”.22 This 
statement marks the starting point for more political involvement on 
the part of the Islamic movement. Because it was under the influence 
of those Islamist students trying to match the revolutionary stand of 
their Marxist opponents, the movement’s position towards the regime 
became increasingly radicalised. It shifted from taking a purely relig­
ious stand which condemned the government only for its “anti- 
Islamic” policies, to what Ghannouchi has described as “a comprehen­
sive theological, political and social view which condemned the re­
gime's dictatorship, alliance with foreign powers, Westernisation and 
exploitation”.23
Very soon after the events of 26 January 1978, the movement be­
gan to infiltrate the trade unions and to establish a solid base there. It 
also began to raise the issues of social justice, the rights of workers,
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and an Islamic theory of development. In 1980 the movement recog­
nised the May 1 International Labour Day activities for the first time, 
and arranged for a special celebration, organising a large meeting in 
one of Tunis’s mosques to discuss social theory in Islam. After 1978, 
Islamist students were not alone in their competing with the Marxist 
groups; Islamist trade unionists were obliged to do the same within the 
trade unions, and the movement’s leadership was forced to adjust its 
message to meet the new needs of the moment.
The Islamists realised by this point that their movement must, as 
Hermassi notes, “wisely reconsider its direction. Time was no longer 
for unrealistic thoughts about the absolute state and pure Islamic jus­
tice, but for building direct relationships with the real people and their 
problems and interests as defined by the people themselves”, and 
argues that their involvement with the trade unions in the late seven­
ties woke the Islamists up from their “dogmatic sleep”.24
These were the new challenges that Ghannouchi and his col­
leagues were faced with after the crisis of 1978. Accordingly, they 
were obliged to widen their frame of reference in order to seek the an­
swers with which to meet these new challenges. They were further in­
spired when just one year later they witnessed what had formerly 
seemed unthinkable — the Islamic revolution in Iran and the ascen­
dance of an Islamic state.
The Iranian factor
When Ayatollah Khomeini’s plane finally landed in Tehran on Febru­
ary 1, 1979, ending fifteen years of exile in Turkey, Iraq and France, 
the joy and excitement among the Islamists was unanimous. Many of
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them had already given up hope that Iran would continue to be an Is­
lamic country, even when compared with the model of secularised 
Turkey. However, the political opposition that had built up in Iran dur­
ing 1977 and 1978 came to a sudden and unexpected conclusion in the 
February of the following year: the Shah had fled the country, to be 
joined very soon by his Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar, and the pop­
ular revolution had won the struggle, under the leadership of a scholar 
who had worked patiently for his aim to build an Iranian Islamic state.
For the majority of Islamists throughout the Arab world, the Is­
lamic victory in Iran was “a dream-come-true”, a long-aspired to and 
distant goal that had suddenly become a reality. It led them to believe 
—  in the words of one of their opponents — that they were “close to 
victory”, because they were “the soldiers of God, and God says, ‘And 
that our forces they surely must conquer’”.25
In Tunisia, the Islamists’ support for the Iranian revolution was 
genuine and overwhelming. In al-Ma‘rifa magazine, issued that year 
on 12 February, Ghannouchi urged Islamic movements in the Arab 
world to offer their unequivocal support for the revolution: “We want 
a strong, clear, frank and solid stand from the militants of Islam every­
where and the supporters of freedom and justice with their brothers in 
religion, the fighters for freedom and justice in Iran . . . those who 
have raised the flag of Islam high over the entire world.”26
In August 1978, the movement had begun to publish a weekly 
newspaper under the title Al-Mujtama ‘, and through this organ the Tu­
nisian Islamists expressed their enthusiasm and support for the Iranian 
revolution. On campus, the Islamist students finally found themselves 
defending an Islamic, anti-American revolution, after having been la­
belled for so long by the Marxists as reactionary, pro-American ele­
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ments.
Khomeini was seen by the Islamists as the leader of this on­
slaught against the United States, defending the oppressed (al- 
mustad'afuri), standing against the capitalists (<al-mustakbirun), and in­
citing the masses to overthrow their corrupt ruling dictatorships. Thus 
he served as a role-model for the Islamist students in their fight against 
the Marxists, while his revolution supplied them with slogans and ter­
minology. As a result, the Islamic movement on campus organised 
huge celebrations in honour of the events, and Iranian slogans were 
immediately reproduced in its statements and newspapers.
Thus we may see that the Iranian revolution also played a very 
important role in politicising the Tunisian Islamic movement. Hermas­
si believes that it
. . . activated the overwhelming hopes of Islamists, and 
their ideas about taking power. The tendency towards 
totalitarian rule which had always existed in the contem-
Eorary Islamic trend had finally materialised. The utopia ecame not only acceptable and realistic, but possible 
too. 27
Inevitably, it was not long before optimistic young Tunisians began to 
ask themselves, if Khomeini had succeeded in Iran, then why could 
the same success not be repeated in Tunisia? As Boulby observes, 
“Ghannouchi glorified the revolution to his followers: ‘The example 
of Iran’, he told them, ‘shows us the awakening has come. Fight 
against licentiousness and make sacrifices! To correct others and make 
our own revolution we have to correct ourselves and worship God’”.28
In all, the most important impact of the Iranian revolution on the 
Tunisian Islamists is that it supplied them with greatly-needed, realis­
tic, political positivism. Pessimism, a readiness for sacrifice, jails and 
torture had been the vocabulary of their former mentors, the Egyptian
57
Muslim Brotherhood, as a result of their confrontations with Nasser. 
The Islamists in Iran, however, provided a model of success and politi­
cal power, which became a source of great motivation for the members 
of and supporters of al-Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya.
The numbers of its followers increased dramatically. The Isla­
mists began to represent the largest political group in many secondary 
schools and faculties. Those who graduated and went on to teach in 
primary or secondary schools were also very active in spreading the 
movement’s message, as were other organisations throughout the 
country. By the end of the seventies, their support base was wider than 
anyone had expected, which once again led the leadership to reconsid­
er the movement’s means and methods. As a result, they agreed to 
convene their first official conference.
Secrecy: the benefits and costs
The conference took place in Mannouba, in the northern suburbs of 
Tunis. Around seventy of the most prominent members of the move­
ment convened in August 1979 at what will be called the “founding” 
conference. They agreed on a constitution for their secret association, 
giving it a more detailed administrative structure, an institutional 
breakdown of which will be listed here, in order of importance:
1. The General Conference, convened once every three years. This 
represents the highest authority in the movement and decides its main 
policies.
2. Majlis al-shura, (similar to a small parliament), made up of fourteen 
elected members from the General Conference. This constitutes the 
legislative branch of the movement, with sufficient power to overrule
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the Executive Bureau. Members meet at least once every three months.
3. The Executive Bureau, run by the amir (president) of the movement, 
who is elected by the General Conference. This bureau exercises its 
functions with the help of various sub-committees.
4. The ‘ Ummal, meaning the presidents of the movement in each prov­
ince, parallel to official provincial governors. They are appointed by 
the amir to run the movement in the provinces with the help of a local 
Executive Bureau and majlis al-shura.
5. W ukala\ meaning those who preside over the movement’s activities 
in the main districts of the provinces.
6. The university, considered an independent entity in the movement, 
almost like a province. Its leadership runs the activities of Islamist stu­
dents all over the country. It is also run by an (amily appointed by the 
amir.
7. Secondary schools, also viewed as a separate entity, run by a central 
committee which plans the movement’s activities within these schools.
8. The cells, which are the basic units of the structure. Every member 
of the movement should spend around three years of training in a two- 
level system designed especially for these cells, before he can be 
granted the rights of a full member of the movement. The training pro­
gramme consists of courses in Islamic sciences and contemporary Is­
lamic movements.29
The Mannouba conference also decided that the movement was 
part of the international trend of the Muslim Brotherhood, and elected 
Ghannouchi as its amir. Ghannouchi had in fact been the de facto  lead­
er since the foundation of the movement’s first cells. In 1977 he be­
came the editor-in-chief of al-Ma ‘rifa magazine and established a rep­
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utation for himself as one of the most prominent lecturers in the 
mosques of the capital. He continued to work as a teacher of philoso­
phy at a secondary school in Tunis, and travelled abroad on a number 
of occasions, notably to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, where he made di­
rect contacts with Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Sudan.30
Other main figures in the elected leadership of al-Jamd‘a al- 
Isldmiyya included Salah Karkar, selected by Ghannouchi as his depu­
ty. A teacher of economy and a keen organiser, he was to become a 
symbol of the radical hardliners among the Islamists and later emerged 
as Ghannouchi’s main rival in the movement's leadership. Abdelfattah 
Mourou was elected to the Legislative Council, but Ehmida Enneifer 
did not even feature in the list of the conference’s members. From 
1976 onwards, he had become increasingly critical towards the influ­
ence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the movement, and called for a 
different, more rational and progressive approach to contemporary is­
sues. It seemed also that his personal relationship with Ghannouchi 
had become strained, and that he was dissatisfied with Ghannouchi’s 
leadership of the movement.31
Around this time Enneifer had begun to meet with a number of 
Egyptian Islamic writers who advocated the necessity of renovation in 
the Islamic movement, and had become interested in the thought of the 
Egyptian Islamist Dr. Muhammad FathI ‘Uthman, and his notion of an 
“Islamist left”. Enneifer wrote a series of articles in al-Ma ‘rifa maga­
zine entitled, "Where Do We Begin?", the focus of which was on “Is­
lamic thought as the main source of the problems in which Muslims 
find themselves and as the key for effectively solving these prob­
lems”.32
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Enneifer decided shortly afterwards to resign from al-Jama ‘a al- 
Islamiyya and to form a new, reformist group under the name of al­
ls lamiyyun al-Taqaddumiyyun (the Progressive Islamists), with the 
main task of “restructuring Islamic thought through a rethinking of the 
fundamentals of Islam”.33 This was different to the main mission of al- 
Jama* a al-Islamiyya, which was to revert society to Islamic rules; in 
other words, the problem was seen to lie with society and not with Is­
lamic thought. Ghannouchi announced finally that his movement was 
unable to contain its differences with what he called “the rationalist 
trend”. Enneifer and his supporters finally seceded and published then- 
own magazine with the title 75/27,34 referring to the combination be­
tween the Islamic and Western calendars, and symbolising the need to 
find a new, progressive deal between Islam and the West.
It was agreed that the new structure for the movement should be 
kept secret, although it presented problems in that it was large and dif­
ficult to hide. Further, with growing radicalism in the movement’s po­
sition towards the regime, and increased media interest in Islamic revi­
valism after the Iranian revolution, secrecy was not easy to sustain. 
The government had set up a special branch in the interior ministry to 
monitor religious activities, and on December 7, 1979 Ghannouchi 
was arrested and questioned for seventeen days, as was Mourou, who 
was detained for three days. They were asked about lectures they had 
given in mosques and statements they had issued against the regime, 
but not about their secret organisation, as yet unknown to the security 
forces.35
Al-M a‘rifa magazine was suspended in that same year, and the 
official media began to attack the Islamists. Even Prime Minister Hedi 
Nouira expressed annoyance: on December 19, he denounced “those
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troublemakers who used religion for their political aims”.36 With the 
leaders of the UGTT still imprisoned after their role in the January Up­
rising, the Islamic movement soon emerged as the “next main threat” 
to the Tunisian regime. Under close observation, the movement’s suc­
cess in preserving its secrecy came to a bitter and very abrupt end.
The discovery of the secret organisation
December 5, 1980 was unlike any other day in the Tunisian Islamic 
movement's history. According to Ghannouchi
It was no less important than the success of the Iranian 
revolution in politicising our Islamic thought and chang­
ing the views of the vast majority of Islamists in Tuni­
sia. We may even consider December 5, 1980 to be the 
separating point between two stages in the Islamists’ 
history: the da ‘wa stage and the comprehensive political 
stage. 37
Tunisian police had arrested two of the Executive Bureau’s mem­
bers: Salah Karkar and Ben Tssa Demni. They found on the latter de­
tailed written documents about the movement’s strategies and activi­
ties. Subjected to severe torture, Demni gave the police crucial 
information about the movement’s organisation. After being chal­
lenged with Demni’s information, Karkar in turn gave the police a de­
tailed description of al-Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya, its foundation, its institu­
tions, the founding conference, its majlis al-shura, the Executive 
Bureau, the local bureaus, and the committees. He also gave the names 
of the main members of these institutions. The two men were finally 
released after a week, during which time the regime had unearthed 
what Ghannouchi describes as “a treasure trove of information.”38
Suddenly, “the enemies”, as Ghannouchi calls the regime, were 
fully aware of all the movement’s activities and actions, leaving its di­
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rection in utter disarray. Steps were swiftly considered in an attempt to 
save the movement from total disaster: first, a number of technical 
measures were taken; the majlis al-shura decided to dissolve itself, as 
did the central Executive Bureau and committees. The question was 
then posed as to how to continue running the movement’s various ac­
tivities. It was in this context that Ghannouchi proposed to his col­
leagues a dramatic solution: to expose the movement, and make the 
facts known to the public before they were misused by the regime. It 
was a solution forced by events rather than pre-meditation. Recalling 
this period, Ghannouchi admits:
Dialogue with some brothers led to the proposition of 
announcing [ourselves as] a political movement at a 
press conference, to cover up for our exposed secret ac­
tivities, especially because the regime had begun —  un­
der pressure from within and from outside — to use 
democratic slogans and to prepare for a phase of plural­
ism, even if limited to Bourguiba’s terms. So [it was de­
cided:] why don’t we seize this chance in order to de­
prive the government of the chance to crack down on us 
and announce the discovery of a “secret dangerous 
movement”? 39
The proposition was met with a positive response from seventy- 
one per cent of the movement, according to a hurriedly organised poll, 
requested by the leadership. The main opposition came from students 
and radical elements in the leadership, notably deputy president Salah 
Karkar. They argued that requesting legal status from the enemy 
would be equal to admitting its legitimacy, and that in their view the 
regime was corrupt, dictatorial, an agent of the West and an enemy of 
Islam, and that to request its permission to form a political party was 
“a crime no less than that of kufr or high treason”.40
Finally, an extraordinary general conference was called, to decide 
on new tactics after the authorities’ discovery of the nature of the 
movement. The conference was convened on April 9 and 10, 1981; at
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almost exactly the same time, Bourguiba’s ruling party held an ex­
traordinary conference at which it set out to tackle its own, associated 
problems. One of the items on their agenda concerned an attack on the 
city of Gafsa, in the south of the country, on the night of January 26, 
1980, by a group of Arab nationalist militants backed by Algerian and 
Libyan intelligence. The date of the attack had been scheduled to coin­
cide with the anniversary of the January Uprising; the attackers had 
planned to “liberate” Gafsa, as a first step towards asking for official 
Libyan assistance.41
The plan failed after the army was called into Gafsa: dozens of 
people were killed, and three hundred were arrested, including all the 
members of the group. After a hasty trial fifteen of them were charged 
with high treason and sentenced to death; they were hanged on April 
17, 1980. The political message received from the attempted coup was 
that a change was very much needed in the political system. The gov­
ernment’s problems were exacerbated further when Hedi Nouira was 
stricken with medical paralysis and was no longer able to continue in 
office.
This opened the way for Mohamed Mzali, one of Bourguiba’s 
long-serving ministers, to become government coordinator; a few 
months later he was appointed as the new Prime Minister. He too sup­
ported the idea that liberalism was the best way out of the socialist 
failure of the end of the sixties, and now Bourguiba turned to a new 
slogan: openness and a new era based on a multi-party political sys­
tem. At the April 1981 conference, he told his ruling party members 
that he no longer objected to the forming of other social, political and 
national associations.42 Two weeks later, an extraordinary conference 
of the UGTT marked its reconciliation with the government after the
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release of its leaders. They were allowed to return to their posts in the 
organisation except for their leader Habib Achour, who would return 
at a later date. For opposition groups, the new era looked very promis­
ing.
The creation of the political party
All these various factors from both within and outside formed the 
background for the Islamists’ meeting in Sousse at their extraordinary 
conference, as they attempted to address their crisis effectively. They 
first listened to Bourguiba’s speech about a multi-party system, and 
then to Ghannouchi about the need to announce themselves as an Is­
lamic political movement. The idea was finally accepted in a new 
strategy, designed to protect the movement from its main enemy and 
only real threat: the regime. Ghannouchi was once again elected to the 
post of amir.
The new majlis al-shura, met frequently over the following weeks 
to work out the exact details for this new departure and to prepare for 
their public announcement. A statement for the occasion was agreed 
upon, as was the formation of a new body called “The Founding Com­
mittee”, which was given the responsibility of applying for the legal 
registration of the new party.
Its members met on May 29 1981, at the home of one of the old 
famous Zeitouna scholars, Shaykh Mohamed Salah Enneifer. There 
they elected the five members of their Political Bureau: Abdel Fattah 
Mourou, Ben Tssa Demni, Zahir Mahjoub and Habib Mokni, with 
Ghannouchi as its president, and Mourou as its secretary general.
By June 6 1981, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya had finally changed its
65
name and course. Its leaders organised the holding of a press confer­
ence, which was attended by Tunisian and foreign journalists. From 
Shaykh Mourou's office in Commission Street, which demarcated the 
old city of Tunis from the modem one, Ghannouchi announced the 
creation of Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (the Islamic Trend Movement) 
in Tunisia. He declared that the movement wished to be recognised by 
the government as a legal political party, and pledged that it would 
play a constmctive role in bringing about success for the new era of 
“openness”, or democracy. This was the first page of yet another chap­
ter in the history of the contemporary Tunisian Islamic movement.
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31981-1993: The Years of  Confrontation
The day that Tunisia’s al-Jama'a al-islamiyya announced to the local 
and international media that it wanted to be recognised as a legal polit­
ical party functioning within the bounds of the constitution, was a 
turning point in the history of the Tunisian Islamic movement. Ghan­
nouchi says of the occasion:
It was as though I had disposed of a mountain that my 
back could not carry. We were in a race against time 
with the regime, and knew that the documents accusing 
us were ready and that they would be used against us the 
moment the nigher authorities decided . . . [However] I 
was so happy that even if I were to have been hanged af­
ter that I would not have minded.1
The days of secrecy had come to an end, and from 1981 onwards 
al-Jama'a al-islamiyya was compelled to engage in a very delicate 
and dangerous political game: on the one hand it had to maintain its 
complex underground organisation, while on the other it had to run a 
political party, with its different obligations. Each of these two organi­
sations had its own particular needs, personnel and rhetoric. It proved 
to be a difficult task to undertake.
As Ghannouchi has admitted, the formation of Harakat al-ittijah 
al-Islaml as a political party was forced upon the movement and, ini­
tially, the new party was unable to propose any clear manifesto. When 
challenged on this point, the leaders of the movement argued that ha­
rassment on the part of the authorities had not allowed them to draft
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such a manifesto. Ghannouchi has described this scenario accordingly:
Both the leadership and the members had tried to draft 
and agree on an ideological approach and a strategy for 
action. We spent a long time [in doing so] and prepared 
large files or theoretical studies on Islamic social views 
ana the current situation in the country from a variety of 
aspects. Special committees had begun to draw their fi­
nal conclusions from these studies . . . but as soon as we 
had begun, the events of 5 December 1980 took place 
and the police seized all our files, destroying the efforts 
of more than a year, and forcing the movement to con­
centrate on defending itself rather than improving its 
theories. 2
For those demanding a detailed manifesto this excuse was unac­
ceptable, indeed one Tunisian critic who published an entire book in 
an attempt to “confront the message of ignorance”3 argued that the ab­
sence of the Islamists’ programme was deliberate, because “it enabled 
their leadership to manoeuvre freely and escape supervision and ac­
countability to the movement’s members. It also enabled them to at­
tract a greater number of supporters, if we consider that religious 
thought is still the ideological framework for society as a whole.”4
The new party did however present a long statement declaring the 
founding of the movement and outlining its ideological and political 
platform (see appendix 1). It declared that Islam had been “the target 
of all conspiracies waged by tyrannies inside Islamic countries, or by 
Western imperial powers from outside”, and added that it had been 
“marginalised in directing and ruling the day-to-day life of Muslims, 
despite the fact that it was Islam which was behind the success of the 
Islamic civilisation and behind the success of the national struggle to 
gain independence from European colonialism”.5
Under the banner of reestablishing Islam again as a dominant fac­
tor in ruling Tunisian society, the statement specified five major objec­
tives for the movement:
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a) To revive the Islamic personality of Tunisia so that 
she may resume her traditional role as a major centre of 
Islamic civilisation and culture; this would necessarily 
entail putting an end to the wastage of national resourc­
es, the progressive alienation of the population by the 
government and the practice of slavish imitation of the 
West.
b) To reformulate Islamic thought, taking into account 
the fundamental principles of Islam, the requirements of 
ma”s continuous evolution and changing circumstances.
c) To reassert popular will as a political force, and in so 
doing to reject internal paternalism and foreign influ­
ence.
d) To establish a system of social justice based on the 
principle that, although everyone should have the right 
to benefit from his own endeavours, subject to the pub­
lic interest, everyone should also enjoy the right to re­
ceive what he needs: to each according to his efforts and 
to each according to his needs, so that the masses ac­
quire their legitimate right to live in dignity, removed 
from all forms of exploitation and submission to interna­
tional economic powers.
e) To contribute to the revival of the political and civili- 
zational unity of Islam nationally, regionally, within the 
Arab world and internationally, thus saving our people 
and the whole of humanity from psychological aliena­
tion and social injustices and international imperialism.6
A separate part of this document identified the means by which 
these rather broad goals could be achieved, although they themselves 
were also very general. Suggested methods included using mosques as 
centres for the general mobilisation of the masses, encouraging vari­
ous cultural activities that would help to enhance Islamic values, sup­
porting efforts to make Arabic the official language of the administra­
tion, accepting political pluralism and democracy, and rejecting 
political violence.7
It may be argued that this vision was not inappropriate for an ordi­
nary, cultural, non-political association, but to Tunisian politicians at 
the time, such “moderate” talk was irrelevant. What really mattered to 
President Bourguiba’s regime was the fact that a religious movement 
was now challenging him for power, a fact which he was not prepared 
to accept. Therefore, only five weeks after presenting their new party
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to the media, the leaders of Harakat al-ittijah al-islami (also known as 
the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, or MTI,) found themselves 
in prison. On July 18, 1981 the authorities launched a wide reaching 
campaign which ended in the arrest of 107 of the Islamic movement’s 
activists, including Ghannouchi and Mourou. They were officially 
charged with the following “offences”: the operation of an unauthor­
ized association, the distribution of tracts, and the dissemination of 
false news. On September 4 they were sentenced to various terms of 
imprisonment ranging from six months to eleven years. After appeal­
ing, some sentences, such as those of Ghannouchi and Mourou, were 
reduced slightly from eleven to ten years.
1981-1984: The first confrontation
According to the public prosecutor’s report, the main danger that had 
emerged in the MTI’s short history was that “the movement, which 
had started as a purely religious movement, had become political, es­
tablishing its institutions and claiming legal recognition . . .  on the ba­
sis that Islam mixes religion with politics”.8
Using religious slogans for political ends was never accepted by 
other sections of the Tunisian elite within the ruling party, nor was it 
accepted by the main opposition groups such as the MDS (Social 
Democratic Movement), the Communist Party, or the MUP (Popular 
Union Movement), all of which had already been granted legal permis­
sion to operate as political parties. The government was adamant that 
the MTI was a blatant threat to society. Its official media denounced 
“the entire Islamic movement, making reference to the adherents of vi­
olence, fanaticism and intolerance, and to those marginals who use re­
ligion to soil the distinguished image of the country”.9
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The accusation of violence was mainly linked to the wide unrest 
that had erupted among students in the secondary schools and faculties 
of the University of Tunisia during the spring of 1981. The Islamists 
had been very active in leading strikes and demonstrations around the 
country, to the point that they had once- taken hostage the Dean of the 
Faculty of Sciences in Tunis in order to stop the police attacking 
them.10
The student wing of the MTI had been greatly influenced by the 
events of the Iranian revolution, including some of its more extreme 
methods of protest, such as the seizure of the American embassy in 
Tehran in 1979. At certain stages during that period of unrest, the 
movement’s leadership was unable to restrain the students from dem­
onstrating in the streets and fighting with the police. It was not until 
the incident of taking the Dean of the Faculty of Sciences hostage that 
the Islamist students and their leaders in the MTI realised the extent of 
the harm they had done to their cause. The incident was widely con­
demned by all teachers in the university and by all political parties, 
and the police began to pursue the leaders of the movement’s student 
wing, and their photos were published in the press as “wanted crimi­
nals”. Ghannouchi admits that “members of the Islamist Trend in the 
university and the whole movement in general went through a terrible 
crisis because of that stupid, irresponsible act”.11
Despite these incidents, which served only to validate some of the 
accusations against the MTI as a potential source of violence, the real 
discord between the newly proclaimed party and the government and 
other opposition parties concerned political power, and whether the Is­
lamists should be allowed to gain it by benefiting from their public 
commitment to Islam. This was manifested clearly in an argument
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raised by the Islamists’ opponents: that the MTI should not be allowed 
to claim Islamic identity in an Islamic society. Toumi explains it ac­
cordingly:
The Islamic movement does not recognise any religious 
legitimacy for the government nor for the other Tunisian 
political parties, despite certain tactical alliances. Be­
cause it claims it is the true guardian of the strict teach­
ings of Islam, the MTI presents itself, in fact, as the sole 
representative of the Truth. Such thinking must definite­
ly lead to the kind of stato totalitario envisaged by Mus­
solini. 12
The problem in 1981 however was that the government allowed 
neither the time nor the opportunity for examination of the arguments 
and counter-arguments about the claims of the Islamists. Repression 
was deemed to be the strongest response to the MTI’s application for 
official recognition, although this line served only to alienate other po­
litical parties opposed to the Islamists, and in fact forced them to show 
some degree of support for this new wave of political prisoners. In 
fact, the period of the first confrontation proved to be a very prosper­
ous era for the Islamists, as al-Mansuri has noted:
The period of repression was a bright page in the history 
of the movement and the country. During it, the move­
ment reaffirmed its unity, insisted on its legitimate 
rights to official recognition, and confirmed its commit­
ment to peaceful and democratic means of political ac­
tion, as well as its denunciation of violence, especially 
as the movement had been a victim of this both in ana 
outside the university. This brought respect from differ­
ent political, human and professional organisations, and 
people’s trust in the movement’s sincerity. All groups 
supported it in demanding a general amnesty and the 
right of the movement to operate legally. The movement 
widened its popular base, and gained a strong and inter­
national reputation as a moaerate group, working to 
make changes by democratic means, within the bounds 
of law, resisting the government’s repression and avoid­
ing being dragged into violence and the logic of force. 13
We may see here that the MTI confidently presented itself in the 
role of the oppressed, thereby securing the sympathy of others. This
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was made possible because of the political climate in the country at 
that time, which was still moderate and even tolerant to a considerable 
extent, compared with earlier periods of Bourguiba's regime and with 
other neighbouring countries.
A few months after the arrest of the MTI's leaders, the first multi­
party general elections took place. Although the ruling party won all 
the seats, the political debate generated by the occasion was new to 
Tunisian political life, and independent and opposition newspapers 
gained respect and attracted a bigger readership. It was within this cli­
mate that different political organisations, writers and personalities 
were able to speak out and show support for the MTI’s political pris­
oners. Had the movement chosen to play the role of the party of revo­
lution and radical change, it would not have been so successful in at­
tracting such a level of national support. Similarly, had the regime 
tightened the margin for free expression, the Islamists would have con­
sidered violence as the only useful way by which to defend their exis­
tence, as was to occur a decade later.
As for during the first years of the eighties, Ghannouchi appeared 
to be happy with the outcome of the then-ongoing confrontation with 
the authorities, as he observed it from his prison cell:
Our arrest was a chance to feed new blood into the 
movement, thereby preserving its youth, effectiveness 
and renewal . . . the movement became the centre 
around which all popular and political trends came to­
gether, either sincerely or for political calculations — 
except for the ruling party, despite the fact that some of 
its wings were against repression and some expressed 
their support for us . . . Almost every week after our ar­
rest, independent and opposition newspapers published 
petitions condemning the government’s stand against us 
and demanding support for us. This led to a national de­
mand for a general amnesty adopted by the entire oppo­
sition and some members of parliament, a demand for 
which Al-Ra’i newspaper gathered the support of twenty 
thousand citizens.
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This assessment may in fact be somewhat exaggerated, but more 
than anything else, it does show that Bourguiba's regime was not fully 
committed to embarking on a wide campaign to eliminate the Islamists 
from society. The slogan of the era was one of openness rather than 
dictatorship. As we see from Ghannouchi’s quotation, not all the lead­
ers of the ruling party supported policies of repression, and it would 
seem that even the prime minister of that time, Mohamed Mzali, was 
more concerned with democratising the country than fighting the Isla­
mists. Despite the rhetoric he had employed during the summer of 
1981 against the Islamists, Mzali was seen widely as a supporter of 
Arab culture, and was in fact suspected of being lenient towards Ghan- 
nouchi and his colleagues. A few years after leaving office, he wrote 
of the MTI, which had by that time changed its name to al-Nahda:
Nahda means “renaissance”. It is very clear that during 
the last few years, we have been witnessing an Islamic 
revival in many Islamic countries, which shows that our 
soul is alive and active. I know by experience that al- 
Nahda is mainly composed of men of values, peaceful 
democrats who do not condone violence, and of Tuni­
sians attached to their country and its cultural and spiri­
tual values. There is no ground for the slightest form of 
indictment. 15
Not surprisingly, the MTI was able to capitalise on its circum­
stances and gain unprecedented publicity for its ideas and leaders. In 
addition to enjoying the support of many politicians and newspapers in 
the country, the university continued to serve as an alternative base for 
the movement, as those students supporting the movement were still 
free to operate in the form of a mini political party. Under the banner 
of al-Ittijah al-Islaml, they were free to organise political meetings, to 
defend their detained leaders, to express their views on all national af­
fairs, and to issue political statements that could be published by na­
tional newspapers. Islamists may not have been the majority in the
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university, but their presence was formidable, as Waltz has noted:
Especially by the early 1980s, the University of Tunis 
had emerged as the principal breeding ground of Islam- 
ism, and within that confined arena the Faculty of Sci­
ence appeared particularly fertile. Some estimates put 
the number of adherents as high as twenty per cent of 
that institute’s student body, but even that figure under­
estimates their impact. While the Islamists are clearly 
not a majority, they are nevertheless the best organised 
and the most unified group among the students.
However, as was the case within the public realm, the MTI still 
had to face the consequences of repression against its inner organisa­
tion. First, a new amir was elected by the majlis al-shura, namely Fad- 
el al-Baldi from the city of Bousalim in the north-west of the country. 
In his early thirties, his main credentials were the role he had played in 
forming the movement in its early days and a heavy prison sentence 
passed on him in absentia.17 After a few months of leading the move­
ment from underground inside the country, he fled to France where he 
claimed political asylum. In 1982, Hammadi al-Jebali, an engineer 
from Sousse, was chosen as the new leader to replace Baldi, as the op­
erating inner shura council insisted that the amir should be inside the 
country.
All these changes were performed in secret, and remained so until 
January 8, 1983, when the police uncovered and arrested most of the 
new leadership of the student movement of the MTI, at a meeting in a 
flat in Tunis. The detainees in turn gave leads to the new secret nation­
al executive committee, and although Jebali himself was not arrested, 
a number of his more prominent colleagues were rounded up. Again 
the movement was forced to make public some of its secret arrange­
ments; it issued a statement on January 19, 1983 announcing the for­
mation of a new five-man Executive Bureau led by Jebali.18
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The new detainees were sentenced on July 27, 1983 to short prison 
terms of up to a maximum two years, although many of them were re­
leased that same day as they had already served their six months’ term. 
Jebali was sentenced in absentia to two years.19 The official mood was 
now clearly different to that of 1981, and many of the discussions be­
tween the imprisoned Islamists turned to a possible reconciliation with 
the government, although opinions were divided about the regime’s in­
tentions towards the Islamists and the conditions — if any —  that the 
movement should lay down before seeking an agreement.20
For Bourguiba and his ministers, however, there were other, more 
urgent, problems to attend to. At the top of the agenda were the violent 
demonstrations held between December 29, 1983 and January 1984 in 
the main cities of the country, in protest against the sharp rise in the 
price of bread. The police responded by using force but were not able 
to contain the situation, and the army was called upon to help restore 
order after a state of emergency had been declared. Fifty people were 
killed before Bourguiba finally decided to abolish the new charges.21
The priorities of the government thus changed from fighting the Is­
lamists to the restoration of its credibility and the country’s stability. 
In this context Prime Minister Mzali proposed to President Bourguiba 
the idea of passing a presidential amnesty on Islamist prisoners. He 
embarked first on secret negotiations with them via intermediaries, lat­
er negotiating directly with Abdelfattah Mourou, the General Secre­
tary of the MTI, who finally sent Bourguiba a carefully written letter 
confirming the noble motives of his movement and its commitment to 
the rule of law. Finally, on August 4, 1984, Bourguiba issued his presi­
dential amnesty, and the leaders of the Islamists were free again, al­
though — as would prove three years later — not for long.
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According to Ghannouchi, Bourguiba did not deserve to be 
thanked for this gesture. He argues that his release was purely the re­
sult of the government’s weakness :
In January 1984, the Tunisian government went through 
a major crisis. The bread crisis revealed the 
incompetence of the regime and its politics, and 
consequently the government was forced to grant the 
people some concessions. Thus we were released by the 
favour of Allah the Merciful, and amnestied. 22
The truth, however, was not so simple. The discussions men­
tioned by Ghannouchi earlier about the possibility of reconciliation 
with the government were also taking place on a wider scale outside 
prison. Many Islamist students did not favour the idea of a dialogue 
with the regime, and blamed Mourou in particular for undermining the 
movement’s principles and recognising the legitimacy of Bourguiba’s 
regime. In an interview given later to a Kuwaiti magazine, Mourou 
demonstrated the lengths that his movement was forced to go to in or­
der to meet the government’s requirements: instead of emphasising the 
radical differences between the movement and the regime, he chose to 
concentrate on the common ground between the two sides, and the 
peaceful, moderate and rational nature of the MTI.23
During these three years of repression the main corps of activists 
was dispersed in jail, in hiding and in exile. Not all were convinced of 
the merits of these concessions that had helped them to gain freedom, 
in fact, each of these groups went through very serious internal prob­
lems, the most serious of which was between Ghannouchi and Karkar 
in prison.
As we have seen, Karkar had previously been Ghannouchi’s depu­
ty president, and had begun to insist that Ghannouchi’s leadership 
must come to an end — a fact of which Ghannouchi was well aware.
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Ghannouchi has recorded his exchanges with Karkar concerning the 
challenges which lay ahead for the movement, and notes that Karkar 
asserted that the main challenge was to find “a management team and 
leadership capable of taking control of things, building a good plat­
form for real and collective action, and making good use of Islamic ca­
pacities at all levels”, adding that the movement’s leadership before 
the period of imprisonment had “proven quite clearly its inability to 
achieve those objectives”.24
Karkar’s remarks were intended as nothing less than a complete 
condemnation of Ghannouchi's leadership, and his negative feelings 
towards his rival were known to many. What is more, it was also 
known that, by condemning the movement’s leadership, Karkar was 
promoting himself as a viable alternative. It is true that, once in prison, 
Ghannouchi was a much weaker leader, and he has not attempted to 
defend his personal record, but points out that he chose to minimise 
the problems of leadership in order to concentrate on what he saw as a 
more complex issue:
It is the problem of a nation trying to find its way 
through a dense fo rest. . . looking to find its lost civili- 
sational identity, through its own renaissance . . . look­
ing for a social, human and civilisational model that re­
flects its religion and heritage and answers the current 
needs and challenges . . .  This is the main challenge, and 
all other managerial and technical difficulties are sim­
pler problems. 5
Those who had fled to France also experienced in-fighting, most­
ly consisting in personal conflicts between the passive, moderate Fadel 
al-Baldi and the more radical students that had remained loyal to their 
views formed during the late seventies. The two groups even went so 
far as to publish two small, rival publications, each of which claimed 
to represent the movement in exile. Further, on a personal level, Baldi
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was unhappy with the manner in which he had been replaced in the 
leadership by Hammadi al-Jebali.
In August 1984, a presidential amnesty made it possible for the ac­
tivists of the MTI to try to reconcile their differences and plan for the 
future. Freed from prison, out of hiding and back from exile, they were 
all poised to seize the chance to better defend their views and ideas. 
Two crucial questions demanded a collective answer: who would be 
the new leader, and what direction should the movement take; should 
it become more involved in the political process as a political party, or 
should it go back to the days of da ‘wa, as a strictly religious organisa­
tion?
The truce of 1984-1986
Before the end of 1984, the MTI succeeded in organising its third na­
tional conference. After having gone through a wide range of different 
experiences, those members who met were united on one main point: 
that the political party which had initially emerged in answer to a se­
curity problem must stay and prosper by all possible means, as it had 
become the main hope for Islamic revival in the country. They decided 
to give priority to improving the movement’s internal structures and 
the publication of an official newspaper, and to increasing the move­
ment’s effectiveness on the national scene and its presence in the na­
tional youth, cultural and trade union organisations.
Theoretically, the movement could also have chosen to retreat 
from the political scene in order to adopt a more cultural and religious 
role, thus avoiding a repetition of the unproductive debate of 1981 
concerning the “legitimacy” of an Islamic political party. However,
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this alternative was totally ignored in favour of making the movement 
bigger and stronger. The logic of the time was that everything could be 
achieved by capable organisation, and the tempting prospect of taking 
power was so great that no one opted for a change in direction. The 
presidential amnesty, along with all the other political indicators, was 
interpreted as “the green light for the movement to continue with its 
public activities. Thus the 1984 conference was clear in supporting an 
increased presence in the various national sectors and organisations”.26
As all sectors were agreed on the political dimension of the move­
ment’s new strategy, the main disagreement was about who should 
lead the party: Ghannouchi or Karkar. Those who had been in prison 
knew the extent of the rivalry between the two men, and some of them 
publicly expressed their fears about Ghannouchi being re-elected to 
the post of amir. But for many of the movement’s members within the 
university and the local provinces, Ghannouchi was seen as “a sym­
bol” of the movement, and they ignored Karkar’s objections and re­
elected his rival to the position of leader. By way of consolation, Kark­
ar was selected to lead the majlis al-shura. In doing so they tried to en­
sure a balance between the executive and the legislative authorities. As 
for Mourou, he was not considered a serious challenger to the main 
posts, and was only confirmed as secretary general in order to benefit 
from his public prominence.27
In line with these internal and public arrangements, the party con­
tinued to play the double game of running both a secret organisation 
and a public political party. Accompanied by wide local and interna­
tional media interest, hopes were high and expectations were great.
The new leadership chose to act on three main points. First, it tried 
to reorganise the central and local structures of the movement around
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the country, benefiting from the return of many prominent activists. 
Almost all local executive committees were renewed, and the main 
leaders were elected either to the executive bureau or to the majlis al- 
shura. Second, it officially announced its new public political bureau 
on June 6, 1985, with Ghannouchi as president, Mourou as secretary 
general, and Jebali as coordinator for political liaison with other par­
ties.
These politicians were officially received by the Tunisian Prime 
Minister for consultation on October 10, 1985, two days after the Is­
raeli raid on the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s headquarters in 
the suburbs of Tunis. Television channels showed scenes from the 
meeting, which seemingly implied official recognition of the move­
ment. The MTI was also strongly represented in the sixteenth National 
Conference of the UGTT, still the second strongest political organisa­
tion after the ruling party, and also participated in the national confer­
ence of the Tunisian League of Human Rights, securing a place on its 
executive committee. The movement was not given permission to pub­
lish its own newspaper, but its news always featured prominently in 
most of the local newspapers.
Thirdly, the student wing of the MTI succeeded in securing the 
signatures of more than fifteen thousand students to proceed with a 
General Conference which was finally held from May 18 to 20, 1985, 
and which gave birth to the revived General Union of Tunisian Stu­
dents (UGET). This was seen to be an important political victory for 
the MTI, as it confirmed the Islamists’ domination at the University of 
Tunis.
At this point it appeared as though all conditions for the movement 
were favourable, despite minor nuisances from the government, such
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as its refusal to grant official recognition to the MTI, or to allow cer­
tain prominent Islamists to return to their governmental jobs. Ghan­
nouchi began to show more aggression in criticising his opponents and 
more optimism concerning his movement’s future, as we may see 
from the quotations below:
The so-called liberation movements which appeared in 
the Maghreb to fight the colonisers took power and then 
betrayed those people who had fought for Islam. Since 
then they have made more efforts to paralyse Islam than 
the colonialists themselves.
The Westernised elites presently in power in our 
country represent only a small minority imposed by the 
force of state, the army and the mass media on a popula­
tion of Muslim believers. They were educated by the co­
lonisers and from them they inherited power. The future 
elite which will govern Islamic Tunisia is the new gen­
eration now being persecuted. They will re-establish Is­
lam in this land in sha 'Allah. 28
Despite its apparent successes at that time, the MTI was not the 
only, nor was it the most important, player on the Tunisian political 
scene. The trade unions were still the only real centre of opposition to 
the social and economic policies of the regime. The economic situa­
tion that had led to the events of January 1984 remained largely unim­
proved, and the tension between the government and the trade unions 
was growing fast. What is more, the regime itself was not united due 
to the deteriorating health of President Bourguiba. Prime Minister 
Mzali was the president’s official successor, but he was disliked by 
other rivals within Bourguiba’s entourage, many of whom were plot­
ting against him and working towards their own ends. Indeed the ques­
tion of who was to succeed Bourguiba soon emerged as the most im­
portant issue in Tunisian political life. To all intents and purposes the 
president was still active on television, but the truth as seen by Tuni­
sians was different, as one Western reporter illustrated:
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Each evening on the T.V. news, Tunisians watch a fa­
miliar sight: ‘President-for-life” Habib Bourguiba sits in 
his office at the Carthage Palace near Tunis, receiving 
ministers. The pictures always look the same, the narra­
tion barely changes.
To many Tunisians, those frozen T.V. images illus­
trate their country’s predicament. Tunisia today is in a 
period of suspended animation, waiting for a change of 
power. 29
Despite strong confrontations with the UGTT and the imprison­
ment of its leader, Habib Ashour, the economic situation failed to im­
prove.30 Bourguiba’s “solution” was unremarkable: in July 1986 he dis­
missed Prime Minister Mzali and appointed Rashid Sfar, his economic 
minister, in his place. Like all other Tunisians, Mzali first heard the 
news on television, and was left regretting the fact that he had not sub­
mitted his own resignation rather than being sacked. He later wrote: “I 
should have resigned, but didn’t because of the state’s national inter­
ests. I regret today not doing so and admit that it was a political mis­
take”.31
However the appointment of Sfar failed to stop speculation about 
the main issue preoccupying Tunisian politicians: Bourguiba’s succes­
sion.32 Internal conflicts between the various factions of the govern­
ment intensified, and each group struggled to be in a better position to 
succeed the ageing leader, who by this time had begun to show agita­
tion with both his aides and opponents. Only Bourguiba himself was 
unimpressed by all this talk; he was “the only one not to think about it. 
He had recently announced to his party’s central committee that the is­
sue of succession was not urgent — now or tomorrow — as he would 
try to live many more years”.33
Although the whole country suffered as a result of this fragile situ­
ation, the Islamists were those who most feared a renewed, direct in­
volvement by Bourguiba in the day-to-day running of the country’s af­
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fairs. Bourguiba was their historical enemy, and they had heard him 
saying at the ruling party’s conference in June 1986 that he would do 
his best to get rid of the shanty-towns and "al-Ikhwanjiyya ”, as he re­
ferred to the Islamists.
How best to respond to these worrying changes was the main 
question concerning the MTI leaders, meeting at their general confer­
ence in December 1986. They agreed on a three-phase strategy which 
they hoped would lead them to power: first was a stage of presenting 
the movement and its ideas to the public, then one of preparing alter­
native Islamic programmes and training personnel to run an Islamic 
government, and finally a stage of victory and government itself.34
By applying this strategy there was now no way back from the po­
litical venture on which they had embarked, in pursuit of their much- 
coveted goal: disposing of Bourguiba and taking his place in the lead­
ership of Tunisia, rather than merely ruling their own small, secret or­
ganisation. But what if the authorities did not allow the Islamists to 
present themselves before the public? A military coup was suggested 
by the movement’s secret military wing as the best solution in the 
event of further repression by the state. A committee headed by the 
military wing’s leader, Mohamed Shammam, was formed and was ad­
vised to prepare plans for a possible coup in which all sections of the 
movement were to participate. By underscoring this final point, the 
civil leadership was trying to avoid total dependence on the military 
wing.35
This represented a turning point in the Islamists’ strategy. The mil­
itary option was in fact contradictory to all of their official rhetoric, 
but for those working underground it seemed to represent the ideal 
means by which to conquer the Tunisian political arena and to realise
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their dream of an Islamic state. It was nonetheless also a very risky 
and dangerous option, because although the Tunisian regime may have 
been weak in the field of ideas, it was by no means weak in the field of 
security. By shifting to a military strategy, the Islamists were up 
against an experienced, tough and efficient security apparatus, led by a 
highly experienced and ambitious general, Zein al-Abidine ben Ali, 
who was then interior minister.
A few months later, on March 9 1987, Ghannouchi was once again 
arrested after insisting on giving a lecture in a mosque, an action inter­
preted by the authorities as a political, not a religious, act. By April 24 
more than two hundred Islamists were behind bars and the crown pros­
ecution ordered an official investigation, having charged them with 
treason, attempting to overthrow the government and defamation of 
the President.36 This time it appeared that Bourguiba was determined to 
eradicate his enemies; he was widely reported to favour “severe ver­
dicts to be immediately carried out — in the case of death penalties for 
instance — to wipe out once and for all the fundamentalist trend”.37 
This was very clear to all parties involved, not least to Karkar, who 
had assumed the leadership of the MTI following Ghannouchi’s arrest. 
He had always favoured the radical option of opposing the regime, and 
now found himself with an official mandate from his movement to im­
plement his views in the face of an all-out assault from the govern­
ment. Indeed, all factors were in place for what was to be the last ma­
jor battle against Bourguiba.
The end of Bourguiba’s era
President Bourguiba was in his native coastal town of Monastir at the 
beginning of August 1987. The third day of the month was his eighty-
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fourth birthday. For a whole month there was to be a daily ceremony 
to celebrate the occasion, and each province in the country had to 
present the best of its singers, dancers and poets to perform in front of 
“al-mujahid al-akbar” and his many guests at the presidential palace 
in Monastir. This was an annual routine invented by the state as part of 
the personality cult that Bourguiba had cultivated for himself and pub­
licly enjoyed.
But that year was to follow a different course of events, when, on 
the night of the second of August four bombs exploded in four hotels 
in Monastir itself and the neighbouring town of Sousse. Thirteen peo­
ple were injured, among them Western tourists from England and Ita­
ly. Bourguiba ordered his Interior Ministry to increase the pressure on 
the Islamists and arrest those responsible for the explosions. On Au­
gust 17, Tunisian state television showed the video-taped confession 
of a Mehriz Boudagga, whom, it was claimed, was the leader of the 
guilty group. Boudagga claimed that he had received instructions from 
the hierarchy of the MTI, but in three statements distributed in Paris 
the movement “denounced the bombings and the use of violence in 
general” and stated that the video shown on Tunisian state television 
was “the first time that they had heard of a Mehriz Boudagga, and that 
he was in no way connected with the MTI”.38
The battle between the authorities and the Islamists thus reached 
its peak and dominated the country’s political scene. The entire state 
apparatus was mobilised in the battle against the MTI, on direct orders 
from the President, whereas the Islamists were well prepared in their 
counter-attacks: demonstrations were held, tracts were delivered, and 
communiques were sent to the local and international media. The 
French media in particular, which had always enjoyed the special re­
gard of the Tunisian elites, were intensely interested in the course of 
events, and seemed surprisingly unimpressed with the regime’s claims 
against the Islamists, to the point that some observers suggested that 
France may have been involved in some kind of conspiracy to destab­
ilise Tunisia, by manipulating the fundamentalists and bringing about 
a new, liberal and more stable regime.39
From the outset of the new confrontation between the regime and 
the MTI, the French media kept a close eye on all developments, em­
phasising the difficulties facing the authorities and the dangers of it 
going too far in fighting its enemies. Le Monde, for example, consis­
tently covered the details of events from the moment of Ghannouchi’s 
arrest, and when it finally devoted its front page editorial to the after- 
math of the Monastir and Sousse explosions, it did not hesitate to 
question the regime’s accusations against the Islamists and to place the 
real blame on the regime, which it described in the following terms:
A regime whose main preoccupation is to not displease 
President Bourguiba, who, from his palace, continually 
manipulates his successors. The timid attempts at 
liberalisation made by Mr. Mzali have long been 
extinguished. The risk today is that the Islamists 
represent the only credible opposition. 40
It was not only the French who let Bourguiba down publicly. Al­
most all the leaders of the opposition liberal and leftist parties stood by 
the Islamists in one way or another, especially the leader of the 
Mouvement des Democrates Sociaux (MDS), Ahmed Mistiri, an ex- 
minister of Bourguiba’s, and his party colleagues who happened to 
dominate the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH). This is how 
an angry Mohsen Toumi has described their role in the fight:
As soon as the state responded, as forced by its duties, 
to the operations of destabilisation and the terrorist acts 
of the Islamists, by arresting those responsible and
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bringing them to justice, the MDS and the LTDH broke 
out, denounced fascism, wanted to storm the prison 
doors, protested against the judges and alarmed interna­
tional opinion. They even went so far as to call for direct 
intervention by France and the United States. The 
French media relayed with eagerness this defence of the 
Islamists. Not a single day passed without Mr. Mistiri 
and the animators o f  the LTDH speaking or being quot­
ed by the newspapers, the radio or the French televi­
sion. 1
The Tunisian authorities tried everything to justify their actions 
against the MTI. Two weeks after arresting Ghannouchi, it had broken 
off diplomatic relations with Iran, accusing its embassy in Tunis of es­
tablishing contacts with certain extremists in order to destabilise the 
country.42 It was an act which calculated to portray the presence of the 
MTI as the product of a foreign conspiracy by Islamic leaders in Teh­
ran, and also to show the determination of the government in going as 
far as was necessary — as certain officials told Le Monde — “to put 
an end once and for all to the intrigues of obscurantists and propaga­
tors of sclerotic and backward doctrines,” adding that President Bour­
guiba had taken this on “as a personal matter”.43
This claim of an Iranian connection was officially confirmed when 
the trial of the sixty most prominent leaders of the MTI by the State 
Security Court began on August 27. The Prosecutor General accused 
the Islamic movement of:
attempting to overthrow the regime in collusion with 
a foreign state [Iran], holding arms, attacking the se­
curity forces, calling for insurrection, slandering the 
President and the government and diffusing false 
news and tracts. 44
The nature of these accusations confirmed the fears of many ob­
servers both inside and outside Tunisia that Bourguiba would not be 
satisfied with prison sentences alone, but would seek the death penalty 
for the MTI’s leaders. All of the procedures of the trial were contested
90
by the defendants’ lawyers and international organisations such as 
Amnesty International, but the government showed complete determi­
nation to end the Islamists’ threat, as one observer at that time wrote:
Tunis is starting to look more like a city that, if not yet 
embroiled in civil strife, is at least preparing for such.
The signs of the crackdown are visible in virtually every 
part or the capital. Armed police patrol the street ana 
stop citizens at random, checking their identification pa­
pers. Vans of police reinforcements, their windshields 
covered with wire-mesh shrapnel protection, are sta­
tioned around the city. At the university of Tunis van­
loads of soldiers ana plain-clothes men are posted just 
outside the gates, ana military helicopters circle over­
head.45
During the days of the trial, there were no demonstrations held by 
the Islamists, but Hammadi al-Jebali, signatory to their official state­
ments, gave the blatant warning that they would not remain calm un­
der any circumstances:
We will not watch this plan of extermination with our 
arms folded. Our supporters, who have managed to stay 
patient by keeping calm and counting on God’s help, 
will not accept in any circumstances that their leadership 
be taken, by treachery and injustice . . .  If the govern­
ment passes the point of no return [i.e. the death penal­
ty], our movement, in a position of legitimate defence, 
will react against that tyranny.46
So serious was the threat of death sentences on Ghannouchi and 
his friends that the governments of the United States, France, Saudi 
Arabia and Algeria discreetly pleaded with President Bourguiba to 
avoid this measure.47 Even inside the government, the strong man at 
the interior ministry, General Ben Ali, was known to oppose the op­
tion of capital punishment in order to deprive the MTI of unnecessary 
martyrs.48 This was the same argument used in another front-page edi­
torial in Le Monde: “Some of the accused have not disguised their 
hopes of becoming martyrs. The biggest service that the regime can
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Ioffer them is to make this dream possible.”49
Ghannouchi himself appeared ready for the worst, having given 
his responses to the judge’s questioning. After advising his supporters 
not to resort to violence, he declared, “I am a human being and I want 
to live longer. But if it is God’s will that I become the martyr of 
mosques, then so be it. However, I warn you that my death will not be 
in vain, and that from my blood Islamic flowers will flourish.”50
It transpired, finally, that it was not to be God’s will. When the 
verdict was announced in the very early hours of Sunday 27 Septem­
ber 1987, Ghannouchi did not appear on the list of the seven people 
who had received the death sentence. Five among them were tried in 
absentia, the other two were convicted of directly masterminding the 
August explosions, which, in all cases, the MTI had said that it had 
nothing to do with. The other accused were sentenced to various terms 
of imprisonment; Ghannouchi was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The verdict was regarded as lenient by Tunisian political commen­
tators, and both President Mitterand and Prime Minister Chirac of 
France were reported to be happy with the “balanced verdict”.51 The 
French political class maintained the pressure on its historical ally, 
Bourguiba, while Le Monde continued to express its anxiety:
Judging by the terms of an unconvincing trial, the re­
gime has avoided making a gross mistake that would 
nave tarnished the image it projects to the outside world 
of a modem and tolerant Tunisia. But the Islamic chal­
lenge is still there, undiminished. It may be weakened 
after around two thousand arrests, but the MTI is not fa­
tally injured. New militants bom in clandestine have 
taken over from the historical figures. They are younger 
and more resolved.
The wisest solution by which to prevent a terrorist 
drift by Islamism would be to legalise the MTI and force 
it to play by the mles of the institutions. The fundamen­
talists will be obliged then to abandon their double mes­
sage, and to expose their backward ideas to a Tunisian
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Ipopulation that remains lamely attached to the modern­
ist gains of Bourguibism.
Bourguiba remained unconvinced, and his resolve against the Is­
lamists did not diminish. Five days after the verdict was passed, he ap­
pointed his interior minister General Ben Ali as the new Prime Minis­
ter, to succeed Rashid Sfar. His intention was to demand a more 
severe verdict from the court of appeal and to mobilise all the state’s 
resources in fighting the MTI. Bourguiba ignored the advice of his 
friends, and failed to see the dangers of increased repression. Mean­
while those around him were perceptive to these dangers, and as his 
ex-Prime Minister Mzali observed “a divided Tunisia was at the door 
of revolt and civil war”.53
More importantly, Bourguiba misjudged the true personality of 
his new Prime Minister; he mistakenly thought that he was merely us­
ing a military man to crack down on his opponents, as he had used his 
predecessors before for various short-term aims. But this time he was 
misled; the General had already decided that this was the most appro­
priate opportunity by which to solve the on-going problem of succes­
sion, and that he himself should be the new Tunisian President. In­
deed, it took him only thirty-six days to execute his plan, although it 
later transpired that he had not been alone in plotting Bourguiba’s 
overthrow.
Karkar, who had fled the country for Paris and then London, and 
Mohamed Shammam in Tunis, had also been busy in preparing their 
final assault on the Bourguiban regime. No one was aware of their 
plans at the time, as most of their public political rhetoric focused on 
democratic and non-violent opposition. Sympathy for their movement 
as a result of the trials was immense both inside and outside Tunisia, 
and they decided as a result of this that it was time to take a gamble.
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As Shammam presided in Tunis over the special committee of 
top military and civil members of the movement responsible for exe­
cuting the coup, Karkar remained the overall leader, or amir of the 
MTI, from his positions in Paris and London. Between the two men, 
Sayyid Ferjani, a member of the Tunis committee, shuttled back and 
forth in an attempt to secure agreement and understanding on all the 
details of the operation. His final visit to London was on October 30, 
1987. There he agreed with Karkar and other exiled leaders of the 
movement on all the details of the military coup, which had then been 
fixed for Sunday 8 November, including the first statement to be read 
to the public and the members of the new national government that 
would be formed.54
On his return to Tunis on November 6, Ferjani met with the top 
command committee — with the exception of Shammam, who had 
been arrested ten days earlier but had succeeded in avoiding giving the 
police any clues about his clandestine involvements.
Thus the Tunisian Islamic movement was less than forty-eight 
hours away from seizing power by a military coup, which was to be 
staged in the name of a national salvation project which, it claimed, 
would recognise the role of other political forces. One of these Isla­
mists claims that at that time
Tunisia did not have a choice. It had two possibilities: 
either a civil war, or the departure of Bourguiba. We 
had hoped for his eviction for a long time, but would 
have preferred that it had come from somewhere else. 
We had indirectly suggested to Mzali: Go ahead . . . you 
are responsible, you are Prime Minister . . .  go ahead. 
We delayed until the last minute . . . because it was not 
just the movement that was threatened, but the entire 
country. It was necessary to move; but in which 
direction? Not by taking power — that was out of the 
question — but by removing Bourguiba, because he had 
become crazy, and by giving political power back to the 
country.55
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This quotation in fact is in some ways contradictory, because “re­
moving Bourgiba” by force would in itself mean seizing political pow­
er, even if the movement’s pronounced intentions were only to govern 
for a short period and to organise a fair election. Another Tunisian Is­
lamist has likened this situation to that of others in the Arab world 
who organised military coups, declaring that they only wished to serve 
their people and return political power to them:
It was, in fact, a scenario in the Sudanese fashion, in the 
style of Siwar al-Dhahab [who, as Minister of Defence 
led a military coup against Numeiri in 1985 and then 
gave power to an elected government the following 
year]: to eliminate Bourguiba, but not by force. We 
were very clear on that point. He should not be hurt, 
ever. We also planned to involve everyone, all the par­
ties, because we were aware that we were not ready to 
assume the heritage of Bourguiba and were incapable of 
solving the country’s problems. So it was necessary to 
make everyone participate, to call on everyone to take 
responsibility . . . and to install a government of public 
salvation, o f national salvation, a parliamentary regime 
where all political parties participate in the country’s ev­
olution. It was clearly not conceivable to take power.
All we sought was a democratic climate that would be 
more or less favourable to dialogue, to the evolution of 
ideas and to peaceful change.
So why take power? The movement’s strategy was to 
eliminate Bourguiba, not as a person, but as a system of 
decision-making. 56
Thus it seemed that everything was in place to execute an extraor­
dinary plan that may have brought about the the Arab world’s first Is­
lamist government. One vital piece of information remained missing, 
however: what was the plan of General Zein al-Abidine ben Ali? It 
was not until half past six the following morning, Saturday Novem­
b er? , 1987, that the Islamists were to discover the Prime Minister’s 
intentions which, once clarified, dealt a severe blow to their plans, cal­
culations and ambitions.
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The promises of the new leader
By early morning that same day, Tunisian radio had broadcast the 
communique that would bring an end to Bourguiba’s presidency. Its 
author was his former Prime Minister, General Zein al-Abidine ben 
Ali. The statement was brief and succinct: it began by praising Bourgi- 
ba’s role in the liberation and development of Tunisia, then gave the 
reasons for his eviction:
The onset of his senility and the deterioration of his 
health, and the medical report made regarding this 
called us to carry out our national duty and declare him 
totally incapable of undertaking the tasks of President of 
the Republic.
Thereby, acting under Article 57 of the Constitution, 
with the help of God, we take up the Presidency of the 
Republic ana the high command of our armed forces.
In the exercise of our responsibilities, we are counting 
on all the children of our dear country to work together 
in an atmosphere of confidence, security and serenity, 
from which all hatred and rancour will be banished.
The independence of our country, our territorial 
integrity, the invulnerability of our fatherland and our 
people’s progress are a matter of concern for all citizens.
Love of one’s country, devotion to its safety, and 
commitment to its growth are the sacred duties of all 
Tunisians. 57
The new President then went on to promise a new era of democ­
racy for the people of Tunisia:
Our people have reached a degree of responsibility and 
maturity where every individual and group is in a posi­
tion to constructively contribute to the running of its af­
fairs, in conformity with the republican idea, which 
gives institutions their full scope and guarantees the 
conditions for a responsible democracy, rully respecting 
the sovereignty of the people as written in the Constitu­
tion. This Constitution needs urgent revision. The times 
in which we live can no longer accept a life presidency 
or automatic succession, from which the people are ex­
cluded. Our people deserve an advanced and institution­
alized political life, truly based on the plurality of par­
ties ana mass organisations.
We shall soon be putting forward a bill concerning 
political parties, ana another concerning the press,
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which will ensure wider participation in the building up 
of Tunisia and the strengthening of her independence in 
a context of order and discipline.
We shall see that the law is correctly enforced in such 
a way that will proscribe any kind o f iniquity or injus­
tice. We shall act to restore the prestige o f  the State and 
to put an end to chaos and laxity. There will be no more 
favouritism or indifference where the squandering of the 
country’s wealth is concerned. 58
Islam was also given mention in the statement, but not in the con­
text that the Islamists had hoped for. It was referred to in the context 
of the international obligations of the new government:
We shall continue to maintain good relations and posi­
tive cooperation with all other countries, particularly 
friendly and sister countries. We shall respect our inter­
national engagements.
We shall give Islamic, Arab, African and Mediterra­
nean solidarity its due importance.
We shall strive to achieve the unity, based on our 
common interests, of the Greater Maghreb. 59
Thus Tunisia found itself with a new president, with no hint of 
opposition or disapproval. Evidence that the plan had been very well 
prepared and executed emerged when it was revealed that Bourguiba 
had failed to command any kind of support to prevent his eviction 
from Carthage Palace, and that no one had been killed during his ar­
rest.
For the supporters of the MTI it was a day to be celebrated, in that 
the turn of events could potentially save the heads of their leaders. But 
for these leaders themselves, both in Tunis and overseas, it was a 
grave moment, as they had been “robbed” of a historical coup that was 
to have been carried out less than twenty-four hours later.
Only they and the new president were aware of this. Ben Ali, who 
had been preparing his move for weeks, had discovered his rivals’ plot 
just three to four days before their plan was to have been carried out,
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after having arrested a soldier who had been invited by the Islamists to 
participate in the coup. Although the soldier had not provided a com­
plete account of their plan, the details were sufficient for Ben Ali to 
decide to act early and seize power before Karkar and his colleagues 
could do so.
The question remaining for the Islamists was problematic: should 
they proceed with their plan, as was technically still possible, or 
should they abandon it, as it was becoming clear that the new regime 
was on full alert in anticipation of rebellion? Karkar was insistent that 
the Islamists should stick by their first option, while the majority of Is­
lamist leaders in Tunis deemed it impossible to proceed with their 
original plan, and agreed to call it off. They succeeded in winning the 
argument, because it was they who directly controlled the military per­
sonnel who had been preparing for the coup, most of whom knew that 
they would be the immediate targets of Ben Ali’s regime. A few days 
later many of them were arrested, including Sayyid Ferjani who, after 
being tortured, revealed all the details of the aborted coup to the au­
thorities.
This was the logistical argument behind ceasing the movement’s 
military action. The political argument was even stronger, because the 
overthrow of the President had been widely welcomed both inside and 
outside Tunisia, almost unanimously so. Even for Mohamed Mzali 
who, on publishing his future vision for Tunisia in 1991, vigorously 
condemning that of Ben Ali, asserted that the events of November 
1987 were a time of enormous popular relief:
People did not closely question the way in which it 
had been accomplished. They did not seem preoccu­
pied by the fact that the operation had been brought 
about by a palace revolt, between the men of the se­
raglio, that the people took no part in it, that the
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Prime Minister, the ex-interior Minister of the fallen 
President was the main actor, and that the seven doc­
tors summoned to the interior ministry at two 
o’clock in the morning to write a certificate of inep­
titude did not examine “the patient”, nor did they de­
termine when the illness had started.
The relief was so real that these legal preoccupa­
tions were seen as pedantic quibbles. The worst had 
been avoided, and this was what mattered most. In 
addition to that, the self-proclaimed successor to 
President Bourguiba had the ability to present him­
self, in his “declaration” of November 7, as a re­
formist anxious to turn the page of the past in a con­
venient manner, and to engage Tunisia on the path of 
democracy and development. The new President 
found himself at one of those crossroads that history 
offers in the course of a nation’s life to make possi­
ble the realisation of its main aspirations. General 
ben ‘Ali benefited from a quasi-general consensus, 
both inside and outside the country. 60
This was the kind of acceptance and hope with which Tunisians, 
the majority of Islamists included, received their new President. Ben 
Ali found no trouble in securing his grip on both the state apparatus 
and the ruling party, as he had been the key player in the country for 
the last few years of the Bourguiba era. As recorded in his first declar­
ation, he did not present himself as the leader of a radical revolution 
that aimed to introduce widespread change, rather he preferred to be 
the “saviour” of the republic, a role that had hitherto been played by 
Bourguiba.
It was within this context that he chose not to dismantle the long­
standing Constitutional Socialist Party, through which Bourguiba had 
ruled Tunisia since 1956, in defiance of some observers who believed 
that he should do so. Rather, he reinforced it, becoming its new Presi­
dent, and appointing his Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche as its Secre­
tary General. The only notable change introduced was in the party’s 
name, which, on February 27, 1988 became the Rassemblement Con- 
stitutionnel Democratique (RCD).61
A new law for political parties was announced on May 3 that same
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year, and a law for the press was announced on August 2. Both were 
slightly different to previous laws, but failed to have any significant 
effect on the political climate, as the first law insisted once more that 
no political party could be based on either religious values or Arabism, 
barring the way for the political ambitions of the Islamists as well as 
the less influential Arab nationalists.62 The mood of the new President 
was cautious; he was determined to do things his way, under his con­
trol, which was very much the way in which he dealt with the Isla­
mists.
Viewed from the perspective of Bourguiba’s intentions to eradi­
cate the Islamists, there was a tremendous sense of relief following his 
fall. The new president, however, did not want his success to be 
viewed within the framework of the MTFs popularity. He followed 
closely police interrogations of the members of what was later called 
“the security group”, meaning those who had been involved in the Is­
lamists’ aborted coup, and was aware of just how close they had been 
to taking his place. Nevertheless, he adopted a well measured plan by 
which to diffuse the tensions with the Islamic movement, without giv­
ing in to their main demands.
First, the police crackdown on civilian members of the movement 
was halted, but those already in prison had to wait a few months be­
fore receiving a presidential amnesty. When Ali Laridh, one of the 
MTI leaders who had been sentenced to death in absentia was arrested, 
his sentence was confirmed by a court of the new era and he too had to 
wait for a presidential amnesty. Ghannouchi had to wait until May 1, 
1988 until finally being granted amnesty and released. He emerged 
from prison highly optimistic, announcing to journalists that he had 
confidence in God, then in Ben Ali, to make a better future for Tuni­
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sia. For him, this was a form of conditional bay ‘a:
The current ruler of Tunisia made a coup against Bour­
guiba promising two things: Bourguiba failed to imple­
ment democracy but I will, and Bourguiba disregarded 
the Arab and Islamic identity of Tunisia, which I will re­
store. On these bases we gave him bay ‘a, as did the peo­
ple. 63
By June 1988, Ben Ali announced that one of his major priorities 
was to find a happy and final solution to the Islamist problem, and al­
lowed the return from exile of Abdelfattah Mourou, the Secretary Gen­
eral of the MTI, and Hammadi Jebali, its former leader. They and oth­
ers who emerged from hiding had to stand in court once more in 
October 1988. They were again found guilty of being members of an 
illegal organisation and sentenced to five years in jail, then were al­
lowed to go home from court, in accordance with higher instructions, 
and were later amnestied on the first anniversary of the events of 7 No­
vember.
There were other positive signs: a member of the MTI was includ­
ed in a national committee that had been asked to draw up a “national 
pact” on the platform of a democratic system, the student organisation 
(UGET) formed by the Islamists in 1985 was given official recogni­
tion, and Ghannouchi was invited to hold talks with a number of the 
President’s top aides, to whom he was to put his demands and sort out 
the problems of those returning from exile or out of jail, and claiming 
back the jobs they had lost during the confrontation with Bourguiba.
One of the most sensitive issues was resolved at this forum: Ghan­
nouchi agreed to publicly distance his movement from the “security 
group”, in return for their quiet release from jail. It was not an easy de­
cision for the Islamists’ leader to take, but he was presented with no 
other choice if he was to reassure the public and President Ben Ali that
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his movement was truly civilian. For the new regime, it was also a test 
to see how far the Islamic-political stand could adapt to a stable politi­
cal climate, and was of course an obligation, if the November 7 declar­
ation was to have any credibility — at least for its first two years. As 
Abdallah Imami, a defender of the government argues, the new regime 
predicted two responses from the Islamists to its policy of appease­
ment:
[First] the movement will reform itself and play by the 
rules of legitimacy and law, which implies a break with 
the legacy of secrecy and the adoption of one field of ac­
tion only: public lire, a choice which makes it compul­
sory to dismantle the military and intelligence wings and 
the whole secret apparatus of the movement.
[Second] the movement will maintain its characteris­
tics, thus limiting its public presence to the activities of 
certain known figures, while its main strength will be 
concentrated around the secret organisation, which will 
make only a few necessary adjustments — mainly to re­
place those uncovered by the police with new faces with 
clean records.
On the basis of this analysis, the government defined 
its responsibility to take a soft line, that would make it 
easy for the movement to proceed towards legalisation.64
Parallel to this soft line taken against the MTI, the new regime 
adopted what looked like a more positive stand towards Islam in gen­
eral, as part of the promises made in the new regime’s first statement. 
Three weeks after taking power, Ben Ali took the decision to broad­
cast on radio and television the call for the five daily prayers.65 The 
sighting of the moon was accepted as a method for deciding the days 
of the two main religious festivals of the year, reversing Bourguiba's 
previous directives to use the Christian calendar. On the last day of 
1987, the President announced the re-opening of the Zeitouna Univer­
sity, to accommodate three colleges of religious studies. An Islamic 
High Council formed in April 1987 was re-activated by a new presi­
dential decree, and Mourou, the Secretary General of the MTI, was in­
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vited onto its membership. Another similar decree passed on March 
30, 1990 announced the formation of a centre for Islamic studies in 
Kairouan, while a new Ministry for Religious Affairs was created and 
attached to the Prime Minister’s office, later becoming an independent 
ministry. Two annual presidential prizes for memorising the Qur’an 
and for Islamic studies were also announced.66
One other main act of legislation introduced was also very relevant 
to these new measures: a new law for mosques was announced on 
May 3, 1988, which made it illegal for anyone to give lectures there 
without prior authorisation from the Prime Minister, thus making it 
very difficult for the Islamists to continue to propagate their views in 
their traditional forum.67
Within the relatively free climate of expression that prevailed 
throughout that period, every positive or negative step taken in the Is­
lamic field was closely monitored by all political groups in the coun­
try, not least by those considered leftists and secularists:
The secular opposition parties, who feared the fall­
out that could result from an attempt to pull the rug 
out from under the feet of the Islamists, had under­
taken to mobilise themselves and to demand that the 
regime states clearly the limits of the recentering of 
its position on religion. On March 18, forty universi­
ty professors representing the principal political for­
mations published a long declaration calling for the 
necessary separation of Islam and politics, and the 
obligation to preserve vigorously the acquisitions re­
lating to the personal status code.
On March 19, on the eve of the new national holi­
day, President Ben Ali put an end to the different in­
terpretations of his cultural policy during a televised 
speech, defining for the first time the limits within 
which he intended to confine his action from then 
on: “There will be no calling into question, nor aban­
doning of that which Tunisia has been able to 
achieve to the profit of women and the family. The 
personal status code is an attainment to which we are 
attached and by which we feel attached. We are 
proud of it, and we draw real pride from it.” 68
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What is more, the question of whether to allow the MTI to oper­
ate as a legal political party remained unclear. Although the move­
ment signed the new National Pact with the government and the other 
main opposition parties on the first anniversary of Bourguiba’s over­
throw, this was not enough to solve the problem of official recogni­
tion. The new Parties Law unequivocally banned religious parties, thus 
obliging the Islamists to change their name for the second time and to 
make more concessions in order to be accepted within the new system.
By the end of 1988 the MTI had reached a decision to change its 
name to Harakat al-Nahda, or "the renaissance movement". Internal 
discussions regarding this point, among others, were problematic be­
cause of the presence of a number of strong personalities within the 
movement’s leadership, and also because the structure of the move­
ment continued to be based on a secret apparatus controlling the public 
one.
Ghannouchi was announced as president of this new political par­
ty, but its real president was not known publicly until his arrest two 
years later. This was Dr. Sadiq Shourou, a teacher at the University of 
Tunis, elected to the post at a secret general conference held by the 
MTI in March 1988, less than a month before Ghannouchi’s release 
from prison.69 The third most powerful man in the movement was 
again Mohamed Shammam, who regained his control over the security 
wing of the movement. Karkar remained in France and rejected the 
idea of returning to Tunis as he claimed to have no confidence in the 
new regime.
The new party’s manifesto was not very different to that drawn up 
by the MTI in 1981, although there was a clear effort in it to limit the 
use of the word “Islam” as much as possible, so as to avoid breaching
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the rules of the new Parties Law. Its primary objective was the preser­
vation of the republican regime and its bases, the preservation of civil 
society (a concept absorbed from the secular literature of that time), 
and the implementation of the principle of peoples’ sovereignty and 
the realisation of shura.10
In February 1989, a new official application was made to the in­
terior ministry to grant legal recognition to the newly-named party. 
The Interior Minister was obliged by law to provide an answer, either 
positive or negative, within the period of a maximum of four months. 
This proved to be a very long and significant period in the fragile rela­
tionship between the Islamists and the regime, mainly as a result of the 
general elections which were due to be held on April 2 that year.
Ben Ali against the Islamists
When the application for the new political party was submitted, hopes 
were high among the Islamists that a positive response awaited them 
this time. The public wing of al-Nahda’s leadership spared no efforts 
in allaying Ben Ali’s fears about the movement’s intentions. The un­
spoken understanding was that, in return for official recognition, al- 
Nahda would avoid any form of challenge for political power, as it re­
garded itself primarily as a movement of da'wa and social change. 
This understanding was made clear by the movement’s main leaders, 
especially by Mourou to Salah Jourshi, the former member of the 
movement who had mediated between the MTI and the government 
during the first half of 1988.71
Within the context of this understanding, the movement approved 
the idea suggested later by the ruling party that all those that had
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signed the National Pact should present a common list of candidates 
for the general elections. However, Ahmed Mistiri’s MDS rejected the 
idea shortly before the elections, making the hope of any other kind of 
coalition problematic for the Islamists, as the MDS was still deemed 
the most important opposition party.
The movement’s first reaction was to present five candidates for 
the one hundred and forty-one contested seats in twenty-five constitu­
encies, representing a symbolic presence by which to gain a few more 
supporters without alarming Ben Ali or any of the other parties. This 
argument was later overruled by that of the radical faction which con­
trolled the movement secretly, and who argued that it was the MTI 
that had brought Bourguiba down, and that the time for cautious calcu­
lations was over. Al-Nahda was capable — in their view —  of attain­
ing a parliamentary majority; a fact that Ben Ali and others should 
learn to accept and live with.
The debate escalated into what amounted to a political coup within 
al-Nahda, as Jourshi later recalled:
Here came a sudden and serious change within al- 
Nahda’ s policy. After it had accepted the principle of 
not participating in the elections, and maybe also the 
support of the RCD’s candidates in return for official 
recognition, it suddenly decided to participate under the 
banner of the independent lists. Then it jumped from 
[the notion of] a symbolic participation in a few constit­
uencies to presenting candidates in all constituencies, 
thus becoming the omy challenger locally and nationally 
to the ruling party.
Instead of opting for a symbolic presence in these 
constituencies, the movement’s masses did their best to 
achieve full mobilisation and guarantee the support of 
thousands of members and supporters, to the point of 
raising the authorities’ fears, who found themselves 
obliged to mobilise all their efforts and capacities in or­
der to face up to this sudden change in the movement’s 
policy. 72
Electoral rhetoric was to prove another problem for the Islamist
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leadership, as many of the independent candidates chosen to represent 
the movement did not always correspond in their views to those of 
Ghannouchi and his followers. As for the supporters of the Islamic 
movement in general, they were not especially interested in the de­
tailed promises of the candidates, but rather in a serious Islamic alter­
native to thirty years of one-party rule.
The results of the election did not reflect the trends revealed in the 
electoral campaign, although they confirmed the worrying weakness 
of the secular opposition parties, who altogether failed to gain five per 
cent of the vote. The ruling party was declared victorious in all constit­
uencies, and Ben Ah received 99.27 per cent of the votes in the presi­
dential elections held on the same day. He was the sole candidate.
As for the Islamists, it was announced that their share of the vote 
was as high as 14.21 per cent in certain constituencies,73 gaining their 
highest votes in the capital and a number of other big cities. However, 
for all these votes, they failed to win any seats. As a result, they pro­
tested and accused the government of rigging the elections. Spurred on 
by the desire for power, the Islamists were derisive of the govern­
ment’s admission of their strong showing in the elections, and lashed 
back, as we see from this account:
Despite the fact that the officially declared results 
showed the Islamists as the second political force in the 
country and admitted that their [total] share of the vote 
was seventeen per cent, the most violent statement 
against the regime after the results were announced 
came from al-Nahda. This led to the breaking off of re­
lations and the accumulation of reasons for tension and 
confrontation.
Al-Nahda’s leadership . . . became tempted by the 
electoral game and quickly jumped in such a manner 
that raised the fears of the government and the political 
elite. It suddenly changed from a political group seeking 
legal permission and a few seats in parliament to play­
ing the role of a major influential force, not content to
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merely lead the opposition, but believing in its ability 
and legitimacy to claim a parliamentary majority, ana 
[claiming] that it played a decisive role in the changes of 
November 7. 74
The April elections were yet another turning point, in as far as re­
lations between Ben Ali and al-Nahda were concerned. For the Presi­
dent, the Islamists had failed his test and had shown that they were 
keen to enforce their political domination by all means, and were 
therefore not to be trusted. For the Islamists, the radical elements 
found new ammunition in calling for a strategy by which to counter 
Ben Ali’s plans and relaunch the initiative that had almost brought 
them to power in 1987. As the cover story of the April 17, 1989 issue 
of the French magazine Jeune Afrique declared, the main result of the 
elections was “Ben Ali face aux Islamistes”.
Confrontation between the government and the Islamists did not 
take long to materialise. First, al-Nahda's application for official rec­
ognition was rejected on June 8, 1989, on the grounds that some of its 
founders had “criminal” records. Another application was made on 11 
December that same year but remained unanswered. In a new govern­
ment formed after the elections, a prominent leftist personality op­
posed to the Islamists was given the post of Education Minister, and 
entrusted to master a new educational vision opposed to that of the Is­
lamic movement. On both July 25, Tunisia’s Republican day, and on 
the second anniversary of his coming to power, Ben Ali used his 
speeches to clarify his position: “We say to those who mix religion 
with politics that there is no way of allowing them to form a political 
party”.75
This latest development created new problems among other oppo­
sition parties and raised concern about a return to repression. As a re­
sult, all of the opposition parties decided to boycott the local elections
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held on June 10, 1990. The MDS spoke of a political impasse because 
of the incompatibility between the democratic rhetoric of the govern­
ment and its contradictory deeds.76 Earlier in Paris, the Tunisian Em­
bassy had refused a request from Ghannouchi— who had left the 
country in May 1989 — to renew his passport.
The only positive step taken in 1990 was the permission given on 
8 January for the movement to publish its own newspaper, al-Fajr. In 
reality it was little more than a trap by which to gain any new, written 
evidence that might be used against al-Nahda in any forthcoming con­
frontation. The Prime Minister at that time, Hamid al-Karwi, said, “Al- 
Nahda speaks more than one language and has more than one face. 
We gave them permission to found a newspaper to discover their 
views and programmes”.77 But after only a few months, the director of 
al-Fajr was accused of publishing defamatory articles, and was arrest­
ed and jailed. The newspaper itself was closed down the following 
year, in January 1991, just one month after a new, extensive crack­
down was launched against al-Nahda’s leaders and supporters around 
the country.
This time things were totally different to how they had been in 
1987. Ben Ali was not Bourguiba; he was much younger and totally in 
control of every aspect of the country’s political life. But al-Nahda’s 
leaders were feeling remarkably self-confident, and adopted a new 
strategy which they called “the enforcement of liberties”. Here is 
Ghannouchi’s definition of this strategy:
We did not mean to seize power, as was claimed, but to 
pressurise the regime to the point of accepting the peo­
ple’s decision. Nothing in our statements — if interpret­
ed fairly — shows that we called for violent means by 
which to topple the government. The central kev to our 
strategy was the enforcement of liberties, even i f  this led 
to the fall of the regime. Our goal was not to bring down
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the government but to pressurise it into negotiating with 
the people. 78
Logically, however, one cannot truly conceive of “enforcing lib- 
erties” on a regime if one is not strong enough to do so, and there is no 
doubt that al-Nahda was depending on the support it had been given in 
the 1989 elections, and on its continuing, strong presence in the Uni­
versity of Tunis. Two other, external factors also raised the expecta­
tions of the Islamists: one was the overwhelming victory of the Algeri­
an Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the local elections of June 12, 
1990, which represented a big moral boost for Islamists all around the 
world; the other was the second Gulf War after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had 
gained wide support among the Tunisian people, and was seen as a 
brave leader who had stood up to Israel and the U.S.-led Western alli­
ance. Ghannouchi believed that the revolutionary mood created as a 
result of Iraq’s policies would help the movement’s plan to take the 
Tunisian people onto the streets and force the regime to respect their 
will. He gave his unconditional support to Saddam and tried to present 
the Iraqi President’s stance as a catalyst for a global Islamic revolu­
tion.
In a passionate and long appeal he addressed the scholars and the 
masses of the Islamic nations, asking them to give up their lives and 
belongings for the leader who had dared to attack Israel, and who had 
stood up to the invading international forces. The conclusion of this 
speech, however, may be interpreted as applying primarily to Tunisia:
Most important for you, the youth of Islam, the hope for 
its renaissance, the energy for its revolution, the support 
for its scholars . . .  is not to fear the great sacrifices re­
quired, and not to cease your blows to the heads of dic­
tators and the invading kuffar and international agents, 
until the dismissal of them and their intellectual lefto­
vers and hypocritical agents . . . Fill the streets against
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them and their agents with your screams and protests, 
and destroy their foundations in your hearts and socie­
ties . . . Do not allow the movement on the streets to 
stop, nor the strikes, the confrontations, and the threat­
ening of their interests. The Merciful has offered you a 
great gift through Iraq, so pick up the lead of revolution 
and don’t let it slip away.
It was during that same period that Ghannouchi recorded an au­
dio message to the youth of al-Nahda inside Tunisia, calling on them 
to stand up to the government and be ready to make sacrifices for a 
promised victory, but the cassette ended up in the hands of the authori­
ties, to be used as evidence against the Islamists.
What the Islamists did not anticipate, however, was Ben AH’s 
clever handling of the Gulf war, in that he succeeded in using the con­
flict to secure fresh popular support and to rectify his problems with 
the other opposition parties. In the meantime, he also mastered securi­
ty plans by which to deal with the demonstrations that had begun to 
take place, first organised by the Islamists in September 1990. Some 
acts of violence occurred during confrontations between the security 
forces and the Islamists, but nothing worked according to al-Nahda 's 
plans and calculations.
By December 1990, more than a hundred Islamists had been ar­
rested, among them several members of the “security group”. They 
were one of “three dangerous groups that were planning to execute ter­
rorist activities”, as was announced by the Interior Minister, who also 
accused al-Nahda of being involved with these groups, and said that 
they would be dealt with firmly, in a manner that would “uncover their 
hypocritical religious claims and stop them from harming the country 
and the people”.80
That was the official start of the confrontation. In the panic of losing 
their main leaders, a number of angry Islamists attacked the local bu­
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reau of the ruling party in Bab Souika, one of the quarters of Tunis, on 
February 17, 1991. In trying to bum down the building, they also set 
fire to two security guards, one of whom died, the other of whom was 
gravely burned. Ten days later, most of those involved in the attack 
were arrested and their confessions were made public on television on 
March 1 and 3. Al-Nahda was clearly losing the battle as far as public 
opinion was concerned; all the opposition parties condemned the at­
tack and the violent behaviour of the Islamic movement, but the most 
outspoken condemnation came from within the movement itself.
The interior ministry invited those few remaining leaders of al- 
Nahda who were not in prison, and put to them all the details gathered 
from the detainees involved in the Bab Souika attack. The leaders con­
demned the attack and all other acts of violence, but this was not 
deemed to be sufficient. On March 7, 1991, Mourou, the Secretary 
General, Beldi, the ex-amir and then-president of the majlis al-shura, 
and Ben Issa Demni, editor of al-Fajr newspaper, published a joint 
communique in which they condemned the “irresponsible acts” of vio­
lence committed with the “approval of certain leaders of our move­
ment”, and announced “the freezing of our membership and activities 
with al-Nahda movement, while waiting to take other steps in the near 
future”.81
With this statement, the two main founders of the Tunisian Isla­
mist movement went their different ways publicly and their movement 
became divided, in the midst of the most difficult period of its history. 
Mourou and his friends went on to announce their intention to form a 
new political party, to which Ghannouchi would not be admitted as a 
member, because, according to Mourou, “he had always objected to 
dialogue. He chose to resort to violence. But other Islamists want to
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hold dialogue with the government in office; myself for example”.82
The government, however, expressed little interest. For Ben Ali, 
the priority was to suppress any opportunity for al-Nahda to make a 
surprise coup. On 29 March, the head office of the pro-Islamist student 
organisation (UGET) was raided and was said to contain “chemical 
products intended for the fabrication of Molotov cocktails” and “tracts 
hostile to the government”,83 the official reason given for the banning 
of the organisation. Violence erupted again in the university, leading 
to the deaths of three students during confrontations with the security 
forces. Instead of the support they had shown in 1987, the opposition 
parties signed a joint statement in which they “condemned al-Nahda's 
decision to resort to confrontation” and held it responsible for putting 
at risk “the main national interests of the country and its security and 
stability”.84 The government even went so far as to invite the leaders of 
the opposition parties to inform them about their findings on the ques­
tioning of the arrested Islamists, before making them public.
The political isolation of al-Nahda was then all but complete, both 
inside and outside Tunisia. On May 22 the Interior Minister Abdallah 
Kallal held a press conference at which he officially accused al-Nahda 
of conspiring to overthrow the regime by violence. He spoke of a five- 
phase plan, which had begun with the distribution of tracts and the 
holding of demonstrations, and which had culminated in using the 
army, through the military supporters of the movement, so as to bring 
down the government. He confirmed the arrest of three hundred Isla­
mists, including one hundred from the army, and announced that 
Ghannouchi and Shammam had been the masters of this plan from 
their chosen exile in Algiers. Journalists listened to a recorded mes­
sage from Ghannouchi, in which he vowed that “the struggle will not
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stop before total victory, no matter how many sacrifices and mar­
tyrs”.85
What followed later was a total attack against al-Nahda and every­
thing connected to it, in almost every political and social aspect. Even 
the option of dealing with Mourou was discarded, as it was seen as a 
clever manoeuvre by which to preserve the Islamic movement, but in 
another form. Mourou was ordered to shut his headquarters down and 
abstain from any political activities. On September 28, 1991 the gov­
ernment revealed the discovery of a new plot by the Islamists to assas­
sinate the President himself, by using a “stinger missile” to hit the 
President’s plane. It was the “top degree of treachery”, according to 
the ruling party’s official newspaper. It said in its editorial:
The obscurantists’ plot to assassinate the President has 
closed the door to any kind of mercy towards them in 
the hearts of Tunisians. We now consider them — after 
what their sick minds have planned and their criminal 
hands were going to do — traitors to Tunisia and ene­
mies to its people. 86
Al-Nahda was clearly helpless; the strategy of “enforcing liber­
ties” had ended in total disaster. Almost everything it had achieved 
during the last two decades had been lost, for the time being at least. 
The thousands of its leaders and members arrested were put on trial 
and given various sentences, ranging from the death penalty for those 
involved in the Bab Souika attack, to life sentences for most of the po­
litical leaders and to relatively shorter terms for others.
The government took its fight abroad to make it difficult for Ghan­
nouchi to make any negative publicity against it. Although the leader 
of al-Nahda obtained political asylum in Britain, his margin of action 
was very limited by the refusal of most of the Arab and international 
media to report his views and comments, under pressure from the Tu­
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nisian regime, and also by the continuation of differences among his 
colleagues. Some of them held him responsible for the confrontation 
and demanded his resignation from the leadership, demanding that he 
not be allowed to hold any influential position in the movement
•  87again.
By the end of 1993, Ghannoushi was speaking of a “new Bosnia 
taking place in Tunisia without being noticed”, and claimed that the 
government was involved in a plan to “wind up the heritage of Arab- 
Islamic culture in all its aspects”, but indicated that his movement 
“had made good progress in absorbing the regime’s attack. We are 
now proceeding to prepare an overall plan to liberate our people from 
dictatorship”.88
A different assessment of the situation was given by President Ben 
Ali to the French newspaper Le Figaro. He said:
Fundamentalism — or if you like the religious obscu­
rantist trend — results in terrorism . . .  It is a reactionary 
ideology that rejects all democratic values . . .The fun­
damentalists claim they are the trustees of religion while 
religion is for all people. Religion is a personal matter 
and not an extreme closed ideology . . . In my opinion, 
there is not much difference between what you call 
“moderates” and “extremists”. Their final goal is the 
same, to form a theocratic and authoritarian state. To 
combat those who use religion in order to gain power by 
force, those who reject democracy and commit violence, 
we have adopted a policy of various dimensions. It starts 
in school and continues with wide-ranging policies in 
the economic and social sectors . . .  I do not fear Algeri­
an contamination, Tunisia is a safe body; this problem is 
now solved. Fundamentalism is now your problem — I 
mean that of Paris, London and Washington. 89
This last assessment is indeed close to reality as far as Tunisian Is- 
lamism in the mid-nineties is concerned, but does not mean that the 
fight between both men and parties is conclusively over.
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4The Basis for a “Political” Islam
In order to analyse and understand the main ideas of the Tunisian Isla­
mists, there are certain key concepts which must first be addressed, as 
they play a fundamental role in defining the Islamists’ contemporary 
mission. The first is their religious judgement of contemporary Mus­
lim societies, and whether these societies may truly be considered “Is­
lamic” or not. The answer to this question paves the way for an equal­
ly important second issue, concerning the difference between the 
“Muslim” and the “Islamist”. Thirdly and finally, there is the issue of 
the Islamists’ stand regarding the growing secularist trend in Tunisia 
and the Arab world, and whether or not it can be tolerated within a 
modem Islamic state.
The party of Islam
The Islamists’ judgement of the religious status of their societies both 
embodies the essence of their mission and highlights their main objec­
tive. By this, it puts them on a different course to that of other political 
groups in their countries. Since their starting point is to re-establish the 
authority of Islam in all areas of life, most Islamists tend to both asso­
ciate themselves with Islam and disassociate others from it. It has be­
come a priority for every Islamic movement the world over, and for all 
of their members, to feel, believe and show others that they are the rep­
resentatives of the “true” Islam.
For those of the main Muslim Brotherhood (or Ikhwan) trend, to
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which al-Nahda belongs, this has been their attitude from the outset. 
In the first paragraph of the famous Risalat al-ta‘lim (“Treatise of 
Teachings”), which summarised the main points of the movement’s 
ideology, its founder Hasan al-Banna called upon every Muslim 
Brother to “believe strongly that our ideology is truly Islamic and to 
understand Islam in the way we understand it”.1 One of the move­
ment’s most prominent Syrian leaders, Sa‘id Hawwa, wrote on the fif­
tieth anniversary of the movement’s creation that “the greatest way in 
which the party of Allah is represented in our time and region is the 
Muslim Brotherhood, in the way Professor Hasan al-Banna shaped 
it”.2
The problem, however, is that more than one group claims itself to 
be the “party of Allah”, and in arguing for the case of the Ikhwan, 
Hawwa succeeds only in limiting the meaning of Islam to a narrow, 
partisan definition: the party itself becomes the location for “true” Is­
lam, and everyone outside it is either totally or partially in the wrong. 
From this approach comes what has been described as “exclusivist” Is­
lam, where different groups claim to be the real spokesmen of Islam 
and accuse others of being “enemies” of the faith or, more simply, 
“bad Muslims”.
Writing in the movement’s magazine Al-Da‘wa in 1994, Sayyid 
Nuh, another prominent personality in the Muslim Brotherhood, iden­
tified ten factors which make it impossible for any world force to stop 
the growth of his organisation, backing his claim by citing a number of 
Qur’anic verses and sayings of the Prophet. His aim in so doing was to 
show that the Muslim Brotherhood are the best witnesses for Islam, 
and to assert that because of this “their God will not let them down for 
one moment”3 (emphasis mine).
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For other Islamists who defected from the Ikhwani trend and 
formed the Party of Liberation (Hizb al-Tahrir) in the early fifties in 
Jordan, “the truth” was viewed somewhat differently. In their opinion, 
all Islamic movements that had preceded them had failed, “and it was 
natural that they had failed for, despite being Islamic, these move­
ments were unable to understand the essence of Islam, thus making the 
situation worse and the problem more complicated. In fact, they were 
driving society away from Islam rather than implementing it” .4 The 
point here is not about the validity of the claims of any of these 
groups, but about the exclusivist perception that each of them main­
tains: that they alone are real Muslims and the real holders of religious 
truth.
The nature of this partisan religious approach leads its advocates 
to fight on two simultaneous fronts: on the one hand they claim the 
only legitimate understanding and representation of Islam for them­
selves, while on the other they deny this to others, directly or indirect­
ly, so that their mission alone can be justified and glorified. This parti­
san approach reaches its peak within the tan^im, or organisation, itself, 
where the organisation becomes an alternative to both society and the 
state.
From its early days, the Tunisian Islamist movement also devel­
oped in line with this trend of thought, therefore it was not surprising 
that a large proportion of its literature focussed on its divine and mis­
sionary responsibility in a society that had somehow departed from Is­
lam. The movement’s understanding of “true Islam” is marked by 
symbols and references that are categorically different from those of 
the Tunisian state educational system, for example. Ghannouchi pro­
tested in as early as 1973 about the form of Islamic philosophy that
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was being taught in Tunisian secondary schools at that time:
What idea will our pupils get of the teachings of Islamic 
thought when they cannot find — in the whole text book 
— even a single quotation from one of the contempo­
rary Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal, Abu al- 
A ‘la al-Mawdudi, Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi, Hasan al- 
Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb and Malik Ben- 
nabi? . . . Will the pupils hot think mat Islam has ceased 
to exist, that it is no more than a part of our heritage, 
and has nothing to do with solving our social, economic 
and political problems? 5
This “non-existence” of Islam is seen not only as an educational 
problem for the Islamists; indeed it is much wider. Even in 1981, 
when they arrived on the political scene, Ghannouchi went to the point 
of denying the existence of an Islamic society in his country:
The reason it is necessary to advocate Islam in our soci­
ety is because of the striking contrast between the bril­
liant model of Islam and the very low, dark, material re­
ality; the immorality, the cultural Westernization, the 
social and political injustices, and the alliance —  not 
with Allah, the Prophet and the Muslims — but with the 
international forces of evil. In conclusion, the Muslim is 
a stranger in this society; and he feels more of a stranger 
as he increases his Islamic knowledge. 6
On forming their political party, their message of the Tunisian Is­
lamists to the public and the political class was that they wanted to 
play by democratic rules, something that Hasan al-Banna had earlier 
rejected in Egypt. Was this, then, a sign of moderation or modernism 
on the part of the Tunisian Islamic movement? It may indeed have 
been a sign of both, but the exclusivist approach was again too appar­
ent to be hidden by such new terminology. Ghannouchi and his col­
leagues implied at the party’s first press conference that the existence 
of an Islamic society was not yet a reality, but was rather a goal to be 
aimed at. Ghannouchi’s rationale was as follows:
We don’t want to get rid of one dictatorial tutelage 
(wisdya) [simply] to bring another one in its place. Our
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way is to present ourselves to the people, and if they 
then choose the Islamic programme, what power could 
deny them their choice, other than by cancelling their 
freedom? Similarly, if they choose the communist, or 
any other, ideology who could oppose the people’s will 
other than by dictatorship? 7
This is, ostensibly, a very “democratic” message, with the excep­
tion of one important point: it links the so-called “Islamic” choice, in a 
society which to all intents and purposes had been “Islamic” for many 
centuries, to one small Islamic movement that was at that time only 
ten or eleven years old. Here also is Ghannouchi’s rather broad defini­
tion of the stage at which an Islamic society will be founded: “If the 
Islamic enlightenment is fruitful and the masses accept Islam to rule 
their affairs, then Islam will get its state, and it will be the duty of this 
state to obey the rules of Allah, and assume its responsibility to imple­
ment justice and forbid unfairness”.8
It may be argued that it was Bourguiba’s far-reaching secularist 
policies that had indirectly strengthened the Islamists’ partisan feel­
ings, and the perception that only they could preserve their country’s 
Islamic identity. Here follows a less ambiguous statement by Ghan­
nouchi, in an interview given in 1981 to the Kuwaiti Islamists’ official 
magazine :
Until now, the Islamic Trend of Tunisia has not de­
manded an Islamic state. We do not see this as the 
movement’s goal at the moment. The implementation of 
the Islamic state must come through the Islamic Trend.
It would be a mistake to ask the other parties to fulfil 
our aims and then to implement Islam. 9
Tunisia was, of course, already a “Muslim” state in that Islam had 
been the dominant element in the political and legal system for centu­
ries. The Tunisian people or their rulers’ commitment to the directions 
of Islam may have weakened from time to time and for various rea­
sons, but never to the point that Tunisia could no longer be considered
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an Islamic country, even with the declaration of the Constitution of the 
Republic in 1957.
What was it, then, that led a graduate of philosophy and a group of 
his friends to believe that only they could bring about a truly Islamic 
state in Tunisia? Again, it reflects the manner in which Islamists as­
sess contemporary Muslims, and the theory of the new, “sectarian” ap­
proach to Islam. The Islamists saw themselves as the only party able to 
defend the Islamic state because, as in the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, they considered the society around them as living in 
jahiliyya — the term by which the Qur’an described pre-Islamic Arab 
society — thereby suggesting a state of ignorance and kufr, the very 
opposite of Islam.
The meaning and implications of ja h i l i y y a
When Ghannouchi wrote in al-Ma‘rifa magazine in July 1979, arguing 
for theological education as a vital priority for the Islamic movement, 
he claimed that the reason for this was that “the individual Muslim liv­
ing in these jahili societies is under various pressures”, giving as his 
explanation of ‘ jahili societies”: “Those . . . which are not founded on 
the basis and values of Islam and which do not comply with its laws 
and teachings”.10
But neither the re-introduction of the concept of jahiliyya nor its 
definition within the contemporary context was an innovation on the 
part of Ghannouchi. The term was first used by Mawdudi in respect of 
Muslims in Pakistan, and was reinforced in the Arab world by the fa­
mous martyr of contemporary Islamists, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. 
Qutb began his public career as a writer and critic of literature, and
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joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the late forties, becom­
ing involved in their disputes with the then-President Nasser. He was 
twice jailed for long terms, and was finally executed in 1966 after be­
ing accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. He wrote some of his 
most influential books in prison, including many chapters of his inter­
pretation of the Qur’an, Fi Zilal al-Qur’an. A gifted writer with an el­
oquent style, Qutb’s ideas were further enhanced and glorified after 
his martyrdom, to the point that he become much more influential af­
ter his death than when alive.
In the course of his struggle against Nasser, the champion of Arab 
nationalism, Qutb concluded that the circumstances in which Islam 
had emerged were being repeated once more in twentieth-century 
Egypt, reviving and reinterpreting the ancient term jahiliyya. He gave 
reference to verses 48-50 of sura 5, which conclude: “Do they seek af­
ter a judgement of the age of ignorance (jahiliyya)? But who, for a 
people whose faith is assured, can give better judgement than God?”, 
and argued the following:
Al-jahiliyya is not a part of history, it is rather a situa­
tion which can be found whenever its conditions are 
present in any place or system. It is, in essence, one 
which gives power and legislative effect to the wishes of 
human beings and not to the system of Allah and His 
laws [by which] to rule life. It does not matter whether 
these wishes are of an individual, or a class, or a nation, 
or a whole generation of people; as long as they do not 
obey the sharVa of Allah, they are all merely subjective 
desires. 11
Qutb then explained further, commenting on verse 50:
The Qur’anic text guides people to the crossroads, it is 
either the rule of Allah or the rule of al-jahiliyya, noth­
ing in between and no other alternative is available . . . 
Al-jahiliyya is the state where people are ruled by the 
laws of people, not of Allah. It has happened before, it 
may happen today and tomorrow, and it is always con­
tradictory to Islam and in opposition to it.
As for people, any time and anywhere, they either
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live by the sharVa of Allah without ignoring any part of 
it, so they can belong to Allah’s religion, or they live by 
a sharVa made by a human being . . . and belong to the 
religion of whoever's sharVa they obey. In no way can 
they belong to Allah’s religion.
Qutb made it clear to every Muslim that he or she has to choose 
between: “Islam or jahiliyya, iman or kufr, the rule of Allah or that of 
jahiliyya”, adding that without taking a decisive position on this issue, 
a Muslim “will never advance one single step in the right direction”.13
If the wording of these quotations is seen to echo the similar 
stand taken by Mawdudi regarding secularism, then the resemblance is 
in fact wider than one of mere vocabulary. Although he was the most 
eminent Arab writer to present a complete theory about the modem 
jahiliyya, in many ways Qutb reproduced the ideas of both Mawdudi 
and his devoted disciple, Abu al-Hasan ‘ Ali al-Nadwi.
It was Mawdudi in fact who introduced the use of the term 
jahiliyya in the context of contemporary Islamic societies, as is de­
tailed in many of his books and lectures. However, it was the transla­
tion into Arabic of al-Nadwi’s book Madha khasira al- ‘alam bi inhitat 
al-muslimin? that exported the idea of a “modem jahiliyya” to Arab 
writers. Qutb himself wrote a preface to the second edition of al- 
Nadwi’s book in 1951, in which he noted the use of the term jahiliyya 
to describe the state of all humanity after it had lost an Islamic leader­
ship, and praised the term as being very “precise”, reflecting the “au­
thor’s understanding of the difference between the spirit of Islam and 
the spirit of the materialistic trend which dominated the world [both] 
before Islam and after its contemporary decline”.14
Adopted by Mawdudi and reinforced by Qutb, the concept of 
jahiliyya has been used by many other Islamists all over the Islamic 
world as a term and method by which to describe the state of contem­
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porary Muslim societies and to decide how to go about reinstating the 
ideal Islamic model.
It is true that among Tunisian Islamists the term was not widely 
used, and that even Ghannouchi only employed the term on rare occa­
sions, but the notion of jahiliyya was in evidence from the move­
ment’s ideological beginnings. Regarding themselves as modern-day 
messengers for Islam in a misdirected or jahili society, they were 
strongly motivated to spread their message and expand their ideas and 
influence. When later subjected to government persecution, they also 
gave reference to a jahili society. In doing so, the fortunes of Islam in 
fact became identified with those of the Islamists, as they became the 
only group that was genuinely prepared to fight the “darkness” of 
modem jahiliyya, both regionally and world-wide. As Ghannouchi 
wrote in 1979:
During the fourteenth century A.H., Muslims have faced 
many bitter defeats on all levels. But, thanks to God, 
they have not given up, and have remained defiant, re­
fusing submission and making sacrifices under the lead­
ership of Islamic movements, until Allah rewarded them 
with strong signs of victory [the Iranian Revolution].
What we believe is that Islam will continue its costly 
jihad  into the fifteenth century, defending its values ana 
stances. Furthermore it will assume a position of attack, 
in order to liberate the world from the darkness of mate­
rialism and its injustices and exploitation, and to build a 
world in which there would be no conflict between the 
human being and his conscience. He would be recon­
ciled with religion, as would economics and politics 
with moral values, today’s life with the day after, the 
human being with his brother human being, all under 
the sharVa of Islam, the sharVa of security, justice and 
freedom. 15
The point that this quote illustrates, however, is that an exclusi- 
vist approach to Islam in fact leads Ghannouchi to rewrite history and 
misrepresent the present. It is well known for example that those Is­
lamic movements praised by Ghannouchi (the Muslim Brotherhood
126
and al-Jamd‘a al-Isldmiyya in Pakistan) played only a minor role in 
the struggles for national liberation in most of the Islamic world. 
Whether in North Africa or in the Middle East, national movements 
were led by the likes of the FLN in Algeria, the Neo-Destour in Tuni­
sia and the Wafd in Egypt. However, his somewhat cavalier approach 
to historical facts shows how he has given priority to raising morale 
among his supporters and to portraying Islamic movements as the 
champions of liberation and progress.
In a society seen as being sick and misguided, the Islamists chose 
to invest in their tangim, or organisation, which was seen to be the 
only alternative in the absence of a truly Islamic society, and a parallel 
to that which they refused to consider Islamic. The concept of 
jahiliyya is also one of defensiveness, meaning that the individual 
Muslim feels alienated, despite being in his or her country and among 
his or her family and friends, as the leader of al-Nahda warns:
[The Muslim] is like a fish out of water . . .  He faces 
what amounts to brainwashing because of the domina­
tion of the jahili media. Using their vast powers over the 
masses, the media try by different means to make him 
unsure of himself, of his [Muslim] brothers, his religion, 
the active Islamic groups and their history, and the pious 
and militant scholars or Islam. At the same time, the me­
dia try to remove any psychological obstacles erected by 
Islam and its culture netween Muslims and the rest of 
jahili cultures, groups, values and ideologies. 16
The terms “Islam” or “Muslim” as employed in this quote are 
used according to the Islamists’ exclusivist definition; what concerned 
Ghannouchi was that his followers would succumb to the misleading 
picture of Islamic movements and their leaders — in his opinion the 
only true representatives of Islam — as projected by a hostile media. 
In this context his young supporters chose to cut themselves off from 
society and show total commitment and obedience to the “pious and
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militant scholars o f Islam”.
The role of the taniim  was to offer protection from such jahili 
pressures, and accordingly, every ordinary Muslim who sought this 
form of protection became an “Islamist”. This differentiation between 
“Muslim” and “Islamist” is one of the most important pillars of the lit­
erature of contemporary Islamic movements, and will be considered in 
further depth below.
The “Muslim” and the “Islamist”
When Ghannouchi spoke about jahili societies, he spoke also about its 
victims: ordinary Muslims. These are not considered jahili people as 
such, but their society is jahili because it is not ruled by the laws and 
rules of Islam. However, it is not the “Muslim” who will bring about a 
return to the aims of Islam but the “Islamist”. According to Ghannou­
chi, Islamists are “all those who want to build the human being, civili­
sation and society on the basis of Islamic values, as they understand 
them”.17 They are also the real representatives of Islam itself, as Ghan­
nouchi claims:
We are the leading elite of the one million Muslims 
yearning for progress, civilisation and world peace un­
der Islam. If we are to be mocked and insulted, our ene­
mies should be clear and frank enough to mock and in­
sult Islam itself. Only Islamists provide the real vision.18
Such is the essence of exclusivism, which the current wave of Is- 
lamism has insisted upon: on many occasions they have denied that 
they regard themselves as the official spokesmen of Islam, but on 
many other occasions they have said and practised the opposite. Ghan­
nouchi is clear in his argument that to mock Islamists means to mock 
Islam, and to attack them means attacking Islam, as they and Islam are
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one.
It is true that every political group tends to present itself as the best 
to serve the nation, and that it may claim that it is the only real demo­
cratic, or socialist or liberal group in the country, however this differs 
from a religious claim. There are no serious implications in the tradi­
tional rhetoric between competing political groups, but religious 
claims may lead to dangerous consequences in that Muslims may con­
sider their opponents as enemies of Islam itself, and not merely oppo­
nents of a certain political party.
Only Islamists are eligible for membership in this new, self- 
proclaimed party of “first-class” Islam. Others, referring to the mil­
lions of nominal “Muslims” are the victims of the new jahiliyya; they 
may not be considered enemies of Islam, but are at best ignorant fol­
lowers of an inferior, “second-class” form of Islam.
The logic behind this new division between “first-" and “second- 
class” Islam is explained by Ghannouchi:
The ordinary Muslim may not know his religion well 
enough to understand the political and civilisational im­
plications of Islam, and this is why we need the Isla­
mists to work for the whole Islamic entity. An ordinary 
Muslim should theoretically be an Islamist, meaning 
that his analysis of politics, society and civilisation must 
be based upon Islam, but this level is not easily reached 
by people because of the various difficulties in human 
life. We end up then with a gap between the ordinary Is­
lamic “minimum”, and the ideal Islamist model. 19
For many Muslims, however, such sectarianism within the Islam­
ic community is simply unacceptable, and most, if not all, opponents 
of the Islamists reject the views of al-Nahda but not of Islam itself, 
many refusing to accept that a twenty-year-old political party can be 
the sole representative of their faith, or that it is even sincere in its re­
ligious claims. Indeed many people regard the Islamists’ position as 
merely a political manoeuvre masked by religious slogans, in an at-
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tempt to gain wider popular support.
In the heat of their arguments with secularists and others, Islamists 
in various countries have tried to defend their adopted title, arguing 
that “Islamist” does not necessarily exclude others from Islam itself. 
Indeed Ghannouchi has compared it to the nationalist, socialist and lib­
eral parties, and has argued that one may still find nationalists outside 
the nationalist party, and socialists outside the socialist party.20 Howev­
er, the case with the Islamists is different: “Islamist” is not merely an 
arbitrary choice of name, but the result of a well-defined ideology 
which condemns Muslim society for abandoning Islam. Secondly, be­
ing religious in essence, it cannot be compared with a political trend 
such as that of the liberals, nationalists or socialists, for with any of 
these contemporary trends, there is no danger involved in rejecting 
them, whereas to be seen to reject Islam is potentially punishable from 
a religious perspective.
Thus an ordinary Muslim in the above position may find him or 
herself the victim of the “sincerity and courage” of someone who sees 
himself as a “good Muslim”, and who wants to get to paradise by kill­
ing an “enemy” of Islam, as is currently happening in Algeria or Af­
ghanistan. In this respect, a change of name would not make a great 
deal of difference when the logic behind it does not change, which is 
why one continues to read statements by Ghannouchi praising his 
movement as the only real representative of Islam and condemning his 
enemies as the foremost threat against it. Even on the occasions when 
some of his colleagues have criticised him for what they have consid­
ered to be political miscalculations, he has used the same line of 
thought in response, advising them “not to doubt the support of Allah, 
and to regain faith in their movement and leadership”.21
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VIt is predictable therefore that within this context, a majority of 
those interested in the issue of Islamism, whether researchers or politi­
cians, have vehemently opposed this two-fold division within Islam. 
“Islamism in the dictionary derives from Islam”, argues the French 
orientalist Maxime Rodinson, adding that “the reader may risk confus­
ing an excited extremist who wants to kill the whole world, with a nor­
mal person who believes in goodness according to the well-respected 
Muslim concept”.22
Islamism or fundamentalism?
The question of “appellation” is by no means simple. It is a part of the 
political and theoretical debates which have arisen with the resurgence 
of Islamic movements, both in the Arab and Western worlds. It is 
worth mentioning here that the term “Islamist” may be traced back as 
far as to the tenth century A.D., when the famous Sunni theologian, 
‘All ibn Isma‘il al-Ash‘ari, wrote this short preface to his work 
Maqalat al-Islamiyyln wa Ikhtilaf al-Musallin (“The Sayings of Isla­
mists and the Differences between Worshippers”): “After the death of 
the Prophet, peace be upon him, people disagreed about many issues; 
they became different groups and divided parties, but Islam still united 
them and covered them all.” 23
There was evidently no argument then about the term; it was seen 
to derive from the word Islam, and had none of the implications ac­
corded to it today. The Islamic community in al-Ash‘ari’s time was 
still united, strong and able to absorb conflicting views on policies and 
doctrines. “Between Sunnis and ShTas, and between various divisions 
of each,” argues Hourani, “. . . was a sense of community, based on 
the profound conviction of Muslims that to live together in unity was
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more important than to carry doctrinal disputes to their logical conclu­
sion”.24 This sense of community also extended to Christian and Jew­
ish peoples, “who were recognized as ‘People of the Book’, who be­
lieved in God, the Prophets, and the Day of Judgement, who possessed 
an authentic revelation and so belonged to the same spiritual family as 
the Muslims”.25
In contrast, there is a sharp difference in the current use of the 
term “Islamist”. The prevailing situation in the Islamic world is quite 
the opposite to that of al-Ash‘ari’s time, being one of division rather 
than unity. Islamists now strongly believe that they are different to 
“ordinary Muslims”, and see themselves as an elite that should be en­
trusted to look after both spiritual and political life. Other Muslims — 
most importantly those in power — do not agree, and accuse the Isla­
mists of using Islam for political ends. Curiously, however, as govern­
ments have begun to realise that religious affiliation is as a route by 
which to gain political power, they have felt obliged to use the same 
logic in an attempt to defend their interests. Thus they have begun to 
portray themselves as the real protectors of Islam, and to portray Isla­
mists as “terrorists” and “enemies of Islam”.
Thus al-Nahda found that its fiercest opponents were not in the 
West but at home, within those intellectual schools and political par­
ties that insisted that any political group bearing the Islamist tag 
should be banned, arguing that the whole nation is Muslim and that 
this is not the privilege of one single party. This is how one Tunisian 
writer and artist, Izz al-Din al-Madani, has argued against them:
Recognition of these groups who shout that they are 
“Islamist” would mean that the rest of the society is not 
Islamic, that is to say kafir . . . How is it possible to 
recognise them and their missionary function for Islam 
in an Islamic society? Is this not one of the paradoxes of
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these times? 26
The argument was repeated everywhere: “When you use the 
name ‘Islamist’,” said one secularist Muslim journalist in an interview 
with Ghannouchi, “you create a lot of confusion on the political scene 
and among the general public, because you imply that those who are 
not members of these [Islamic] movements are not actually Mus­
lims.”27
Thus the Tunisian Islamist movement found itself with a theolog­
ical and political problem, and with no past precedent to guide it. Be­
fore independence from French rule in 1956, there had been no such 
division on the Tunisian political scene between Islamists and non- 
Islamists: all groups, with the exception of the somewhat ambiguous 
communists, recognised Islam as the most important factor in the 
country’s cultural, religious, and political identity. Furthermore, their 
attachment to Islam had been a prime dimension of the struggle for na­
tional liberation; it was seen by all political parties (again, with the ex­
ception of the communists) as both a conviction and a political strate­
gy, and the sole means of safeguarding Tunisians from assimilation 
and losing their identity.28 There were, of course, different trends and 
views among those parties concerning many issues, but they were not 
articulated as conflicts between “Islamists” and “non-Islamists”. The 
most common terms used to express the different views on the role of 
Islam in society, especially after independence, were “modernism” and 
“traditionalism”.
Even ex-President Bourguiba, a secular and modernising leader, 
was keen to present his ideas as being compatible with Islam insofar 
as it was possible, and was cautious to avoid forcing secularism on all 
aspects of political and social life. Indeed Hisham Djeit, one of the
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leading contemporary historians on Tunisia, argues that Bourguiba’s 
secularist views were not of a category that may be described as “anti- 
Islamic”.29 In line with this way of thinking, both Bourguiba and his 
successor, Zein al-Abidine ben Ali, explained their refusal to legalise 
any religious political party on the grounds that all Tunisians are Mus­
lims, and that no political party should use a common religious ground 
to achieve its partisan political aims. Islamists have always rejected 
this argument, and have accused the government of violating their po­
litical and democratic rights.
“It is necessary then,” warns the French writer Michel Camau, 
“not to confuse a politico-religious phenomenon of a circumstantial 
character with a culture of more than a thousand years,” asserting fur­
ther that “Tunisian society is Islamic. This is a fact that the events of a 
decade cannot challenge or deny”.30
As a consequence of such arguments, Islamists have been widely 
denied the recognition they so desire. Their movements have been 
banned in many parts of the Arab world, and even when allowed to 
operate legally their “Islamist” appellation has always been in ques­
tion. Their opponents prefer to call them “al-usiiliyyun”, or “funda­
mentalists” in English, “les integristes ” in French. In the eyes of their 
enemies they are not even that, but are “extremists” and “reactionar­
ies”.31
Most Arab intellectuals admit that “fundamentalism” as well as 
“integrisme” are both Western terms that were originally used in spe­
cifically Western circumstances. According to the Oxford dictionary 
definition, fundamentalism is the “strict maintenance of traditional 
Protestant beliefs”, while the Longman dictionary defines it both as “a 
belief in the literal truth of the Bible”, or “a Protestant movement in
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the twentieth century emphasising such belief’.
The term “fundamentalism” does not appear in the Encyclopaedia 
of Islam; the derivative term “usul” speaks of roots, or principles. 
Among the various terminological uses of this word, two are promi­
nent as terms for branches of Muslim learning: usul al-din, and usul 
al-fiqh. With regard to the French term “integrisme ”, it is described in 
the 1975 edition of the Lexis dictionnaire de la langue frangaise as: “a 
tendency of Catholics who claim their adherence to the sole orthodox 
(or traditional) doctrine, and who wish to maintain the integrity of 
their doctrines”, or an “attitude of those who refuse to adapt their doc­
trines to new circumstances”. Similarly, the 1932 edition of Le Petit 
Robert says that “L ’integrisme is a doctrine which tends to maintain 
the totality of a system, or an attitude of Catholics who refuse all kinds 
of evolution”; the “integriste” is described also as a member of a 
Spanish party which called for the submission of the State to the 
Church.
Thus we may see that both the English and French terms used to 
define modem Islamic movements are by no means neutral terms, 
rather, they have negative connotations rooted in Western history, in 
that they are linked to certain orthodox religious trends that have re­
fused evolution and change. When Western analysts began to pay 
close attention to Islamic movements following the Iranian revolution 
in 1979, they found terms such as “fundamentalism” and “integrisme” 
to be the closest descriptions that could be applied to what they knew 
of autocratic religious trends in their own history. Thus they adopted 
the two terms and made them universal in their application.
For the United States in particular, which had backed the Shah’s 
falling regime in Iran, almost everything connected to Islam at that
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time was seen in a negative light, and not only that relating to Islamic 
movements and their activities. Coverage of Islam from the Western 
perspective — what Edward Said has coined the “covering up” of Is­
lam —  was seriously imbalanced:
This coverage — and with it the work of academic ex­
perts on Islam, geopolitical strategists who speak of “the 
crescent of crisis”, cultural thinkers who deplore the 
“decline of the West” — is misleadingly full. It has giv­
en consumers of news the sense that they have under­
stood Islam without at the same time intimating to them 
that a great deal in this energetic coverage is based on 
far from objective material. In many instances “Islam” 
has licensed not only patent inaccuracy but also expres­
sions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even 
racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostil­
ity. All this has taken place as part of what is presumed 
to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of Islam. 32
Below is another definition of “fundamentalism”, as seen from a 
wider, universal perspective:
Religious fundamentalism, whether Jewish, Christian, 
or Islamic, consists of an assertion that the received sa­
cred text consists of a set of eternal living truths. It has, 
therefore, an inbuilt guarantee of infallibility. It is an 
ideology of the Books as the all-sufficient guide in eve­
ry condition and circumstance of life in whatever centu­
ry or for whatever purpose. It neglects transcendence 
and open-endedness ana avoids the need for a creative 
re-interpretation of the faith. It sees God in the light of 
its own concepts. Having made up its mind what the 
faith should be, isolated texts are then used as proof 
texts, often in support of some particular cause. 33
This definition does not totally explain the notion of fundamental­
ism, however, in that it is also an ambitious theory, an activist trend 
which expresses a religious obligation to save the sacred (and un­
changed) faith and doctrines from any distortion. The implications of 
this, as presented below, appear to be somewhat ominous:
The notion of activism is, therefore, closely associated 
with that of fundamentalism; and some movements may 
behave in a manner which justifies the use of the term 
“militant”, or even “terrorists”. But these are far from
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being essential characteristics. Similarly, the assertion 
that one set of beliefs is true can lead to a denial of the 
veracity of all others, and then intolerance and persecu­
tion may result. Fundamentalism is clearly more likely 
to produce an atmosphere of confrontation rather than 
co-operation, but it need not inevitably do so. 34
Twice in this passage, the author attempts to dilute the dangerous 
liaisons he suggests between fundamentalism on the one hand, and ter­
rorism and intolerance on the other, arguing that these characteristics 
are “far from being essential” to fundamentalism. But this is little 
comfort to those regarded as fundamentalists, who have already been 
labelled with a series of negative descriptions: mainly “conservative” 
and “anti-evolutionist”, besides which they are usually portrayed as 
dissidents and terrorists. Even Roger Garaudy, the French philosopher 
who converted to Islam, affirms in the first paragraph of his book Inte- 
grismes that “integristes, all integristes, whether technocrats, Stalin­
ists, Christian, Jewish or Islamic, today represent the biggest danger 
for the future”.35
A minority of Western thinkers disapprove of this general trend of 
condemning Islamic fundamentalism as one entity; two well-known 
proponents of this trend are the French scholar Francois Burgat and 
the American John Esposito. Both have met with Ghannouchi many 
times and have written sympathetically about both him and his move­
ment. In his book The Islamic Threat, Esposito has criticised oriental­
ists such as Bernard Lewis and all those who see “the Muslim world 
through the prism of Khomeini and revolutionary Iran”, arguing that 
their work has deeply influenced American perceptions of Islam and 
the Middle East, and that it has “often obscured the differences and di­
visions in the Muslim world; the many countries and Muslims that did 
not follow his lead; Iran’s failure or at best very limited success in ex­
porting and inciting Islamic revolutions; and the many voices other
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than Khomeini’s who spoke out on Salman Rushdie".36
The general direction of this debate about Islamism and fundamen­
talism is not in favour of the Islamists. For the greater part, the consen­
sus among many Western and Arab writers about the “dangers” of 
fundamentalism is another sign of the “unholy” alliance between the 
West and Arab secular elites. Islamists themselves disapprove of the 
use of the translation of the Arabic word al-usuliyya as “fundamental­
ism”, and similarly reject its attendant implications. But they have not 
been able to effectively counterbalance the influence of the mass me­
dia, nor the insistence of Western and Muslim secular writers on im­
posing what they see as an inappropriate and misconceived concept on 
them. This is why some have opted for a more pragmatic stance, and 
have accepted the term but have tried to change its negative connota­
tions. Abdelmajid al-Najjar of al-Nahda explains: “Al-usuliyya derives 
from usul, meaning the Islamic trend that accepts the basics of Islam 
[the Qur’an, traditions, views of the Sahaba] as the basis of their ideo­
logical, political and social programmes”.37 He also extends the scope 
of the term to cover all those who believe in the Islamic identity of Tu­
nisia, as accepted in its long history since the country was Islamised at 
the end of the seventh century.38
As for Ghannouchi and the movement itself, they found that 
problems regarding the movement’s name had done them more harm 
than good as far as their political interests were concerned. Thus in 
1988 the movement dropped its historical name, Harakat al-Ittijah al- 
Islami, and chose its current name, Harakat al-Nahda, in which no 
“Islamic” term is included. This was largely a political move taken to 
obey the regulations banning “Islamic” political parties, but the move­
ment’s theoreticians also attempted to rationalise it. Ghannoushi ex­
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plains that although “Islamists” is in fact the best possible term for 
those seeking the Islamic model, such a term is not essential, because 
names do not necessarily convey the truth. “We gave up the term on 
that basis,” he says. “If we had believed that it was essential, we 
would not have dropped it.”39
It is ideas, not names, that concern the Tunisian Islamists: they 
have given up the term “Islamic” in their official name, but their ideol­
ogy, projects and aims remain unchanged. They still maintain that 
their society is “sick” and in need of Islam — that is, an Islam in its 
comprehensive sense — which we shall now examine in more detail.
The principle of comprehensiveness
One central point in the ideology of contemporary Islamic movements, 
al-Nahda included, is the firm belief in the validity of Islam, not only 
to guide society in matters of faith and culture, but also in all political, 
social and economic aspects of life. All movements begin by asserting 
that Islam is both a religion and a state {din wa dawla), meaning that it 
must rule in matters of faith, as well as political issues. They all be­
lieve that Islam is “more than just a matter of faith and ritual and that 
it provides solutions to all social, political, economic and cultural 
problems”, and argue that “the present economic, political, military, 
social and cultural weakness of the Muslim world is the direct result of 
deviation from the true path, and in particular the espousal of secular 
and materialistic ideologies and values”.40
The two main notions that Islam is comprehensive and that it is 
the only solution for the current weakness of the Islamic world, pro­
vide all Islamists with an ideology, an aim and a raison d'etre. When 
they proceed to the details of this basic theory, however, they differ
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among themselves about how to bring about the true Islamic state, and 
thus become divided into different groups and parties. As has been 
mentioned, al-Nahda belongs to the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood 
trend, which supports a view of Islam as defined by Hasan al-Banna:
We believe that Islam’s regulations and teachings are 
comprehensive. They organise people’s affairs in this 
life and in the next. Those who believe that these teach­
ings concentrate on theological and spiritual matters are 
simply mistaken. Islam is belief and worship, country 
and nationality, religion and state, spirit and action,
Qur’an and a sword. The Holy Qur’an is very clear 
about all this and considers it part of the essence of Is­
lam . . . The Muslim Brotherhood is totally convinced 
that Islam has this overall comprehensive meaning, and 
that it must rule and supervise all aspects of life . . .  as 
long as the umma wants to be Islamic in the correct 
manner. 41
Because of the early influence of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
on Ghannouchi, his understanding of Islam and of the duties of the Tu­
nisian Islamists is close to that of his Syrian counterparts. From the 
days of the organisation’s beginnings in 1969 as al-Jama‘a al- 
Islamiyya, the Islamists promoted themselves as representatives of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas in their country. In turn they became part 
of the international network of Muslim Brothers, and every full mem­
ber was asked to swear to serve the movement, as part of the interna­
tional organisation of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. This rule is still valid to 
the present day.
With the formation of the MTI in 1981 its leaders announced 
their manifesto, in which they stated that there were two main factors 
behind the emergence of their trend, one religious, the other political. 
On the religious side, they stated that Islam had become little more 
than a symbol encircled by cultural, moral and political dangers, com­
ing as the direct result of a prevailing lack of interest and attacks on its 
values, institutions and people.42 On the political side, it was argued:
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Despite gaining its formal documents of independence, 
Tunisia suffered from special circumstances 
characterised by crisis, increasing social confrontation 
and the suspension of efforts for overall development.
This situation was further exacerbated because of the 
unitary political control of the Destour party, and its 
growing inclination towards total domination of power 
and mass institutions and organisations. It was also due 
to impromptu political and social policies and its 
fluctuations and dependency on international interests, 
which contradict the national interests of our people.43
Because of these two main reasons, the Islamists felt obliged by 
their “divine, national and human responsibility, to continue their ef­
forts and improve them, aiming for the real liberation of the country 
and its progress on the just bases of Islam and its straight path”.44
The combination of the religious and the political was strongly 
emphasised in every part of the 1981 declaration, and was clearly 
marked as representing the basis of the movement’s ideology and its 
Islamic identity. They prepared themselves for a negative reaction, as 
this defiant excerpt shows:
Some will describe our activities as a way of mixing re­
ligion with politics. This criticism does not only reflect 
a clerical approach alien to our original culture, but also 
suggests a desire to prolong the historical deviation of 
the Islamic world . . .  the [members of] the Islamic 
Trend Movement, without claiming to be the official 
spokesmen for Islam in Tunisia, think it is its right to 
adopt a broad approach to Islam, which makes the basic 
theory from which the various intellectual views of the 
movement come, as well as its political, economic and 
social programmes, which shape the identity of the 
movement and establish its strategic and tactical posi­
tions. 45
To match this analysis, the first goal of the MTI — out of the five 
mentioned within the declaration — was to bring about the rebirth of 
Tunisia’s Islamic identity, so that it could both reclaim its status as a 
great base for Islamic civilisation in Africa and bring an end to its “cri­
sis of identity”. The second goal consisted in the renewal of Islamic
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thought on the basis of the fundamental principles of Islam, in addition 
to purging it of the traces of the age of “backwardness” and the influ­
ence of Westernisation. In the list of means by which to achieve those 
goals, the use of mosques to mobilise the masses assumed first place.46
In many ways, the declaration reflects closely the intention of al- 
Jama ‘a al-Islamiyya some ten years earlier to serve Islam and build a 
true and just Islamic state, in opposition to the modem, secular Bour- 
guiban version. Then, as now, the Islamists were compelled to present 
a strong front on three main issues: to justify the involvement of relig­
ion in politics in accordance with the original texts of Islam, thus mak­
ing their case against secularism; secondly, to justify their call for an 
Islamic state in an already-Islamic country that had adopted Islam in 
its constitution as its official state religion; and thirdly, to present a de­
tailed model for the Islamic government that the movement so hoped 
to bring about.
Islam and secularism
In arguing for a broad Islam that rules over both the individual and 
collective society, al-Nahda rejects the secularist concept that separ­
ates religion and the state. From the outset, Ghannouchi and his col­
leagues were unequivocal regarding their aim of placing religion at the 
heart of the political system. From as early as 1973, Ghannouchi ex­
pressed his confidence in what he saw as the solution for the problems 
of Tunisia and the whole Muslim world:
In the past, our umma could only go forward with Islam 
. . . The main revolutions in our history have been based 
on Islamic values and that is the reason behind their suc­
cess. When we tried in other instances to make radical 
changes and ignored those values, our programmes and 
plans ended in total failure.
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When we call for the rebirth of Islamic values in our 
minds throughout the entire umma, it is not simply to 
achieve the Baraka of religion, or because it woulcf solve 
our problems on the Day of Judgement before God . . .
The problem of Muslims is that they do not adopt the Is­
lamic solution to their problems, and this is why they 
are backward. 47
In 1979, when the movement began to attract negative attention 
from the authorities, Ghannouchi responded to those who accused the 
Islamists of using Islam for their political ends by arguing that
in principle, we find no problem in insisting that politics 
is a part of Islam’s comprehensive programme by which 
to conduct life. Islam strongly rejects the Western con­
cept of the separation between religion and state, be­
cause it regards the state as a servant to religion, respon­
sible for its protection, the execution of its orders, and 
making its word the most influential in the world. 4
In this context, Ghannouchi asserted that “the Islamic state is the 
main goal for the political movement that adopts a religious basis”.49 
Referring to evidence by which to support this theory, he alludes to 
Qur’anic verses from suras 4 and 5, as is the case with most Islamic 
movements. Here is al-Najjar’s response to those who questioned the 
connection between religion and state:
It is possible to confirm Islam’s authority to rule over 
political and social life with just one verse, such as:
‘But no, by thy Lord, they can have no [real] faith, until 
they make thee judge in all disputes between them” (4:
65), and the verse: “If any do fail to judge [hukm] by 
[the light of] what God has revealed, they are [no better 
than] unbelievers” (5: 44). 50
However, these verses do not contain any clear instructions or in­
dications about a political system that may be called “the Islamic 
state”, and some Muslims, such as the Egyptian Dr. Muhammad 
Ahmad Khalafallah argue that the Arabic word hukm, as used in the 
previous verses, relates to the judicial system only, and not to a system 
of government.51 But the political interpretation is still defended in two
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further arguments by the Tunisian Islamists. The first is by al-Najjar:
Islamic teachings came to enlighten the human being 
with the truth about his existence, as well as with the ba­
sics for social and economic dealings, also rules for the 
administration of the umma’s affairs, meaning its politi­
cal affairs . . .  On the basis of this, the first element in 
the political dimension of [Tunisian] identity according 
to the usuli approach is that the overall rules for the 
government should be drawn from the revelation. First 
among the revelation’s rules on government is that the 
nation must organise itself politically and adopt a presi­
dential institution, which is called in Islamic thought the 
“Caliphate” or “Imamate”. 52
The second argument is presented by Ghannouchi:
To emphasise the necessity of government in Islam or 
for Islam does not mean it is a part of it, because there is 
no direct order in Islam to install it. However, its ab­
sence will make void all — or the majority — of the 
laws of Islam. As association is necessary for people’s 
life and prosperity, and as they definitely need a govern­
ment to uphold justice among them, and because Islam 
is a canon of justice, that government will either be re­
sponsible for implementing it and thus being Islamic, or 
for implementing another canon and thus being non- 
Islamic; call it what you like, but not Islamic. 53
The Islamists’ approach to the issue of the Islamic state is as val­
id today as it was at the time of the movement’s conception. It is nei­
ther right nor wrong, and there is (in theory) no compromise with any 
form of secularism, as there is only one formula for an Islamic state, 
despite there being many others for non-Islamic models. Ghannouchi 
chose merely to follow and repeat what the main leaders of contempo­
rary Islamic trends had said before him, especially those whom he had 
selected as the most important reformers of this century: Mawdudi, 
Hasan al-Banna and Ayatollah Khomeini.54
Al-Banna’s views were widely known in this respect: he argued 
that one of the main goals of his movement was to set up a
Muslim government which will guide the people to the 
mosque and lead them according to the teachings of Is­
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lam. We do not recognise any government that is not 
based on Islam, we do not recognise these political par­
ties, nor these traditional forms of rule imposed upon us 
by the enemies of Islam. We will work to reinstate the 
Islamic regime in all its aspects, and form an Islamic 
government based on this regime. 55
As for Mawdudi, he asserted that Islam can never truly be ful­
filled without being the sole criterion for the state’s affairs. His clear 
advice to Muslims is as follows:
If you truly and strongly believe in Islam with which 
came the Qur’an and Muhammad, peace be upon him, 
then you have to fight democratic nationalistic secular­
ism, and take the lead to implement the Lord’s khilafa , 
based on the worship of God wherever you are and 
wherever you settle, especially in the country where you 
are in control. But if you choose to be responsible for 
this regime that does not believe in Allah and his mes­
sengers, then there is nothing we can do but to cry and 
feel sorry for your fake Islam, and your false claim of 
abiding by it.
For Mawdudi, secularism is the opposite of religion, because the 
relationship between God and the human may take only one of two 
forms:
Either Allah is indeed the creator, master and governor 
of the human being and the universe in which he lives, 
or he is not so . . .  If Allah is the creator, master and 
governor . . .  then it is not logical that his rules and juris­
diction should be restricted to the personal affairs of the 
individual and should not cover the relationship between 
him and others in public life . . .  If there were no need 
for Allah and his teachings in our family life, our com­
munity affairs, nor in the school and faculty, shops and 
the market, or in parliament and government, or in the 
government’s administration, or in the military camp . . . 
then what would be left of the meaning of worshipping 
God? 57
This categorical rejection of secularism is one of the main themes 
of Mawdudi’s thought. He shuns secularism because of its capacity to 
“conceivably exclude all morality, ethics or human decency from the 
controlling mechanisms of society”, and because “morality of any 
kind is simply inconceivable without religion and the sanctions of eter­
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nal punishment to support it”, arguing that “when religion is relegated 
to the personal realm, men inevitably give way to their bestial impuls­
es and perpetrate evil upon one another. In fact, it is precisely because 
they wish to escape the restraints of morality and divine guidance that 
men espouse secularism”.58
The argument concerning secularism in the Islamic world is not, 
of course, decided by the assertions of the Islamists alone. Many other 
Muslims, especially those among the ruling classes and the intelligent­
sia, defend secularism, not necessarily as an alternative to Islam, but 
as an “Islamic” idea, or at least as a concept that is compatible with Is­
lam. The Algerian Mohamed Arkoun may be seen to represent this 
trend when he argues for what amounts to a “manifesto” for “Islamic 
secularism”. In his opinion, not only is “secularism included in the 
Qur’an and the Medinan experience”, but also asserts that “the 
Umayyad-‘Abbasid state is secularist; ideological theorising by the 
jurists is a circumstantial product using conventional and credulous ar­
guments to hide a historical and political reality; this theorising is built 
on an outdated theory of knowledge”.59
Arkoun also mentions that the “very early military powers played 
a pre-eminent role in the caliphate, the sultanate and all later forms of 
Islamic government,” and argues that “attempts to rationalise the de 
facto  secularism and to develop a lay attitude have been made by the 
f a l a s i f a which explains why the “new history of Islamic thought has 
to devote a chapter to the sociology of the failure of philosophy: it is 
one of the requirements of reasserting a philosophical attitude in Is­
lamic thought.” 60
For the Tunisian Islamists, as well as for the vast majority of Isla­
mists in the Arab world, Mawdudi’s argument is representative of
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their stand against secularism, while Arkoun’s view is dismissed as an 
apologia for a Western argument, which they oppose. They do not 
hide their rejection of the Western separation between religion and 
state which, in their opinion, clearly contradicts the principles of Is­
lamic political theory. Ghannouchi argues:
There is no future for a political group that wants to 
govern on the basis of refusing the rule of Islam. It has 
no hope of ruling a society with which it cannot be asso­
ciated, simply because this society is of an Islamic na­
ture . . . there are no grounds for our secularists to be­
lieve that Islam may abandon its authority to rule and 
guide society at any time in the future. They have to 
give up their hopes of changing the nature of Islam to 
Christianity”, meaning a set o f  beliefs that bears no re­
lationship to the running of society’s affairs.61
On this matter Ghannouchi takes an uncompromising stand, and 
the Tunisian Islamists offer a number of arguments in his defence. Al- 
Najjar, the second leading theoretician of the movement, argues that 
the emergence of secularism in Europe was the result of various fac­
tors such as “the nature of Christianity, which does not claim to cover 
all aspects of life”, and “the atrocities perpetrated by the Church in the 
name of religion”; reasons that are deemed void in the Islamic context, 
as “Islam rules all aspects of human life, and there has been no clergy 
in its history claiming special religious authority and becoming a dic­
tatorship, ruling the people by force. This is why the Islamic world did 
not know secularism before its emergence in the West, meaning that it 
is simply imported from them.” 62
Although there have been a number of Muslim and non-Muslim 
thinkers who have defended the concept of secularism and have tried 
to make it compatible with Islam, such as Arkoun and ‘All ‘Abd al- 
Raziq of Egypt (1888-1966) before him, in his Al-Islam wa Usul al- 
Hukm (“Islam and the Bases of Political Authority”), the majority of
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writers and experts on Islam do recognise what may be called the 
“special relationship” between Islam and the state.
It would seem in fact that there is recognition of the anti­
secularist concept in Islam among even the majority of researchers in 
the West. The only difference here is that some of them choose to 
highlight this point as a “negative” feature, especially when addressing 
a Western public which disapproves of interference of the religious in 
the political. Bernard Lewis, for instance, claims that there was no dis­
tinction between “church” [sic] and “state” in classical Islam, and 
makes a comparison with Christendom where
the existence of two authorities goes back to the 
founder, who enjoined his followers to render unto Cae­
sar the things which are Caesar’s and to God the things 
which are God’s. Throughout the history of Christen­
dom there have been two powers, God and Caesar, rep­
resented in this world by sacerdotium and regnum, or . .
. church and state.63
Lewis also argues that classical Arabic did not even possess vo­
cabulary corresponding to the notions of “spiritual and temporal . . . 
religious and secular”, and that it was not until the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, when the Arab world was under the influence of 
Western ideas and institutions (in addition to direct colonial rule over 
many Islamic countries), that new words were found, first in Turkish 
and then in Arabic.64
Other researchers agree on the Western nature of secularism and 
have argued that it was accepted by some Muslim reformers as a theo­
ry for progress:
In the Islamic world, it was seen by a group of reformers 
as a tool to face up to the European challenge. This 
group advocated direct borrowing from the Western 
models of secular culture and nationalism, the presump­
tion being that the only effective way to meet the chal­
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lenge of Western political and cultural intrusion was to 
adopt, at least in part, those institutions that had made 
the European powers so irresistibly powerful. Also im­
plicit in this approach was the premise that Western sec­
ular civilisation was innately superior to the established 
Islamic culture of the Middle East. 65
For al-Nahda, there is no way in which secularism can be com­
patible with Islam and its culture. It is simply, in Ghannouchi’s words, 
“a foreign product, a Christian product that grew in the period of intel­
lectual colonialism [or conquest] and which has failed to solve any of 
our nation’s problems. People’s refusal to accept these ideologies is in­
creasing”.66
What has made this refusal so strong is a similar radicalism in the 
position of those Tunisians who advocate the idea of the secular state, 
most of whom do not argue from within an Islamic context, attempting 
to show that Islam is “secular” or that it approves of secularism. Rath­
er, many of them (the Marxists in particular), have made their fight for 
secularism a fight against religion in general.
In a number of his speeches, President Bourguiba proclaimed a 
new kind of regime and state based on “reason”. As we have already 
seen, when he invited the Tunisian Muslims to abstain from the fast of 
Ramadan in order to maintain their capacity for work and avoid unpro­
ductivity, he argued that this illustrated how Islam is based on reason.67 
Although very provocative, it is clear that Bourguiba was nonetheless 
attempting to find a religious rationale to support his opinion; indeed 
most of his policies for modem Tunisia were presented and defended 
as being compatible with Islam and the policies of a Muslim ruler.
Bourguiba did not favour the total separation between Islam and 
the state, but felt obliged to respect deeply-rooted Islamic feelings in­
asmuch as was necessary to have his ideas implemented, and despite 
its obviously secularist bent, his official political message was not to
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break with Islamic ideology completely. As one Tunisian writer 
argues, the Islamic connection was always required by the Bourguiban 
regime, “mainly to defend its legitimacy and strengthen it among the 
traditional classes. Besides, this legitimacy was always needed to con­
front the Islamic movements, which could challenge the religious val­
ues of the government.” 68
As we have seen, Bourguiba was not the only secularist to oppose 
the modem Tunisian Islamic movement, however, as the main locus of 
power in the country he was its most prominent opponent. A more rad­
ical defence of secularism came from the Marxist groups with whom 
the Islamic movement clashed at the University. For the likes of Ham- 
mami, leader of the Tunisian Communist Party, Bourguiba was a ser­
vant to traditional Islamic values. He protested at the fact that the Tu­
nisian constitution ruled Islam as the religion of the state and its 
president, describing it as “a means to protect the interests of the bour­
geoisie and to use religion as an opiate to appease the labour masses".69
After arguing that an Islamic state is one of oppression and dictat­
orship, Hammami suggested that the secular state, for which the Marx­
ist Leninists and all tme progressives called, represented the most sig­
nificant guarantee of freedom of belief in Tunisian society,70 while 
Mohamed Maali, who wrote the preface to Hammami’s book Didda 
al-Zalamiyya (“Against Obscurantism”), argued that the truly impor­
tant issue for contemporary Tunisia was the demand for a secular 
state: “It is now clear that the demand for secularism or its rejection is 
the issue that distinguishes the real supporters of democracy from their 
enemies, even if they mask their intentions with Islamic slogans”.71
For al-Najjar of al-Nahda, all calls for secularism, whether 
oblique as in Bourguiba’s case, or official and unequivocal as pro­
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/claimed by the leftists, are simply contradictory to the true essence of 
Islam. His belief is that Islam only should rule over society, while “the 
aim of secularism”, he says, “is to base our policies on education, cul­
ture, economy and international relations — not on Islam, but on hu­
man reason”.72 He denies that the Islamic state will open the door for 
dictatorship, for in his opinion this notion comes from a “theological 
misunderstanding about Islam which has no relationship with the truth 
of Islam,” while arguing that dictatorships under secularist and leftist 
regimes have been far worse than anything under an Islamic ruler in 
Islamic history.73
Secularism in the Islamic world is of course not merely a simple 
target to either attack or eliminate; it was and still is a complicated po­
litical, economic, social and cultural process which will prove to be 
very difficult to reverse. Hourani provides a telling account as far as 
this process is concerned:
In the realm of law, civil and criminal, commercial and 
constitutional, secular codes have replaced the religious 
(from the mid-1940s and 1950s onwards) everywhere, 
except in the most withdrawn parts of Arabia, and this 
has happened less completely in a country such as 
Egypt, where it has taken place almost imperceptibly, 
whereas in Turkey it has been the product o f revolution.
In Turkey and Tunisia an attack has been made even on 
the last stronghold of the sharVa, the law of personal 
status: polygamy has been abolished and civil marriage 
introduced, apparently without causing great scandal.
Secularisation is indeed still underway in all parts of the Arab 
world, and even in Saudi Arabia itself. With a stronger Western influ­
ence than ever before, the modem Arab state is more and more in­
clined to disregard what may be seen as the obligations of Islam, while 
at the same time overlooking the rudiments of secularism, especially 
the democratisation of political life and making governments account­
able to free elected parliaments. The current trend for ruling regimes is
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to depend on financial, political and military help from Western pow­
ers to remain in control, and to ignore all popular calls for either Is- 
lamisation or democracy. As a result of this, secularism becomes 
merely a political tool used by the regime to suppress active Islamic 
movements, and has nothing to do with democratising political life.
As the Islamists’ presence in Tunisia began to grow in the late 
eighties, their fight against secularism became increasingly difficult on 
both the intellectual and political fronts. Their political efforts may 
have been halted as a result of their last confrontation with President 
Ben Ali, but Ghannouchi and his colleagues have continued to present 
themselves as the leading Tunisian intellectual force for the promotion 
of democracy and a modem, comprehensive Islam, and have now for­
mulated what amounts to a theory about the modem Islamic state.
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5The Islamists’ Islamic State
One of the most common accusations made against modem Islamic 
movements is that they lack specific solutions for the political, social 
and economic problems of their countries. They tend, as John Esposito 
claims, “to be more specific about what they are against than what 
they are for. While all may speak of an Islamic order or state, of im­
plementation of the sharVa, of a society grounded more firmly on Is­
lamic values, the details are often vague”.1
Since the date of the formation of their political party in 1981 the 
Tunisian Islamists, when challenged on this point, have always 
maintained that it was the government’s repression that prevented 
them from working on a detailed political and social programme. 
Ghannouchi addressed the movement’s critics on this point: “You de­
mand from us renewal and want to see our views and programmes 
and, initially, you have good reason to do so. But we are occupied 
with something more important: defending our right to existence and 
standing up to the efforts being made to suppress our movement”.2
However, it is remarkable that al-Nahda in general, and Ghan­
nouchi in particular, have produced an interesting range of literature 
regarding the political system they wish to see in place in Tunisia. 
Since 1981, the Tunisian Islamic Movement has adopted what may be 
considered a very “democratic” approach to questions of political or­
der and freedoms, thereby gaining respect from many Arab intellectu­
als outside Tunisia, notably the group of Arab nationalists who pub­
lished Ghannouchi’s book al-Hurriyyat aVAmma f i  al-Dawla al-
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Islamiyya (“Civil Liberties in the Islamic State”). Ghannouchi has also 
earned the respect of certain Western scholars such as Burgat and Es­
posito, the latter of whom has argued that “despite the government’s 
attempt to paint the MTI as retrogressive, fundamentalist fanatics and 
a violent Iranian-backed revolutionary movement, Ghannouchi. . .  dis­
tanced the movement from the excesses of revolution and advocated a 
Tunisian rather than an Iranian solution. Ghannouchi denounced the 
use of violence and instead chose to work within the system, empha­
sising a gradual process of social transformation and political partici­
pation as the means to realise [the] MTI’s long-range goal of establish­
ing an Islamic state”.3
The evolution of Ghannouchi’s political thought
Ghannouchi’s work al-Hurriyyat a l-‘Amma is of particular signifi­
cance to both its author and his followers. Ghannouchi mentions that 
on completing its first version in 1986, he was convinced that he had 
achieved a work of lasting importance, and which identified “that 
which . . . could overcome death itself’: Islamic democracy.4
Ghannouchi argues strongly in his work that his notion of “Islam­
ic democracy” is his own, personal contribution to contemporary Tuni­
sian Islamic thought. However, historical evidence by which to sub­
stantiate this claim is somewhat lacking. For example, there is no 
evidence of him using this term in his articles and speeches from the 
early seventies, when he was interested primarily in issues of educa­
tion and morality rather than issues such as democracy and political 
freedoms.5 In fact, Islamic democracy was never given mention in the 
context of his country’s problems, and this was not because the Tuni­
sian government at that time was especially democratic. As we have
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seen, Tunisia was then under one-party rule, which controlled all as­
pects of public life and was itself controlled by President Bourguiba.
The reason behind this curious silence is that democracy was ac­
tually not an issue for the Tunisian Islamists, at least not during the 
first years of their formation. Indeed they only began to pay attention 
to the concept for pragmatic reasons: the first was as a result of the im­
pact of the trade unions’ demonstrations in 1978 and the consequent 
emergence of Prime Minister Mzali under the banner of openness and 
democracy. Second, by 1981, the Islamists had earmarked democracy 
as a possible ideological safe-haven after the police’s disclosure of 
their secret organisation on December 5, 1980. There was also the 
strong impact of the Iranian revolution on the movement and especial­
ly on Ghannouchi, who saw it as the beginning of a new era that could 
bring into being an Islamic state that would “rule the world by the con­
stitution of the Qur’an”.6
These factors combined helped to change the Tunisian Islamists’ 
message from being religious-educational to political, while as we 
have seen, the very idea of forming a political party came originally 
only as an emergency measure to pre-empt a governmental attack. It 
was only once they had established themselves as a political party that 
the Islamists felt the need to produce literature that would address spe­
cific political questions, as Ghannouchi testifies:
The issue of civil liberties in the Islamic state became 
my main topic of interest when the Tunisian Islamic 
movement began to change from the stage of propagat­
ing the principles of Islam in the face of a dominant for­
eign culture, to a different stage of a wider attachment to 
the needs of Tunisian society, and Arab society in gen­
eral. That was more than ten years ago.
At the top of these needs was — and still is — the is­
sue of freedom. It was an intellectual necessity for the 
Islamic movement to offer clear answers to the chal­
lenges facing Islamic thought in a country such as Tuni­
sia, which had become extremely Westernised. There
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was no other alternative.7
It was at this time that Ghannouchi began to read the relevant lit­
erature concerning the political issues in question,8 and he used most 
of his time in prison between 1981 and 1984 in preparing the material 
for his book. On his release, he regained his position as amir of the 
movement and was distracted for a time from writing up his findings; 
it was only when he was forced to stay at home under police surveil­
lance that he finally managed to write the first draft of his book. After 
being released from prison once more in 1988 by President Ben Ali, 
Ghannouchi again concentrated on day-to-day politics rather than on 
formulating political theories; it was only after going into exile in 
1989 that he turned his attention fully to the concept of Islamic democ­
racy. The book was printed finally in August 1993, with an important 
note from the author: he asserted that, in writing this book, his aim had 
not been merely intellectual; his objective had in fact been “an Islamic 
revolution that would uproot dictators from the land of Allah”.9 By this 
he was essentially referring to the “minority government” of President 
Ben Ali of Tunisia.10
This personal account of the emergence of Ghannouchi’s book is 
important in that it reveals the political dimensions of his self- 
proclaimed, yet genuine interest in offering a democratic interpretation 
of Islam. It was clearly not an interest that had been of much concern 
at the time of the movement’s beginnings in the late sixties, but was 
almost definitely a pragmatic response to the security and political 
concerns which the movement faced after 1981. Even though it be­
came a political necessity to present the Islamic movement’s views on 
democracy and political freedoms, these issues only really preoccu­
pied Ghannouchi when he was in prison, under house arrest or in ex­
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ile. Whenever he was in a position to play his traditional role as amir 
of his movement, the democratic interest became secondary to the 
day-to-day running of the movement’s affairs.
One should take into account, however, that Ghannouchi has 
spent the greater part of the last fifteen years either in prison, in hiding 
or in exile, which may help to explain why he was finally able to pro­
duce a lengthy, 382-page volume, showing a clear attempt to render 
his theory in an academic style, and with an extensive bibliography 
containing many classical, contemporary and even foreign-language 
references.
Islamic democracy
If we may say that most Arab governments tend to favour secularising 
politics and society in their countries without actually implementing 
Western norms of democracy, the Tunisian Islamic movement seems 
to adopt quite the opposite position: it accepts Western democracy, 
with a few reservations, under the banner of Islamic shura, but still re­
jects secularism as a theory that separates religion and politics.
For Ghannouchi, there is nothing wrong with the institutions of 
Western democracy, such as elections, parliament, the rule of majori­
ty, the multi-party system and freedom of the press. The main problem 
lies with “the political, national and material philosophies of the West, 
in that it separated body and soul, then ignored the soul, killed it, de­
clared war against God and fought ferociously to put the human being 
in His place”.11 This, he explains, is why “secularism and, for example, 
nationalism, racism, the supremacy of values of profit, pleasure, domi­
nance, power, utilitarianism, and the separation between religion and
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state are not fundamental parts of the democratic system”.12
After making the distinction between democracy and secularism, 
Ghannouchi goes on to suggest that democracy may in fact be of Is­
lamic origin. He speaks of “the way in which Western reason dealt 
with our heritage of engineering and mathematics, when it trans­
formed them into concrete technology”, and then invites Muslims to 
do likewise with Western democracy: “Why should we reject these 
political and industrial tools simply because they were made in the 
West? Is it not better to say that this is our merchandise brought back 
to us, and that wisdom is the aim of the Muslim and wherever the pub­
lic interest is found then there is the sharVa of Allah?”.13
In this context, the real alternative for Muslims is to introduce 
what he defines as “Islamic” democracy:
As the democratic system worked with Christian values 
and produced Christian democracies, and with the so­
cialist philosophy to produce socialist democracies, and 
also with Jewish values to produce Jewish democracy, is 
it then impossible to work with Islamic values to pro­
duce Islamic democracy? We support this trend, and 
find in it a great relief, not only for the Islamic nation 
suffering from dictatorship, but for all humanity. 14
According to Ghannouchi, there are two main pillars to this Is­
lamic democracy: first is sharVa, meaning the Qur’an and the sunna, 
shura is second, as the method by which Muslims can rule themselves. 
Allah is the “original governor” and the one with supreme authority 
over the universe, thus his ruling over human affairs reigns supreme 
over all other laws and ideologies. To uphold his rule is obligatory for 
every Muslim, and this is why Muslims should organise themselves 
politically and form an Islamic state. The Islamic state’s raison d'etre 
is the implementation of the sharVa, which is also the source of its le­
gitimacy; if it is not implemented, then it cannot command the obedi­
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ence of the people. This is the framework within which the Muslim’s 
obedience to his government becomes obedience to Allah, for which 
he will be rewarded. Conversely, his disobedience to the government 
becomes disobedience to Allah.15
In comparison with Western democracy, which Ghannouchi 
claims “kept searching for the basic values on which the state’s juristic 
system should be built”, he argues that the Islamic state has found in 
the texts of the sharVa a solid base and a code of just laws; a canon 
not made by a ruling majority or a dominant class, but by Allah, the 
God of all. This canon is applied in detail by human institutions cho­
sen by the people, wherein lies the authority of the umma, embodied in 
shura.16
After quoting those Qur’anic verses that emphasise the need to 
obey Allah’s judgement in all disputes, Ghannouchi concludes that 
“there is in Islam a political system ordered by Allah, its rules as de­
tailed in the Qur’an and sunna, and that obedience to them and their 
full acceptance is the line of demarcation between faith (iman) and dis­
belief (&w/r).”17
The implications of trusteeship (khilafa)
The wider framework for this “Islamic democracy” is a strong stand 
for the respect of human rights. In a speech given in Khartoum in 
1979, Ghannouchi suggested in unequivocal terms that Islamists 
should fight against dictatorship in any form, even if it is practised by 
someone claiming to use it for the sake of Islam: “How can we tolerate 
it when Allah has forbidden it for his prophets? It is vital that we con­
sider the human being as the trustee (khalifa) of Allah on this earth
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and believe that jihad  for freedom is a jihad  for Islam.” 18
The trusteeship (khilafa) of the human being is the cornerstone of 
the Islamic approach to human rights, according to Ghannouchi, for it 
is Allah who created mankind and decided that freedom and dignity 
should be the conditions for man’s trusteeship on earth. This notion is 
based on the Qur’anic verse: “We have honoured the sons of Adam; 
provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for suste­
nance things good and pure; and conferred on them special favours, 
above a great part of our creation” (17:70). The basic interpretation for 
this verse is as follows:
The distinction and honour conferred by God on man 
are recounted in order to enforce the corresponding du­
ties and responsibilities of man. He is raised to a posi­
tion of honour above the brute creation; he has been 
granted talents by which he can transport himself from 
place to place by land, sea and now by air; all the means 
for the sustenance and growth of every part of his nature 
are provided by God; and his spiritual faculties (the 
greatest gift of God) raise him above the greater part of 
God’s creation. Should he not then realise his noble des­
tiny and prepare for his real life in the hereafter? 19
Trusteeship is mentioned earlier in the second sura of the Qur’an: 
“Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: ‘I will create a vicegerent on 
earth’. They said: ‘Wilt thou place therein one who will make mischief 
therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate thy praises and glorify 
the holy (name)?’ He said: ‘I know what ye know not’”(2:30). The ba­
sic interpretation for this verse is the following:
If man is to be endowed with emotions, those emotions 
could lead him to the highest [point] and drag him to the 
lowest. The power of will or choice would have to go 
with them in order that man might steer his own course. 
This power of will (when used correctly) to some extent 
gives him mastery over his own fortunes and over na­
ture, thus bringing him nearer to the God-like nature, 
which has supreme mastery and will. We may suppose 
that the angels had no independent wills of their own: 
their perfection in other ways reflected God’s perfection
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but could not raise them to the dignity of vicegerency.
The perfect vicegerent is he who has the power of initia­
tive nimself, but whose independent action always re­
flects perfectly the will of his principal. 20
Vicegerency for Ghannouchi is understood in the same broad 
sense, meaning that the human being
had been honoured by his creator with a mind, will, 
freedom and the sending of the prophets to help him 
find the right path and to progress in the path of perfec­
tion, through his obedience to the sharVa and the law of 
Allah, which, defined in its final version brought by the 
Arab Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) the 
framework of the human being’s life individually and 
collectively, leaving to him in this context wide do­
mains, empty spaces, in which he was required to exer­
cise his vicegerency by filling them [through his own ij- 
tihad], thus making a combination between freedom and 
commitment, unity and diversity. 21
The implications of Allah’s special regard for the human being 
leads to the idea that the freedom and dignity of the human being in Is­
lam are not only rights, they are also duties, as Ghannouchi argues:
Rights here become holy duties which the human being 
is allowed neither to ignore nor be deprived of. He does 
not own these rights, as Allah is their only owner. The 
human being is merely a trustee of these rights, required 
to behave towards them according to the will o f  their 
owner . . . likewise the duty to reject slavery, and the op­
position of dictators and the fight for freedom, justice, 
progress and the welfare of humanity. These are not 
simply rights but religious duties, which he will be 
praised for observing and punished for ignoring. It is in 
this way that human rights are deemed holy, as an Is­
lamic concept, which makes it impossible for them to be 
denied or manipulated by a party, parliament or ruler. 22
With the wide range of possibilities for interpreting the Qur’an, 
the view defended by Ghannouchi regarding the concept of trusteeship 
is one of many possible logical interpretations. If compared with the 
views of the Egyptian Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa, a specialist in the 
field of Islamic political systems, for example, one may note that al- 
‘Awwa’s studies do not base their analyses concerning freedom in Is­
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lam on the concept of trusteeship, but on other verses of the Qur’an, 
insisting for example on the freedom of belief and giving priority to 
rational arguments and evidence.23
The argument that it is impossible for Muslim governments or 
rulers to deny human rights because they are duties within the Islamic 
context is also questionable and easy to refute. First, there is the obvi­
ous problem stemming from the fact that Ghannouchi has attempted to 
interpret the Qur’anic text to match contemporary, and mainly West­
ern, meanings of political freedom. For example, using this methodol­
ogy, it would be impossible to find any acceptable political experience 
in Islamic history that meets the definition provided by Ghannouchi of 
“political freedom”. It would be difficult even to find a similar experi­
ence in Western history, as democracy is a very contemporary prod­
uct.
Further, even by classical definitions of “freedom” and “justice”, 
it is clearly difficult not to see the numerous failures of successive Is­
lamic states and dynasties in observing the essence of Islamic teach­
ings with regard to running the affairs of political life, such as allow­
ing for shura and tolerating different political opinions. Indeed, if the 
meaning of the concept of vicegerency had been as clear to Muslim 
rulers as it evidently is to Ghannouchi, Islamic political history might 
have taken an entirely different course. Ghannouchi himself admits 
this, but argues that Muslims and non-Muslims alike have lived under 
dictatorships, and that contemporary Muslim governments backed by 
the West are far worse than all previous Islamic regimes. He also adds 
that the deviation from a principle is not evidence of its denial, and 
that historically, Islamic states have been acknowleged by many objec­
tive, Western historians for their tolerence towards non-Muslims.
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However, the overriding answer, he asserts, is for Islamic thought to 
continue spreading its message of freedom and Islamic democracy, 
which is what Ghannouchi aimed to achieve with his book.24
Basic human rights in Islam
For Ghannouchi, the sharVa is meant to serve the interests of the hu­
man being both in this life and the hereafter. He states that in classical 
jurisprudence, especially that of Abu Ishaq al-Shatibl (b. 790 A.H.) in 
his famous book al-Muwafaqat, sharVa is defined as safeguarding the 
five main interests of the human being: belief, life, mind, wealth and 
honour.
In this context, the starting point for Islamic human rights is the 
freedom of belief. From the verse “There is no compulsion in relig- 
ion”(2:256), Ghannouchi argues that compulsion is incompatible with 
Islam, and that religion depends on true faith and free will; every per­
son must have the freedom to either believe in Allah and his teachings 
or to refute both.25 Freedom of belief is thus the basis for the following 
rights:
1) Equality: all citizens of the Islamic state are equal before the 
law, both in their rights and duties, including non-Muslims.
2) Freedom to practice religious worship: Islam guarantees fol­
lowers of all faiths the right to build places of worship and practice 
their religion there, provided they respect the religion of the majority.
3) Freedom to propagate non-Muslim religions, even if this in­
cludes arguments (though not abuse) to discredit Islam. In this in­
stance, Ghannouchi mentions the example of the different prophets 
who engaged peacefully in serious dialogue with their opponents, and
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the historical debates that used to take place in the mosques and palac­
es of rulers between Muslim scholars and scholars from other relig­
ions.
4) Freedom and dignity of the human being: Islam not only 
stresses the rights of the human being in life, freedom and safety, but, 
notes Ghannouchi, it makes those rights sacred for both the individual 
and society, according to the fundamental principle of man’s role as 
Allah’s representative on earth. Aggression against men and women is 
forbidden to all. Human beings must be protected against hunger, ill­
ness, homelessness, spying and all manner of injustices, while dignity 
should be secured for all people, regardless of their colour, nationality 
or religion, and whether living or dead. This also implies the total re­
jection of all kinds of torture and all kinds of illegal interference in the 
private lives of people.
5) Freedom of thought and expression: Allah has equipped the 
human being to be his representative on earth by giving him reason, 
will and freedom, leaving him to choose his path and assume his re­
sponsibilities. Islam makes “thinking” a duty, because through it vital 
issues are decided, such as the question of belief and its consequences 
in life.
6) Freedom of private ownership: Islam secures the right of pri­
vate ownership in the context of the human being’s trusteeship on 
earth, but Allah in fact owns everything. This implies that private own­
ership must serve the whole society, not just the selfish goals of the in­
dividual. One of the benefits of allowing private ownership, Ghannou­
chi argues, is to distribute power between people through the sharing 
of wealth, which gives democracy its social aspect and prevents the 
state or an elite class from controlling material wealth, and thus, politi­
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cal power.
7) Social rights: Ghannouchi includes in this respect the rights to 
employment, health care and social security. He quotes the Egyptian 
writer ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad and his summary of Islamic social 
democracy: “Islam rejects all kind of profiteering and considers as 
holy and sacred the rights of employment. In fact, democracy does not 
need more than these two principles to be stable and successful”. 
Ghannouchi argues that it is a vital duty for the government to find 
employment for people and secure the rights of workers against any 
form of profiteering by their employers.
Health care is also a fundamental aspect of human rights since it 
is linked to the essential right to and sanctity of life. The rights to have 
a family life and to education are also among Islamic social rights.26
In total, these rights represent the framework within which Ghan­
nouchi presents what he sees as a modem Islamic political regime. It 
would appear that there are no major differences between his views on 
this issue and the general Western approach to human rights, except in 
terms of the religious basis he employs.
The people’s authority
The projected image of Ghannouchi’s Islamic regime is that of a presi­
dential system, with an elected president and parliament, where the 
sharVa is the supreme authority over the constitution and all laws. It is 
also a missionary system in the sense that the government must look 
after Islam and its promotion as the state religion, as well as keeping a 
vigilant eye on every action or movement that endangers the state, and 
to deal with it using the appropriate measures.27
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If the sharVa is the main pillar for any Islamic government, 
Ghannouchi also argues that shura is the second most important factor 
to give a regime its true identity. He refers to verses such as: “O ye 
who believe, obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with 
authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer 
it to God and his Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the last day” 
(4.59); and: “Consult them in affairs (of moment)” (3.159); and: “Who 
(conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation” (42.38). Ghannouchi 
concluded from these verses that shura is thus a symbol for both the 
Islamic state and the Islamic nation, and that it is not simply a secon­
dary religious ruling, argued for in a handful of verses. Rather, “it is in 
fact a fundamental pillar of the pillars of religion and a necessary re­
sult of trusteeship, meaning that the power of Allah is given to the 
people”.28
Verse 4:59 is the basis for the Islamic political, social and relig­
ious order, according to Ghannouchi, because it states the supremacy 
of the authority of the Qur’an and the sunna, as well as stating the au­
thority of the people, within the boundaries of the sharVa: “the Qur’an 
and the sunna are the ultimate law that governs the behaviour of rulers 
as well as all Muslims. They are also above any invented law [arrived 
at] through ijtihad, meaning that it must not contradict any rule of the 
Qur’an and that it must serve the main interests of the sharVa”.29
Ghannouchi argues nonetheless that the umma is the source of 
legislation:
Although the prime source of legislation in Islam is Al­
lah’s will, as is reflected in revelatory text from the 
Qur’an and the sunna, the umma should actively partici­
pate in legislating. The reason for this is that, making 
the final sharVa eternal required limiting the text of the 
revelation to legislate only the main principles ruling 
human relations and not to elaborate on details and mi­
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nor issues, except for in a few cases such as legislating 
for the punishment of a major crime and for certain is­
sues related to the family; legislation that helps form the 
overall shape of Islamic society. This means leaving the 
details of this shape to the legislative effort o f  the 
umma, which changes with the times, and it is a respect­
able endeavour, as the ijma ‘ of the umma is considered 
one of the [religious] sources of legislation. 30
After discussing the various ways in which the authority of the 
people may be expressed, Ghannouchi concludes by describing two 
forms of representation: the first is a direct form through referenda and 
general elections concerning major and vital political issues, such as 
alliances, the direction of the state’s main policies and the choosing of 
a leader. In issues such as these, there is no alternative but to seek the 
people’s verdict through direct consultation. This direct shura, says 
Ghannouchi, is the textual implementation of the Qur’anic teaching 
which calls for the participation of all people in making the general 
policies of the state.
Second is an indirect form of representation, through an elected 
body of “those charged with authority among you”, being people of 
good Islamic conduct who would form a committee of shura (parlia­
ment), that would play a role of control and guidance for both the gov­
ernment and the people. It would also make policies and laws within 
the framework of the sharVa. Non-Muslims may be elected to this 
body, and prominent experts in fields of specific importance may be 
assigned to it, along with the elected members.31 Ghannouchi does not 
specify however how these “men of expertise” will be chosen and by 
whom, but it may be assumed that this will be the right of the elected 
members of the shura council, as is the case with al-Nahda council.
Ghannouchi insists that these two forms of consultation must go 
hand in hand, with a committee of prominent religious and legal schol­
ars with the main responsibility of making sure that all laws passed by
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the parliament or the government are compatible with the rules of the 
sharVa. This body may be considered a vehicle for collective ijtihad 
on all matters related to religion; Ghannouchi has compared it to the 
high court of the United States, the state council of France or the com­
mittee for safeguarding the constitution in Iran.32 Again, he fails to 
specify the criteria on which the members of this body will be select­
ed, and whether they will be elected or nominated.
One of the main duties of the shura council would be to nominate 
one or more candidates for the post of president of the Islamic state, 
without closing the door for other candidates not nominated by the 
council. The people would then be called on to elect their president, 
who would oversee the implementation of the sharVa and take care of 
the nation’s interests. Having the president voted into office by the 
people, Ghannouchi argues, would ensure a popular mandate for the 
president, and free him from being tied to the narrow political calcula­
tions of the elites and factions assembled in the parliament, and to con­
centrate on serving those who selected him.33 This is one of the reasons 
Ghannouchi forwards for favouring a presidential political system; he 
also mentions the fact that the candidate will be chosen first by “those 
charged with authority among the population”, guaranteeing a better 
relationship between the legislative and executive powers, and a better 
understanding between these powers and the public at large.34
There are, however, a number of necessary conditions that should 
be met by any candidate for the post of president of the Islamic state. 
Ghannouchi summarises them below:
The president of the Islamic state must be a Muslim, a
fooa Muslim. The minimum in this regard is for him to e known to have the correct religious beliefs and con­
ceptions, to care for religion, to like knowledge and 
scholars, to observe his religious duties and abstain from
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forbidden deeds, to be honest and of a good character 
with a strong personality and physical capability, thus 
being able to serve the nation and lead it properly.
He must be of an age of maturity and stability (forty 
years), having known life and the people ana being 
known by them, being satisfactorily involved with the 
needs of the people, and ensuring the testimony of those 
charged with authority among the population that he has 
religion and honesty and competence, and that he is the 
best among them, ft would also be a bonus for him to 
have a transparent soul and enlightened thought [in re­
ligious terms], thus being able to play the role of the ed­
ucating shaykh and the leading reformist [again in relig­
ious terms]. He must also have the consensus approval 
of the nation or its majority. 35
It should be mentioned that some of the conditions listed above 
would be rather difficult to “prove” in a candidate as they are so sub­
jective, however the overriding emphasis is on the religious aspect be­
cause the main duty of the president is to uphold the sharVa. It may 
also be seen to reflect the yearnings of many Muslims for a “true, hon­
est” Muslim ruler, as the majority of rulers in both Islamic history and 
the present day have essentially been politicians, playing the power 
game both within and outside the boundaries of the sharVa. At the 
same time, these conditions give Ghannouchi himself an edge over his 
political rivals in Tunisia, where he is seen as the one politician whose 
agenda focuses on religion and religious duties.
Ghannouchi’s book goes into enormous detail about the classical­
ly-defined duties of the president and his rights, such as his duty to li­
aise with the ordinary people, to be humble and faithful, and his right 
to be obeyed by the nation for as long as he obeys the rules of the 
sharVa, and to encourage “those hearts that do not like him to do so, 
and to ensure people’s love for him in the interests of the whole na­
tion”.36 This quotation was used by Ghannouchi in detailing the presi­
dent’s rights, also outlining another nine rights of this nature, all deriv­
ing from the special religious status of the leader of the Islamic state.
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Thus, in short, the Islamic concept of shura is basically expressed 
in electing a parliament and a president, who is initially nominated as 
a candidate by the parliament. The two main constitutional questions 
that arise here are: what is the nature of the relation between the legis­
lative and executive powers, and what is the nature of the relation be­
tween these powers and the committee of leading religious and legal 
scholars, suggested by Ghannouchi to supervise all the laws in the 
land?
In response to the first question, Ghannouchi’s answer is impre­
cise. He mentions, rather vaguely, that there are many options availa­
ble to Muslims according to their own specific circumstances and at 
any given moment in time, and argues that there is nothing in Islam 
which gives a specific ruling about the nature of the relationship be­
tween the legislative and executive powers. However, he does provide 
a sufficient number of hints to suggest that he disapproves of the rigid 
separation between the two, as an idea deriving from the Western cul­
ture of “a conflict of interests”, which has turned Western democracy 
into a simple mechanism by which to institutionalise this conflict and 
keep it in check.37
Ghannouchi also argues that this notion of rigid separation is not 
compatible with Islamic concepts and values; it is contradictory to the 
bay ‘a, which the body of shura gives to the amir in order to listen to 
and obey him, and would give the ultimate power of authority to the 
legislative council rather than to the amir or head of state, making him 
accountable to this council and not to the people who voted him presi­
dent. This may only be acceptable if the head of the Muslim state were 
to hold a merely nominal or protocolic position, a Western system that 
no scholar of Islamic politics has ever approved, nor which has been
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approved by the revelation or any another Islamic ruling, or by the ex­
periences of the first caliphs.38
The alternative, according to Ghannouchi, is the principle of 
cooperation (ta ‘awun) between the different powers, to ensure that the 
word of Allah prevails.39 The judiciary should rule independently over 
all individuals including the president; while legislative power is es­
sentially that of the Qur’an, the sunna and the supervising committee 
of scholars. This would mean that the Islamic state is essentially an ex­
ecutive state, through both the parliament and the president’s authori­
ties. Ghannouchi then goes on to address the second, and most impor­
tant, question:
In the case of a dispute which cannot be solved between 
the president and the shura council of which he is presi­
dent [implying that Ghannouchi favours the president 
himself being the president of parliament], the matter 
should be examined: if those opposed to the president 
represent a consensus (ijma‘) or something close to it, 
such as a two-thirds majority, then the president should 
bow to this consensus because it is one of the pillars of 
Islam. If it is a small majority, then the issue should be 
put before a committee of experts if related to a matter 
of legislation, and its ruling should be obeyed by all. If 
the issue of conflict is related to general policy, men the 
president may have the right to veto the council’s deci­
sion and refuse to execute it. 40
Ghannouchi also provides another option for the president in the 
face of parliamentary consensus: if he chooses not to accept the major­
ity decision, he can take the matter to the people in a referendum. 
Whoever loses the vote, be it the president or the parliament, must 
then concede their position.41
Ghannouchi clearly favours a presidential system with strong 
powers, his view that the president may also preside over the shura 
council is a clear sign of his rejection of the notion of separating the 
executive and the legislative powers. However, this may in fact throw
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all of his book’s democratic credentials into question, as it is clear 
that, as president of the parliament itself, this allows the president too 
much unchecked authority to be truly “democratic”.
His defence, which lies in his argument that real legislative au­
thority lies with the sharVa and the committee of scholars, provides 
more questions than answers, for example, who will nominate these 
scholars: the president, the parliament or the people? Is their responsi­
bility limited to giving their opinion on laws passed by the parliament 
or by the government, or does it include making new laws independent 
of the parliament or the government? Despite the significance of these 
questions, Ghannouchi fails to provide an adequate answer to the first, 
and merely offers confusing hints regarding the second.
In fact, there is no discussion of how the members of the commit­
tee of prominent scholars and experts of law should be chosen. One 
should assume therefore that it is the right of the president or parlia­
ment to select them, which opens the door for either of these powers to 
be politically manipulative, in order to get as many “friendly” schol­
ars as possible onto this important committee. It may therefore also be 
safe to assume that scholars known to hold opposing views to the rul­
ing class will not be nominated for this prestigious position. In short, 
this is a highly sensitive area, with wide ranging possibilities for disa­
greement between the scholars on a number of issues.
Ghannouchi does emphasise, however, that the main responsibili­
ty of this body would be to make sure that the laws passed by the par­
liament or the government are compatible with the sharVa. He also 
mentions that it would be responsible for the “orientation” of both the 
government and public opinion, through “single and collective ijtihad 
on issues related to the sharVa, without being binding [to the state]”.42
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This role of “orientation” and of creating new laws should initially be 
entrusted primarily with the parliament, a view that Ghannouchi reiter­
ates throughout the book.43 Within this context he argues that, in relig­
ious terms, the umma should be the source of legislation, because the 
sharVa has left a wide, empty space for the changing of ijtihad, as ex­
ercised by Muslim public opinion at large, and organised through the 
body of the shura council.44
However he also states, when discussing the relationship between 
the powers in the Islamic state, that the responsibility of legislation 
should be basically left to the Qur’an, the sunna and the supervising 
committee of scholars, and that the shura council is in fact a part of 
the executive power, presided over by the head of state, in an Islamic 
state of an executive nature.45
These conflicting statements seem to reflect the difficulties Ghan­
nouchi faced in trying to set up a detailed, modem Islamic political 
system that would be both compatible with classical Islamic models 
and the norms of modem Western democracy. One of the major con­
sequences of giving a wide range of powers to the supervising com­
mittee of scholars is that it increases fears of an autocratic state run by 
religious scholars, accountable only to what they see as the divine 
truth of Allah. Ghannouchi and his colleagues have always distanced 
themselves from this concept; at their press conference of 1981, they 
assured the public:
Let us make it clear that Islamic thought and the MTI re­
ject the idea of an Islamic autocratic government, be­
cause there is no one who can claim to be the official 
spokesman of Allah or Islam, and thus oblige people to 
follow their own interpretation of Islam as the sole legit­
imate interpretation. Rather, we will propose our own 
policies ana views and will not oblige anyone to accept 
them. We expect the same from other parties and recog­
nise their rights to deal seriously ana responsibly with
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Islam. While we reject theocracy, we do believe in 
shura; we will propose our programme and accept the 
people’s verdict, for or against us. 46
If this does not represent a real safeguard against a dictatorial au­
tocratic state, al-Nahda in general, and Ghannouchi in particular, have 
spoken of a number of assurances, or “guarantees against dictator­
ship”. These include the right for all to form political parties; their 
1981 declaration stated the movement’s rejection of the one-party sys­
tem, and their statements to the press were unequivocal:
Islam says that there should be no compulsion in relig­
ion. Our problem is that others want to impose their pol­
icies on us by force. Let us make it clear: we have never 
opposed the existence of any political movement, even 
if  it is totally against our views, including the commu­
nist party. This is a fundamental Islamic position, be­
cause it is for the people, not us, to choose this party or 
any other for government. Indeed we have proven this 
through our relationship with other opposition parties. 47
Ghannouchi argues that, in an Islamic state, the multi-party sys­
tem is the best — if not the only — way to strengthen society vis-a-vis 
the state, especially when the state deviates from the path of justice. 
What is more, he argues that political parties have a great role to play 
in educating people about their rights and duties and spreading values 
throughout society, while part of their mission is also to nurture a wide 
range of well-educated politicians and potential leaders to serve socie­
ty. Political parties should not need official permission from the gov­
ernment to operate, because their activities are in fact one form of exe­
cuting Allah’s order to “enjoin what is right and forbid what is 
wrong”.48
In Ghannouchi’s view, the independence of the judiciary and 
freedom of the press are other guarantees against dictatorship, arguing 
that in Islam justice reigns supreme over all people, including the pres­
ident and the government. In order to ensure this supremacy, there
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should be no governmental involvement whatsoever in judicial af­
fairs.49 Similarly, a free press constitutes a means by which the people 
can keep an eye on every aspect of public affairs, and put a stop to the 
wrongdoings of the government.50
International charters are also included in the list of Ghannou­
chi’s guarantees against dictatorship. He argues that there is nothing in 
Islam that opposes the building of an international order between peo­
ples and civilisations based upon justice and equality. An example he 
gives is of a charter opposing aggression and injustice around the 
world.51
The status of non-Muslims
Another important issue facing all advocates of an Islamic state is the 
status of non-Muslims and the extent of their rights within a mission­
ary state that sees itself as a servant to the values and teachings of Is­
lam. Ghannouchi provides his own analysis both in al-Hurriyyat al- 
‘Amma f i  al-Dawla al-Islamiyya and in another book Huquq al- 
Muwatana (“The Rights of Citizenship”),52 entirely dedicated to delin­
eating the rights of non-Muslims in the Islamic state.
The starting point for Ghannouchi’s thought with regard to this 
matter is the contract of dhimma used in classical Islamic law schools 
to organise the residence of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, which 
he sees as the equivalent of today’s laws of citizenship. He has adopt­
ed this equivalence from another contemporary Muslim writer, ‘Abd 
al-Karim Zaydan, and also refers to Mawdudl's definition of ahl al- 
dhimma, or
all those non-Muslims living within the boundaries of
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the Islamic state and who accepted to give it their alle­
giance and to obey its laws, whether they were bom in it 
or migrated to it from abroad and asked the government 
to consider them among the people of dhimma. Islam of­
fered these people, in the internal laws of the country, 
the same rights offered to Muslims, on equal terms.53
This is similar in essence to what a Muslim must do nowadays if he or 
she wishes to become a citizen of a European country, for example.
To go into further detail: Ghannouchi argues that non-Muslim cit­
izens of the Islamic state may enjoy the same basic human and politi­
cal rights guaranteed to Muslim citizens. This includes the right to 
equality before the law, freedom of thought, belief and expression, in­
cluding that of defending their religious beliefs.54 Non-Muslim citizens 
of the Islamic state are also free to form their own political parties as 
long as they recognise the sovereignty of the sharVa and pledge their 
loyalty to the state. They may also invite Muslims to discuss their re­
spective religions provided they respect the general norms of dialogue; 
this is not seen to represent a “danger” to Islam, which cherishes intel­
lectual dialogue with all faiths and ideologies.55
Needless to say, however, there are certain exceptions for the 
non-Muslim, which, Ghannouchi argues, are nonetheless fair and just:
His citizenship remains special and only becomes com­
plete on converting to Islam. This means that he may 
continue to enjoy freedoms not allowed to the Muslim 
in his personal life, regarding his food, drink and mar­
riage, but also that he is deprived of certain rights en­
joyed by a Muslim, such as serving in key political posts 
that influence the nature of the state [such as the presi­
dency]. On the other hand, the non-Muslim citizen re­
mains free of certain requirements imposed on a Mus­
lim, such as avoiding certain forbidden deeds [drinking 
wine, for instance]. There are a limited number of ex­
ceptions that do not affect the principle of equality, a 
highly respected principle in the Islamic state . . . 56
In other words, Ghannouchi argues that true equality suggests 
that the religious nature of the Islamic state should not be undermined,
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and that non-Muslims should recognise the fact that the main orienta­
tion of the state is Islamic and its main duty is to uphold the sharVa. 
This explains why only Muslims may fill key posts, such as in the cas­
es of the presidency, the council of shura, the army or the supreme 
council of justice. Non-Muslim citizens are free to choose their be­
liefs, but at the same time they must recognise the right of Islam, as 
the majority religion, to organise and direct public life. Similarly, their 
political parties should not aim to undermine Islam’s leading posi­
tion.57 While not eligible to serve in key posts, non-Muslims may still 
serve in the Islamic state as members of parliament or even as minis­
ters; the main guideline here is that they are only deprived of taking up 
posts that have a direct relationship with the state religion.58
The question remains as to whether the non-Muslim citizen 
should pay a special tax to the Islamic state, known in Islamic history 
as the jizya. Ghannouchi’s response is that, historically, this jizya  was 
imposed by the Islamic state as a contribution towards ensuring the se­
curity of the country, as non-Muslims were not enlisted into the army. 
In this sense, it was a form of defence tax that was not imposed on 
Muslims because they were required to join the army and defend their 
state. Consequently, he concludes that this tax may be abolished for all 
non-Muslim citizens who accept to do military training and are ready 
to join the army if required to defend the country.59
With regard to Islamic hudud, as implemented in the cases of 
certain major crimes, Ghannouchi tends to argue for the application of 
Islamic criminal laws in the cases of all citizens of the Islamic state 
where possible. This however should not ignore the need to 
accommodate different circumstances and allow for different laws 
within the Islamic state when there is a non-Muslim majority in some
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of its provinces.60
Here is finally how Ghannouchi summarises the nature of an 
Islamic state:
The Islamic government is one in which:
1) Supreme legislative authority is with the sharVa, 
that is the revealed law of Islam, which transcends all 
laws. Within this context, it is the responsibility of 
scholars to deduce detailed laws and regulations to be 
used as guidelines by judges. The head of the Islamic 
state is the leader of the executive body entrusted with 
the responsibility of implementing such laws and regula­
tions.
2) Political powers belong to the community (umma), 
which should adopt a form of shura, which is a system 
of mandatory consultation.61
This model of government, which Ghannouchi insists is a relig­
ious duty for all Muslims to establish, must work for the welfare of the 
people within the general framework of the aims of the sharVa as de­
fined by al-Shatibl. He argues as follows:
The general inclination in contemporary Islamic politi­
cal thought is to adopt al-Shatibi’s concept of the pur­
poses of religion, namely that religion was revealed only 
to fulfil and protect the needs ana interests of mankind 
in this life and the hereafter, and as a general framework 
for tackling new problems in Muslim society. Within 
the framework of this general perspective or purpose of 
the sharVa, the details of religion find their appropriate 
place as branches of the fundamentals. Within this same 
perspective, all new problems in the lives of not only 
Muslims but of all humanity, can find proper solutions 
• that guarantee the fulfilment of their requirements. 62
Within such a wide framework, the proposed Islamic government 
may opt for a broad range of policies in all areas of social life, as long 
as they do not violate the explicit laws of the sharVa. Indeed this 
framework is so wide that the government may effectively disregard 
those laws in certain circumstances, as Ghannouchi illustrates:
Some of these principles [of the sharVa] apply to stan­
dard situations and normal circumstances, while others 
deal with exceptional situations and extraordinary cir­
cumstances. An example of the latter is the principle of
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“necessities eliminate prohibitions” (necessity knows no 
law). This principle is Qur’anic. Allah says: “But if one 
is forced by necessity, without wilful disobedience nor 
transgressing due limits, then he is guiltless”.(2:173)
Similar to this are the principles of balancing between 
the better and the worse and opting for that which seems 
to best serve the general interests of the people, and the 
principle of outcomes or consequences, according to 
which acts are judged on the basis of what they lead to.
The decisive criteria in all cases are the fulfilment of the 
needs of humans and serving their best interests. 63
In classical terms, Ghannouchi’s views do not reflect those of one 
single traditional school of Islamic law (madhhab); as is the case with 
most contemporary Islamist writers, he looks to different interpreta­
tions of the sharVa and selects what he thinks is best in responding to 
contemporary circumstances. He is not a mujtahid, inventing new 
views or exploring new avenues in Islamic jurisprudence, but a re­
formist, or a politician who is anxious to clarify his position on impor­
tant political issues. As we have seen, most of his preferences reflect a 
strong desire to present an Islamic political system that is compatible 
with contemporary norms of Western democracy.
Despite its ostensibly “moderate” and “modernist” appeal, al- 
Nahda’s political approach to the issue of civil liberties is still the 
source of many doubts among Tunisians. For example, in the first 
three years of President Ben Ali’s rule, there were many discussions 
focusing on the question: “is the new strategy of the Tunisian MTI 
[i.e. its strong support for democracy] mere manipulation, to win the 
support of public opinion for their demand for legal recognition, or is 
it a reflection of the roots of the movement in civilian society and Tu­
nisian political culture?”64
The Tunisian sociologist, Dr. Abdalkadir al-Zghal, who was the 
first to openly raise this question, has been rather lenient by Tunisian 
standards: he notes that Ghannouchi is a politician who wishes above
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all to please his supporters, even to the extent of expressing different 
views to different audiences among Tunisia’s pluralistic society. 
Nonetheless he remarks that this should not be deemed unusual, as 
Ghannouchi is not a “theologian like Ibn Taymiyya, a predecessor of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but a politician who tries to expand 
his political base and reduce opposition among his partners and oppo­
nents”.65
No doubt this interpretation does not please Ghannouchi, as, after 
all, he presents his views in religious terminology and as an Islamic 
thinker first, and as a political leader secondly. Evidence suggests 
however that political pragmatism is not always compatible with pro­
viding religious answers to important issues. Striking a balance be­
tween the requirements of religion and those of political tactics and 
manoeuvres is not always easy, to which, no doubt, Ghannouchi can 
testify.
However, an analysis of his words and his deeds over the last few 
years of his political career indicates that his political considerations 
have been very much stronger than the religious. To many of his de­
tractors, the stance Ghannouchi took during the second Gulf war 
against the Western military presence made him one of the Iraqi Presi­
dent’s strongest supporters, despite the fact that he was not alone in his 
support, as President Ben Ali and the majority of Tunisian politicians 
also sided with Iraq. But the special criticism addressed to Ghannouchi 
in this instance concerned his total disregard for Saddam Hussein’s un­
democratic record, and the extent of the enthusiasm he expressed for 
the Iraqi leader: Ghannouchi praised his wise and courageous leader­
ship and declared that the man “who dared to attack Israel and resist in 
the face of united international aggression deserved to give orders and
182
to be obeyed [by Muslims], and to have the right to money and 
lives”,66 which suggests that Hussein had the right to demand money 
and volunteers from the Islamic nation because it was an “Islamic” 
battle.
The apparent ease with which Ghannouchi portrayed Hussein as 
an “Islamic leader” was a worrying fact, even to his close Islamist 
friends, such as the Egyptian Fahml Huwaydi, who wrote:
The record of the Iraqi regime, which the statement [of 
Ghannouchi] asked us to support, is full of pages of 
atrocities and dictatorship. The battles it has fought dur­
ing the last twenty-five years were first against the Arab 
people of Iraq, then against the Muslim Kurds, then 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran, then with the Leba­
nese Maronite General Aoun, and then against the peo­
ple of Kuwait . . . How is it that Professor Ghannouchi 
did not hear in his exile about the tens of thousands of 
victims of that regime, or about what is left of them after 
the killing, torture and poisoning?67
It was not long before pressure from some of Ghannouchi’s col­
leagues, particularly following the failure of the movement’s plan to 
“enforce liberties” in Tunisia, forced him to change his opinion, to the 
extent that he began to criticise Hussein’s democratic record and de­
clare: “I cannot accept that either myself or the Islamic nation should 
be led by Saddam Hussein and others like him who are neither demo­
crats as I understand the term nor Islamists as I understand Islam- 
ism”.68 He then went on to recommend Hussein’s resignation from 
power.69 This was basically a political about-turn, undertaken in an at­
tempt to win back influence and support for al-Nahda from Saudi cir­
cles in particular, although it proved to be a futile gesture. One Lon­
don-based Saudi newspaper did not even bother to publish a later 
statement issued by Ghannouchi in which he condemned Iraq, dismiss­
ing it as a political manoeuvre by which to seek support for his strug­
gling movement.
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A second reason for questioning the democratic claims of the Tu­
nisian Islamists arose as revelations surfaced about their secret mili­
tary wing, which they had set up to support their political struggle. As 
we have seen in earlier chapters, the nature of this wing meant that it 
was forced into secrecy, not only with regard to the authorities and 
other political parties, but also with regard to the vast majority of al- 
Nahda members and supporters. Indeed it was only after the aborted 
coup of November 1987 that most people came to know of the mili­
tary wing’s existence. The problem it posed was that it forced the as­
sumption that the balance of power lay with whoever in the movement 
was in control of its military section, a scenario not entirely compati­
ble with the democratic norms as suggested by Ghannouchi.
With the disastrous results that followed the movement’s con­
frontation with the regime, many supporters of al-Nahda blamed 
Ghannouchi for forcing a confrontational agenda on the movement. 
Long before Mourou’s resignation from his post as Secretary General, 
there had been a great deal of talk about whether Ghannouchi’s state­
ments were in fact representative of al-Nahda 's true position, and 
about the legitimacy of his status as President of the movement. The 
official view expressed at the time by Ali Laridh was that Ghannouchi 
did in fact represent the movement whenever he signed a statement on 
al-Nahda 's behalf.70
This accusation later gained even more momentum, notably fol­
lowing the resignations of Mourou and his sympathisers. When asked 
at that time what advice he would like to give to Ghannouchi, Mourou 
asked him to abandon the use of violence in the domain of Islamic po­
litical action.71 He argued further that Ghannouchi could not be accept­
ed as a member of the break-away party he intended to form, as, in the
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eyes of public opinion, this would merely be seen in terms of double­
standards.72 Even to a close personal friend of Ghannouchi and founder 
member of al-Nahda such as Abdalkadir al-Jadidi, Ghannouchi’s 
statements in exile were not representative of the movement’s views 
and “embarrassing even to his friends, unthinkable to intelligent 
minds, and annoying for the intellectual and man of trust”.73
There were other, less prominent supporters of al-Nahda who 
also accused Ghannouchi of manipulating the movement according to 
his personal views and plans.74 Ghannouchi’s defence was always that 
he had remained faithful to the internal democratic rule of his organi­
sation, and that the complaints of these Islamist dissidents did not rep­
resent an “intellectual ijtihad or a new school of thought”.75 For his 
critics, this dismissal of their views was further proof of Ghannouchi’s 
undemocratic tendencies. Nonetheless, he chose not to take their com­
plaints seriously and did not feel obliged to resign from his post as de­
clared president of al-Nahda in exile.
A note on Tunisian modernism
Most of these doubts and accusations, both from within al-Nahda it­
self and from outside observers and opponents, have come to the sur­
face within the last few years, largely as a result of the movement’s 
double defeat: in Tunisia as a result of a government-organised cam­
paign, and internationally as a result of the defeat of Saddam Hussein.
This should not however undermine the gains that the movement 
has made in presenting itself as a democratic Islamic trend. This ap­
proach in fact has been appreciated by many, to the point that al-Zghal 
has argued that Ghannouchi and Bourguiba are both “above all the
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products of Tunisian civil society, well entrenched in the long tradition 
of exchange between the two shores of the Mediterranean and continu­
ing the reformist tradition of political men such as Khayr al-Din and 
[members of] the ‘ulama\ such as Taher ben Achour”.76 In this sense, 
al-Zghal ranks Ghannouchi alongside Tunisia’s leading modernists, a 
point that warrants closer examination.
From the time of the rule of Ahmad Bey (1837-1855) to that of 
Bourguiba, Tunisia has seemed more prepared than most other Islamic 
countries to adopt Western-style reforms within its political and social 
structures. Slavery was abolished in 1846, equality between Muslims 
and non-Muslims before the law was granted in 1857 by Mohamed al- 
Sadik Bey in a document known as the “Pledge of Safety” (‘ahd al- 
aman), which also granted foreigners the right to acquire properties in 
Tunisia. A new constitution was adopted in 1861, giving more powers 
to a consultative council and to ministers at the expense of the Bey. 
This period also witnessed the rise of the man whom many were later 
to call the “father of the Tunisian renaissance”, Khayr al-Din.77
Khayr al-Din was Tunisian Prime Minister from 1873 to 1877, 
but was most famous for his book Aqwam al-masalikfi ma ‘rifat ahwal 
al-mamalik ("The Straightest Way to Know the Conditions of King­
doms"), first published in Tunis in 1867. The importance of the book 
lies in its introduction, in which Khayr al-Din specified his two main 
purposes:
First, to urge those who are zealous and resolute among 
statesmen and men of religion to adopt, as far as they 
are able, whatever is conducive to the welfare of the Is­
lamic community and the development of its civilisa­
tion, such as the expansion of the boundaries of science 
and learning, preparation of the paths which lead to 
wealth from agriculture and commerce, the creation of 
industries and eradicating reasons for unemployment.
The basis for all this is good government, from which 
result security, hope and good work, as seen in the Euro-
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pean kingdoms.
Secondly, to warn those who are heedless among 
Muslims about persisting in closing their eyes to what is 
praiseworthy in the practice of adherents to other relig­
ions, but which is in conformity with our religion, sim­
ply because they have the idea engraved in their minds 
that all acts and institutions of non-Muslims should be 
avoided, and that their books on these issues should be 
denounced and not mentioned. They strongly criticise 
whoever appreciates them, despite the fact that this be­
haviour is clearly not correct.
Khayr al-Din also called for governmental reforms, to ensure 
wider consultation with eminent leaders in society, and suggested 
many ideas for solving the problems of Tunisia’s stagnant economy. 
What is more, he insisted on the need for benefiting from Western 
methods and policies in running Tunisia’s public affairs, and on the 
role of the state in leading the way to adopt these necessary changes 
and reforms.
There are two main remarks that may be made about the Tunisian 
renaissance: the first is that it was strongly influenced by Western, and 
especially French, domination. The Constitution of 1861 was in fact 
written by the French, arabised by the Bey’s secretary and approved 
by Napoleon the Third. Khayr al-Din himself was clearly influenced 
by Western policies and was intent on achieving success by Western 
standards, although not at the expense of the sharVa and the Islamic 
alliance with the Ottoman empire. The case with Bourguiba was even 
clearer still, through his strong cultural and political links with France. 
A second, but equally important, remark is that all reformists and po­
litical leaders in contemporary Tunisia have emphasised the role of the 
state as a key factor by which to implement their policies. Discussing 
the changes that occurred in Tunisia in the period leading up to 1881, 
Michael Brett has described this period as that of “the great increase in 
direct state control of the population”, leading to a state of affairs
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where "the traditional social hierarchy was severely weakened, its 
place taken by a general levelling . . .  of the population”.79
This trend helped to form a new class that the state could control
and manipulate. According to Brett:
The word “class” is too dangerous to be used without 
qualification. Nevertheless it seems an appropriate term 
for a rural population whose traditional social and eco­
nomic structures had been subordinated to the fiscal 
pressure of the central government, creating a homoge­
neous class of taxpayers and subjects, and under Ahmad 
Bey, of conscripts to the army, whose new condition in­
creased steadily in importance at the expense of the old. 
“Class” likewise seems appropriate for those who un­
doubtedly benefited from this new direction taken by the 
state, its agents who profited from its patronage.80
By 1987, Bourguiba’s rule had all but accomplished this very sig­
nificant social transformation; the state had become the only and abso­
lute source of power in Tunisia, at the expense of all other traditional 
forms of alliance, or even modem alliances such as syndicates or polit­
ical parties. Thus when President Ben Ali assumed power, he had only 
to crush the Islamic movement to reclaim total control over the coun­
try, in a manner similar to or even stronger than that of communist re­
gimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
For this reason, it is hard to agree with those who speak of “Tuni­
sian civil society and its political culture”, such as al-Zghal and others, 
as though democracy has been a dominant component of Tunisian po­
litical life throughout the last century. Tunisia may rightly deserve spe­
cial mention on account of its Western-influenced, modernising 
trends, but this must exclude democratisation. In fact, like many Mus­
lim governments, it has often chosen to disregard democracy and the 
will of the people in order to enforce Western-oriented reforms.
Because Tunisian modernism was a state-owned and essentially 
non-democratic project, the efforts of al-Nahda to present itself as a
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democratic party failed to result in any genuine acceptance on the part 
of the country’s ruling and influential elites. Rather, these elites mere­
ly viewed the Islamic movement as a dangerous threat to all of the 
Western-oriented reforms that had been made throughout the previous 
century, which were of far more significance than the possible positive 
aspects of a legal Islamic party. Indeed, these elites were unable even 
to accept differences within their own camp, let alone accept those 
who wanted to bring about an Islamic state.
Another explanation may be found in the theory of the Tunisian 
writer Saleh Bashir, in which he argues that Tunisian modernism, 
which was much more successful than the limited achievements of 
most Arab-Islamic countries, evolved in fact within a context of dictat­
orship, and not of democracy. He also argues that, because modernism 
managed to strengthen its roots in all classes of Tunisian society, it be­
came a source of legitimacy that every ruling elite aspired to monopol­
ise, in the same manner as religion or the will of the nation. Thus by 
claiming to be modernists, these elites presented their form of dictator­
ship as a legitimate defence of modernism.81
The response of Tunisian Elites
As we have seen, Ghannouchi’s writings may not necessarily be seen 
to represent the “official” view regarding the political theory of al- 
Nahda, but among his works is the most important document in the 
movement’s political literature, which provides a detailed theory of 
the Tunisian Islamists’ Islamic state. It is also true that this proposal 
for an Islamic state is compatible with the general line expressed with­
in al-Nahda's official statements, issued from the date of their forma­
tion as a political party in 1981. A few points emerge when one looks
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closely at the various Tunisian responses to this position.
Ghannouchi’s book was published in 1993, by which time al- 
Nahda had been banned in Tunisia. As a result, the book was not dis­
tributed in the country and there was no opportunity to review or dis­
cuss its ideas in the national press, although al-Nahda’s ostensibly lib­
eral views were well known, as much of the movement’s political 
rhetoric concerned democracy and the multi-party system. Nonethe­
less the Tunisian government, both under President Bourguiba and his 
successor Ben Ali, chose to ignore their claims and focus on fighting 
al-Nahda as an extremist political party using religion for its partisan 
aims. The official view is expressed in the following quotation, taken 
from President Ben Ali’s speech at an official symposium organised 
with UNESCO in 1995 on the subject of “The Teaching of Tolerance 
in the Mediterranean Basin”:
We are engaged in a fight against extremism which has 
shown by its terrorist methods not only hostility to the 
values or tolerance but also to the spirit and precepts of 
religion. This extremism seeks to wipe out the achieve­
ments of modernity, to encourage hatred and fanaticism, 
and to destroy the universal values and norms which 
govern human rights and all civilisations and religions.82
This statement reflects the Tunisian government’s outright rejection of 
the Islamists’ political activities, and confirms that opportunities for 
the discussion of views and ideas between the two sides seem to be 
slender, at least for the present.
Few Tunisian writers and analysts have publicly written positive­
ly about al-Nahda’s “democratic message”. Together with al-Zghal, 
Elbaki Hermassi is possibly the most prominent personality among 
Tunisian academics to have noted this, in as early as 1984, in his paper 
to a conference about the contemporary Islamic movement in the Arab
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world. In this paper he spoke of a new political approach taken by the 
Tunisian Islamic movement since 1980, one “that reversed the tradi­
tional equation ‘Allah, the ruler, the people’ to one of ‘Allah, the peo­
ple, the ruler’, implying a relationship in which the people assume a 
central position so as to give legitimacy to the ruler and even to the Is­
lamic project”.83 Until as late as 1990, Hermassi’s writings remained 
generous towards a Tunisian Islamism that he viewed as being orient­
ed toward modernity and pluralism:
A conceptual effort toward modernism, shaping the 
movement into an avant-garde, partly able to face the 
underground as well as the broad daylight of public life, 
and at last dictating the choice of a more convincing — 
and more and more convinced — tendency toward a le­
galistic strategy: this is the main feature or the Tunisian 
Islamicist movement. 84
However, as the confrontation resurfaced between President Ben 
‘All’s regime and the Islamists, all objective approaches to this issue 
became extremely difficult for Tunisian academics. Hermassi, for ex­
ample, was appointed Tunisian Ambassador to UNESCO, a position 
from which he could not continue to express publicly his views about 
al-Nahda, which differed to those of the regime. Again, the state’s 
considerations emerged as the stronger argument and the priority of 
most of the Tunisian elites.
In fact, the majority of politicians, academics and journalists have 
always shown suspicion towards the Islamists’ liberal claims, if not to­
tal rejection of them. Much of their argument concerns the slogans 
used by the movement, such as the necessity of forming an Islamic 
government, or the implementation of sharVa laws. Those who have 
been keen not to show a “negative attitude” towards religion have 
argued that putting Islam at the heart of politics is “not good” for Is­
lam, because:
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It brings it down to the level of a temporary ideology, in 
an attempt to explain changing political choices, and be­
cause it holds it responsible for the mistakes of human 
actions. The right approach then is to keep religion as 
the closest uniting factor that brings all people o f  the Is­
lamic nation together, regardless of their races, colours 
and political systems. It is unjust to religion to involve it 
in the social struggle to legitimise organised violence, 
instead of being a source of mercy and protection, and 
to [use it to] hide the faults of institutions.. .85
Those who have not believed in the political role of religion from 
the outset have been more outspoken. They have argued that the relig­
ious state implies an absence of freedom of belief, “as was shown for 
centuries”.86 They have also argued that it implies the absence of polit­
ical rights, because a religious government tends to persecute people, 
as the self-proclaimed representatives of Allah on earth. As for the Is­
lamists’ argument that they would only form an Islamic government 
after a popular mandate, they consider this undemocratic, because it 
would still force one interpretation of religion on the whole popula­
tion, while there are many different religious groups in Tunisia 87
The alternative for a large proportion of the Tunisian elites is a 
secular state, as “politics is a social issue ruled by a human [i.e. not a 
religious] order”.88 As has been previously mentioned, this trend de­
nies that the current Tunisian state is secular and argues for a new po­
litical order that will keep religion apart from politics. As one secular­
ist writes: “The state in Tunisia has never been secular. The rulers of 
yesterday were behind the emergence of the obscurantist movement, 
and offered it all that it needed to grow. They made religion one of the 
main pillars of their ideology and used it for their political ends”.89
With regard to the implementation of the sharVa, the overwhelm­
ing position taken by the centrist (being those closest to the govern­
ment) and the leftist groups is one of emphatic rejection. Abd Allah
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Tmami, who worked for the governmental Tunisian Information Bu­
reau, ridiculed the slogans of the independent lists supported by al- 
Nahda in the 1989 general elections, especially those concerning the 
implementation of the sharVa. After arguing that times have changed 
since the period of the Prophet and his Companions, when the punish­
ment (ihadd) for theft or the position against interest (riba) were rea­
sonable, he argued that there is no way that laws created for the past 
can be valid for the present: “This ignoring of the factor of time 
through insisting on tying the present to the past, and the refusal to ob­
serve the changes and complications that have taken place throughout 
the past years and centuries, are the main problems of salafl 
thought”.90
For yet another critic, a writer for the official media, the sharVa 
contains little more than a limited set of rules, incapable of fulfilling 
the needs of modem society, arguing that in any case “its implementa­
tion is totally impossible because its conditions are impossible to 
meet”.91 Meanwhile, for the leftists, the Islamists’ call to implement 
the sharVa has revealed “their terrible face”, and confirmed them as 
representatives of the “dark side of our civilisation”.92
These reactions reveal that most of Tunisia’s influential elites are 
in agreement with regard to the issues of the Islamic state and the im­
plementation of the sharVa. They share a position of categorical rejec­
tion of the idea, even if it is arrived at via a democratic process, which 
is why almost all of them have supported the government’s restrictions 
on the formation of “religious” parties, and supported it even when the 
supposedly “civilian” al-Nahda party was refused legal recognition af­
ter dropping its religious title.
Although the Islamists’ views have been in most cases vague and
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unspecific, the position taken towards them among the majority of in­
fluential elites, including those in power, in academic circles, in the 
parties of the left and in the media, has been taken a priori, on the ba­
sis of their principles and not their specific proposals or ideas. The 
modem elites of Tunisia are unrivalled, even in supposedly secular 
Turkey, in their radical and undemocratic stand towards the Islamists.
The implications of the Islam ists’ programme
Despite the extent of the radical opposition to the Islamists’ main ide­
as, a close study of the exact implications of Ghannouchi’s proposals 
for a Tunisian constitution reveals that the gap between the models of 
the republican and the Islamic state is not that great, at least theoreti­
cally. By Ghannouchi’s standards, only two main modifications or ad­
ditions are needed to make the current constitution “Islamic”: to insist 
that all laws of the state must be compatible with the laws of the 
sharVa; and to widen the responsibilities of the existing official Islam­
ic Council to include ensuring that all laws passed by the parliament or 
the president are acceptable in the eyes of the sharVa.
Almost everything else in the constitution of the Tunisian state is 
in fact similar to what Ghannouchi has proposed in al-Hurriyyat al- 
‘Amma. For example, Tunisia is currently under a presidential govern­
ment, with an elected parliament, which is exactly the system favoured 
by Ghannouchi. With regard to the laws governing the state, one can 
easily perceive in his works a number of very positive, democratic and 
liberal notions which, if applied properly, could make Tunisia a very 
democratic country indeed. Restrictions on the formation of political 
parties or the freedom of the press could be lifted, a demand voiced 
not only by the Islamists but by the majority of politicians.
194
As far as religion is concerned, the government is currently re­
sponsible for its well-being, especially the building and the financing 
of mosques and Islamic education, which is an official part of the na­
tional curriculum. In the case of an Islamist government, they may 
choose, in addition, to increase the budget for mosques or the time al­
located for religious education; they may also insist that text books be­
come more religious in their content.
The question of implementing Islamic hudud may also be simpler 
than it appears within the rhetoric of competing political groups. 
Hudud are applied, for example, in countries such as Saudi Arabia 
without causing any undue strain in Tunisian-Saudi relations, or even 
in Saudi-Western relations. Even in the case of Sudan, where Islamists 
are in power and the hudud are applied, there have been very few cas­
es in which any specific punishment has been executed, as laws make 
it extremely difficult to apply the hadd unless a number of strict condi­
tions are met. In fact, Tunisian Islamists are very pragmatic concern­
ing this issue: in addition to stressing the very rare circumstances in 
which these punishments should be applied, they also point out that 
this is not a fundamental component of their programme. Ghannouchi 
explains it accordingly:
To say that to carry out a range of hudud conditional 
upon certain circumstances will hold the society back 
and cause its decline is a form of insult, and not a ration­
al analysis. The main factors of revival are represented 
in certain fundamental values such as work, and in the 
mind which believes in reason, the dignity of the human 
being and social justice. These are the pillars of the es­
sence of Islam, as is clear in its texts. 93
One of the main areas of debate between Islamists and their oppo­
nents is the political and social rights granted to women in Tunisian 
laws. During Bourguiba’s reign, Islamists were known to oppose the 
Personal Status Code because it banned polygamy and allowed adopt­
195
ed children to take the names of their new relatives, although they 
were prepared to concede these points in the hope that the government 
would grant them legal recognition. In 1988, Ghannouchi told a na­
tional newspaper that the Personal Status Code was “a body of choices 
and decisions which are part of different schools of Islamist thought”.94 
This also reveals the pragmatic nature of the Islamist’s thinking: a pol­
icy which was inherently unlslamic could become the product of “dif­
ferent schools of Islamist thought” if circumstances dictated.
A government led by the Islamists would also have to find an an­
swer to the religious problem of producing and selling wine as part of 
the tourist industry, one of the country’s main sources of hard curren­
cy. Wine is forbidden to Muslims, but the Islamists claim that they 
would still be flexible and keep it legally available for consumption by 
non-Muslims.
From the above comparisons, it is clear that the Islamist’s Islamic 
state would not require the replacement of the existing legal system in 
its entirety. Changes in the constitution would be limited, and only the 
rhetoric and orientations of an Islamic government would be different, 
a fact that is rarely given mention in the ongoing war between the Tu­
nisian government and the Islamists. It would seem that their oppo­
nents have chosen to overlook this fact in an attempt to legitimise their 
own political interests.
The question of originality
If the Tunisian elites failed to recognise the intellectual efforts of 
Ghannouchi and his colleagues, could he possibly expect a more 
favourable judgement on the part of foreign observers, either Muslim
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or non-Muslim?
One may safely say that a wide section of Arab Islamists in fact 
see Ghannouchi as the leader of the democratic trend within the Arab 
Islamic movement. In contrast to the conservatism of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, Ghannouchi has been one of the most outspoken 
Islamists voicing the case for democracy. The issue of democracy in 
Tunisia has been high on his agenda since 1981, but it has not proved 
to be as important to other Islamic movements, who have faced differ­
ent sets of challenges. This has given him the chance to be different, 
and to appeal to many Arab Islamists who view him as the voice of re­
newal within the Islamic trend in general. The editor of the magazine 
Qira'at Siyaslyya has described Ghannouchi as the representative of a 
“distinguished intellectual trend on the Islamic scene”.95
Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa, one of the most distinguished con­
temporary Islamists specialising in the field of Islamic government 
and author of the well-known work, “On the Political Order in the Is­
lamic State”96, wrote in the preface to Ghannouchi's al-Hurriyyat al- 
*Amma that “in all parts of the book, Rashid has clearly sided with the 
Islamic position that supports freedom against dictatorship and 
progress against conservatism”.97
This statement gives an indication of the essence of Ghannou- 
chi’s theoretical enterprise: it is a serious effort to collect the views of 
both past and contemporary Islamic scholars and writers on issues of 
freedom within the Islamic political system. In doing so, he proposed 
to
choose the view with the strongest proof, the one that 
serves public interests and reflects the opinion of the 
majority of scholars, trying not to forget for a moment 
the current Islamic circumstances in which this message
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must be used, as a means of change and reform and of 
solving its problems. Our goal is not merely intellectual, 
but is an Islamic revolution that will uproot dictators 
from the land of Allah. 98
There are, however, dangers with his methodology, in that it im­
poses a pre-determined political objective on the research as a whole, 
ultimately making it a political, rather than an academic, undertaking. 
Ghannouchi himself has been frank about this from the outset, howev­
er this may well have played a part in limiting the originality of his 
work, in that he has merely opted to select from previous recorded 
opinions concerning the Islamic state, and their suitability within the 
current political predicament.
In some parts of his work, Ghannouchi fails to hide his immense 
bitterness towards the current regime in Tunisia, which he describes as 
a coalition of “pseudo-modernist groups allied to the army”.99 In other 
instances he makes a number of unsubstantiated claims, such as his as­
sertion that al-Nahda won the majority of seats in the 1989 general 
elections, without supplying any evidence to this effect other than his 
reference to “documents which will be revealed in the future”.100 (As 
we have already seen, official reports recorded that al-Nahda won 
around only seventeen per cent of the vote.) He also enthusiastically 
defends the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, praising its victory in 
the aborted general elections of 1991 as “a chapter in the Islamic 
struggle which uncovers the true face of the secular elite in the Magh­
reb”.101 Indeed there are many examples in which he comes across 
more as a zealot addressing a public meeting, than an intellectual pur­
suing an academic undertaking.
Writing a book to incite revolution is not in fact an academic 
goal, as Ghannouchi himself has admitted, but it remains an attractive 
enterprise for the thousands of Islamists who share Ghannouchi’s
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dreams of an Islamic state. In one of the few reviews published about 
the book, there is praise for the fact that it comes as the result of a long 
period of contemplation in prison: “This is new proof that most of 
those timeless books by activist thinkers have been written either 
when entering periods of persecution (mihan) or emerging from 
them”.102
There are, however, two more serious problems implicit in this 
political approach to the subject of the Islamic state: the first is raised 
by Dr. Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani of the International Institute of Islamic 
Thought in the United States, who has commented on Ghannouchi’s 
views on democracy and citizenship in Islamic society. He too argues 
that Ghannouchi is trying to appease Westernised secularists in the Is­
lamic world, by claiming that Islam can accommodate a Western mod­
el of democracy, for political gain. Al-‘AlwanI argues that this is little 
more than a continuation of the practice of imitation of Western civili­
sation, which has thus far been a complete failure. Thus, he asserts, 
“All thought which fails to make progress in the contexts of innova­
tion and imagination, and in leading the nation from stagnation and 
traditionalism, will not make a relevant contribution. We may even 
say that it will fail, regardless of whatever short-term gains it may 
have”.103 Al-‘Alwani insists also that being faithful to true Islamic val­
ues should be more important than giving in to purely political consid-
104erations.
This leads to the second problem in Ghannouchi’s political inter­
pretation of Islam, as it is presented in this book and indeed most of 
his other works: it is in fact politically motivated, and thus self­
contradictory on more than one occasion. One of the more recent ex­
amples of this has been highlighted by Hennas si, concerning Ghan-
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nouchi’s new approach in 1988 to the Personal Status Code, in the
context of defending the Islamists’ political rights:
Having for a long time considered the Personal Status 
Code as part of a campaign of forced and alienating 
Westernisation, this same code is now considered to be 
a “body of choices and decisions which are part of dif­
ferent schools of Islamic thought”. The code is an exam­
ple of ijtihad (interpretation) and represents a positive 
element. 105
It is interesting when one compares this to what Ghannouchi
wrote in another of his books (“The Muslim Woman in Tunisia”),
which was published in the same year:
The Bourguiban code known as the Personal Status 
Code was an anti-nationalist response to nationalist de­
mands. It was not the result of Tunisian society’s own 
evolution, nor a response to human demands and pres­
sures. It was indeed part of a new crusader campaign to 
Westernise our society and to destroy its Arab-Islamic 
identity. 106
Deciding which of the above two attitudes to believe concerning 
such a fundamentally important issue is problematic. One may, of 
course, adopt al-Zghal’s approach, which argues basically that it is not 
uncommon for a politician to have different messages for different au­
diences, and that “the ambivalence of Ghannouchi’s language is a re­
production of Bourguiba’s language in the colonial era”.107
Al-Zghal may have a valid point, but his approach is equally 
problematic as far as Ghannouchi is concerned, because it strips him 
of any religious legitimacy and sincerity. Even if the Tunisian Isla­
mists are content to maintain their “political” face, this will not solve 
their problems of legitimacy, especially when one considers that they 
in fact lost the political battle with the current regime some time ago.
200
Notes: Chapter Five
1 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
2 Al-Ghannushi, Harakat al-ittijah al-islamifi Tunis, vol. 3, op. cit., pp. 122-
123.
3 Esposito, op. cit., p. 159.
4 Al-Ghannushi, Hurriyyat a l-‘ammafi al-dawla al-islamiyya, p. 18.
5 See chapter one, note no. 56.
6 Al-Ghannushi, Harakat al-ittijah al-islamifi Tunis, vol. 3, p. 84.
7 Al-Ghannushi, Hurriyyat a l-‘ammafi al-dawla al-islamiyya, p. 17.
8 Ibid., p. 17.
9 Ibid., p. 27.
]0 Ibid., p. 19.
11 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
12 Ibid., p. 88.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 98 and pp. 104-105.
16 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
17 Ibid., p. 99.
18 Al-Ghannushi, Mahawir islamiyya, op. cit. pp. 40-41.
19 A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Commentary (Maryland: 
Amana Corp, 1983), p. 714.
20 Ibid., p. 24.
21 Al-Ghannushi, Hurriyyat al-'amma f i  al-dawla al-islamiyya, p. 41.
22 Ibid.
23 Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa, ‘An al-nizam al-siyasifi al-dawla al-islamiyya, 
(Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989), pp. 210-216.
24 Al-Ghannushi, op. cit., pp. 306-309.
25 Ibid., p. 44.
26 Ibid., pp. 44-68.
27 Ibid., p. 50.
28 Ibid., p. 109.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 119.
31 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
32 Ibid., p. 139.
33 Ibid., p. 153.
34 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
35 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
201
36 Ibid., pp. 170-177.
37 Ibid., p. 247.
38 Ibid., p. 246.
39 Ibid., p. 247.
40 Ibid., p. 247-248.
41 Ibid., p. 248.
42 Ibid., p. 342.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 119.
45 Ibid., p. 247.
46 See H aqa’iq hawla harakat al-ittijah al-islami (Tunis: n.p., 1983), pp. 10-12 
and p. 16.
47 Ibid., p. 16.
48 Al-Ghannushi, op. cit., pp. 298-301.
49 Ibid., p. 301.
50 Ibid., p. 304.
51 Ibid., p. 306.
52 (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993.)
53  —Rashid al-Ghannushi, Huquq al-muwatana: huquq ghayr al-muslimfi al- 
mujtama ‘ al-islam i, p. 72.
54 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
55 Al-Ghannushi, Hurriyyat a l-‘ammafi al-dawla al-islamiyya, pp. 292-294.
56 Ibid., p. 291.
57 Ibid., pp. 292-293.
Al-Ghannushi, Huquq al-muwdtana p. 77.
59 Ibid., p. 102.
60 Ibid., p. 112.
61 Rashid al-Ghannouchi, "Participation in a non-Islamic Government", in Pow- 
er-Sharing Islam, ed. Tamimi, (London: Liberty Publications, 1993), p. 55.
62 Ibid., p. 54.
63 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
64 ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Zghal in al-Dinfi al-mujtama( a l-‘arabi (Beirut: Markaz
dirasat al-wahda al-‘arabiyya, 1990), p. 340.
65 Ibid., p. 349.
66 Rashid al-Ghannushi, Ila ‘ulama ’ al-umma wa jamahiriha, op. cit. See also
Al-Sha‘b newspaper, September 18, 1990.
67 Fahml Huwaydi, “Hiwar ma‘a al-Ghannushi”, al-Majalla, October 3, 1990.
68 Al-Darwish, Hiwarat, op. cit., p. 112.
69 Ibid., p. 113.
70 See Ali Laridh’s statement in Realties, October 26, 1990.
71 See Morou’s statement in Realties, May 17, 1991.
202
72 See Morou’s statement to Realties, April 12, 1991.
73 Abdelkadir al-Jedidi in Al-Hurria, 9 June 1992.
74 See Abdelkadir al-Jedidi's open letter to al-Nahda leaders, Realties, July 10, 
1992.
75 Extracts from Ghannouchi’s statement to the BBC, reproduced in al-Nahda 
publication al-Hadath al-maghribi, May 23, 1991.
76 ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Zghal, op. cit., p. 344.
77 See Van Krieken’s preface to Khayr al-Din wa Tunis: 1850-1881 (Tunis: Dar 
Sahnun)1988.
78 Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, Muqaddimat aqwam al-masalik f i  ma ‘rifat ahwal al- 
mamalik (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1978), pp. 109-110.
79 Michael Brett, Modernisation in Nineteenth Century North Africa, p. 18.
80 Ibid., p. 18.
81 Salih Bashir, “Tunis aw ihtikar al-hadatha”, in Abwab magazine (Beirut: Sum­
mer 1994).
82 Zin al-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia News, 129, (Tunis: May 29 1995).
83 Al-Harmasi, in al-Harakdt al-islamiyya al-mu‘asirafi al-watan al- ‘arabiyya, 
op. cit., pp. 272-273.
84 Hermassi, “The Islamicist Movement and November 7”, in Tunisia: The Politi­
cal Economy of Reform, op. cit., p. 193.
85 Announcement by a group of Tunisian university teachers in Al-Sabah news­
paper, Tunis: March 18, 1988.
86 Al-Hammami, Didda al-ialamiyya, op. cit., p. 34.
87 Ibid., p. 34.
88 Announcement by a group of writers and artists in Al-Mawqif magazine, Tunis: 
March 17, 1988.
89 At-Tahir al-Hammami, “al-La’ikiun yataharrakuna fi al-daw’” in Al-Sada 
newspaper, Tunis: April 3, 1988
90 ‘Abd Allah ‘Imami, Tanfimdt al-irhab f i  al- (alam al-islami: unmudhaj al- 
Nahda : al-nash'a, al-tanfir, al-haykala, al-irhab . .  . , op. cit., pp. 357-359.
91 Anas al-Shabbi, “Naqd al-mastur wa hijabuhu ‘an dawlat al-shara‘ wa 
du‘atuhu”, Al-Mustaqbal newspaper, Tunis: February 26, 1988.
92 Al-Hammami, op. cit., p. 141.
93 Al-Ghannoushi, Harakat al-ittijah al-islamifi Tunis, vol 3, pp. 128-129.
94 Hermassi, op. cit., p. 199.
95 Qira’at siyasiyya, 3-4, (Florida: Summer-Winter 1993), p. 121.
96 Published Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989.
97 See preface to al-Hurriyyat al- ‘ammafi al-dawla al-islamiyya, p. 13.
203
6Issues of Identity and Westernisation
In spite of their deep involvement in politics, the Tunisian Islamists 
have always maintained that the issue of reforming Tunisia is primari­
ly cultural. The first manifesto of the movement put as its two main 
goals the revival of an Islamic identity in Tunisia and the reforming of 
Islamic thought, in light of the fundamental principles of Islam and the 
requirements of man’s continuous evolution and changing circum­
stances.
At the heart of this cultural question lies one of the most highly- 
discussed issues in Tunisia and indeed in all the Islamic world: what 
Ghannouchi describes as “Westernisation, which has taken Tunisia 
from its roots, values and identity.”1 It may be argued that the chal­
lenge of the West has dominated political and cultural life in most 
Muslim countries since the French invasion of Egypt (1798-1801). As 
a consequence, political and cultural trends in the Muslim world have 
been divided into categories of “conservatives”, “progressives” or 
“moderates”, mainly with regard to their attitude towards Western 
domination and civilisation, and whether they choose to imitate, reject, 
or accommodate this within the Islamic context.
As Hourani has observed, it was in as early as the 1860s that the 
issue of reform vis-a-vis the process of Westernisation began to be 
clearly formulated by the elites of the Muslim world:
It found expression in a movement of thought, directed 
in the first instance at the specific problems of the Near 
East, but raising once more by implication the general 
questions of political theory: what is the good society,
-■
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the norm that should direct the work of reform? Can this 
norm be derived from the principles of Islamic law, or is 
it necessary to go to the teachings and practice of mod­
em Europe? Is there in fact any contradiction between 
the two? 2
One of the most prominent Muslims to formulate such questions 
was Khayr al-Din of Tunisia. Some of his views have been presented 
in the previous chapter with regard to the role of the state in imple­
menting necessary reforms, and the need for Muslims to adopt those 
aspects of European systems and ideas deemed to be worthy within an 
Islamic context.
Perhaps the most important observation which may be made 
about Khayr al-Din’s approach is his insistence on the compatibility 
between those modem, Europe-inspired reforms and Islam, as we may 
see from the following two quotations:
The progress of Europe, Khayr al-Din assured his read­
ers, is not in any sense due to its being Christian. Chris­
tianity is a religion which aims at happiness in the next 
world and not in this. If it were a cause of worldly 
progress, the Papal State would be the most advanced, 
not the most backward state in Europe. Thus if the Mus­
lim countries try to adopt the causes of European 
progress they will not be adopting Christianity. They 
will simply be adopting the modem equivalent of the an­
cient institutions of the Islamic umma. 3
He is at pains indeed to make the parallel clear. What 
are the characteristic institutions of modem Europe?
They are responsible ministers, parliaments, freedom of 
the press. But the modem idea of the responsible minis­
ter is not very different from the Islamic idea of the 
good wazir who gives counsel without fear or favour, 
and parliaments and press are equivalent to ‘consulta­
tion’ in Islam. Members of parliament are what the 
‘ulama ’ and notables were in the Islamic State — ‘those 
who bind and loose’ (ahl al-hall wa’l-‘aqd). Thus to 
adopt European institutions is really to fulfil the spirit 
and purpose of the sharVa. 4
Khayr al-Din was unambiguous in insisting that the sharVa is the
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main source of legislation for Muslims and that it remains valid for all 
times and places. In this respect, it is correct to describe him as an Is­
lamic reformer:
With regard to the sharVa, Khayr al-DIn remained, 
without a doubt, in the main stream of classical Islamic 
thought. As he saw the teachings of the sharVa to be 
valid for all times and places, he then made it the basis 
for all of the umma’s activities, arguing that it was proof 
of the advantage that the Islamic nation had over other 
nations, as it contained rules and teachings which non- 
Muslims needed to learn and figure out gradually, some­
times paying a heavy price for that. 5
The second characteristic of Khayr al-Din’s thought is that it was 
pan-Islamic and not narrowly nationalistic, that is to say it was not 
confined within the Tunisian borders. At that time Tunisia was still a 
part of the Ottoman empire, although its rulers enjoyed a great deal of 
autonomy. Thus the umma in Khayr al-DIn’s terms meant the Islamic 
nation as a whole, and the Ottoman empire represented the political 
expression of this nation as it was the centre of the Islamic caliphate.6
In light of the political and cultural environment of his time his 
rationale was not deemed strange, as most of the Islamic world was 
still viewed as one major political entity under the control of the Otto­
man empire. In this sense, the modem notion of borders and national 
identity was still unobserved in the Muslim world.
Khayr al-Din served as Prime Minister in Tunis and later in Istan­
bul itself (1878-1879). Eighty years later, however, by the time Bour- 
guiba had become the first president of the first Tunisian republic, the 
Arab Muslim world was totally different to that of the time of Khayr 
al-Din. Under the leadership of Ataturk, the Turks themselves had 
abolished the Caliphate in 1924, ending all official forms of a united, 
pan-Islamic political entity. As a result, Turkey was converted to a
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secular state by its new constitution, guarded closely by the new re­
publican army. Even its linguistic connection with the Arab world, the 
Arabic alphabet, was substituted with the Latin script by official de­
cree. Ataturk argued that the caliphate had become both an irrational 
mission and a disaster, which the Turkish people could not conscien­
tiously permit to continue.7 To him, the caliphate characterised the be­
haviour of a nation which looked ashamedly at its past, and was ex­
pressed in such minor details as the wearing of the traditional fez, as 
we may see from the following quotation:
It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our 
heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to 
progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the 
hat, the customary head dress of the whole civilised 
world, thus showing among other things, that no differ­
ence existed in the manner of thought between the Turk­
ish nation and the whole family of civilised mankind. 8
Although at that time the notion of pan-Arabism seemed to 
present an attractive alternative to the abolished, united Islamic state, it 
was in fact the nationalist identity of separate and divided Arab coun­
tries that emerged victorious after the colonial period. For while a pan- 
Arab identity remained an aspired-to dream for many, the tmth was 
that every Arab nation-state existed as a totally separate entity; borders 
assumed a new significance as indicators of separate nationalities, and 
have remained significant — to the point of being the main source of 
conflict among Arab countries since the 1950s.
In addition to the destruction of the united Islamic political entity, 
European domination of the Islamic world resulted in marginalising 
the reformist trend, which had attempted to introduce changes within 
the teachings of the sharVa. This was to the benefit of a new class, 
which Sharabi has called the “Muslim secularists”, being those of “the 
tendency to look forward, to progress, pragmatism, science, scientific
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doctrine, materialistic orientation of thought, dynamic views of social 
values, relativism of truth.”9 The Muslim secularists stood in contrast 
to the Islamic reformists who, despite being
open to the values and achievements of modem sci­
ence ..  . never really attempted to work out a systematic 
accommodation of it. Mostly they satisfied themselves 
with verbal compromises, tending always toward a de­
fensive or apologetic stance. Instead of reformulating 
their assumptions in modem terms, they chose to follow 
traditional methods of rationalisation. Propaganda and 
polemics rather than criticism and analysis dominated 
their approach. 10
In this post-Caliphate Arab world, increasingly polarised between 
conflicting trends of thought and politics, Bourguiba was seen as a 
leading “Muslim secularist”, as defined by Sharabl. In comparison to 
Khayr al-Din, Bourguiba was no longer attached to the state of the 
sharVa, and was no longer committed to the pan-Islamic state. His at­
tachment to the West, however, was more profound and strategic, 
shaping his views during the early stage of his political career, and be­
fore the independence of his country.
In 1951, he commented on the attitude of certain delegates at an 
Islamic conference held in India, at which he was present:
There were those who, as a natural reaction to the 
West’s mistakes and abuses, suggested the total and 
simple return to all that had made our great past, and, 
more precisely, to all that used to exist in our great past.
They wanted the integral resurrection of the Muslim so­
ciety of the first Caliphs, which in fact represented the 
golden age of Islam. It was an attractive and flattering 
suggestion, but one which is now impractical, even 
more so dangerous, because it would be translated as a 
fatal regression, throwing the Muslim world into a stage 
which had been golden in the past because it represented 
a formidable jump in the path of progress, but which 
would be nowadays largely outdated. 11
A religious system of government was deemed to be out of the
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question for Bourguiba:
I have always thought that the Tunisian state, being non- 
theocratic and without a religious base, in that it in­
cludes non-Muslim citizens [Jews], can also assimilate 
Christians, who would be Tunisians in Tunisia without 
ceasing to be French in France. 12
This attitude was also reflected in the manner in which Bourguiba 
handled the Islamic affairs of independent Tunisia, which, as we have 
seen in the first chapter, was one of the reasons behind the emergence 
of the Tunisian Islamic movement. What should also be added here is 
that Bourguiba was conscious not to be as brutal as Ataturk. In 1951, 
he wrote from Istanbul a short but telling remark:
I have seriously thought about this Kemalist experiment.
There is [the question of] what to take from it and what 
to ignore. We can achieve the same results, or better, 
with less draconian measures that give more considera­
tion to the soul of the people.13
His was a different form of secularism, in that it gave more em­
phasis to deeds, rather than words and slogans. Nonetheless, without 
declaring an official, secularist constitution, Bourguiba was indeed 
able to do much of what had been done by Ataturk in restricting the in­
fluence of religion in the state’s affairs.
Another significant difference, which sets Bourguiba apart from 
Khayr al-Din, for example, was that the former was a nationalist lead­
er, with a vision of Tunisia as a political entity independent from the 
rest of the Arab and Islamic world. He saw Tunisia as a nation with its 
own independent history as represented by the state —  which is an in­
carnation of the nation and which fulfils its hopes.14 The battle for na­
tional independence from France also played a very influential role in 
giving legitimacy to this line of thought, as it was primarily a Tunisian 
issue, and not Arab or Islamic. Even when the Arab and Islamic di­
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mensions of the struggle for independence were mentioned, they were 
used to serve the new nationalist concept in the face of French policies 
of assimilation:
Where do we want to end? Is it serious to think that a 
nation of an ancient civilisation, Arab culture and 
Islamic religion; an ancient nation which had its hour of 
glory, a civilisation and a history; which had its own 
‘state’ ruled by a dynasty which itself came after four 
more ancient ones . . . with the most ancient dating back 
to the eighth century, the era of Charlemagne and Harun 
al-Rashid; is it serious to imagine that that such an 
individual nation, which is proud of its history, will 
allow itself to be absorbed and dissolved into a foreign 
community?15
However this pride in an Arab-Islamic history, as a weapon with 
which to fight France, did not mean that “Tunisian-ness” should be di­
luted within a larger Arab entity; as Hisham Djait has observed: 
“Bourguiba’s restrictive nationalism was strongly opposed to unifying 
Arab nationalism.”16 Indeed B ourguiba was also greatly influenced by 
the symbols of the pre-Islamic era in Tunisian history, especially those 
of Jugartha and Hannibal. More important than all of these experi­
ments and symbols, however, was the fact that the Bourguiban era it­
self was proclaimed to be the stage at which Tunisia had finally ex­
pressed itself as an independent and sovereign entity, and as a safe and 
strong nation.17
A third, significant dimension of Bourguiba’s programme was his 
attachment to the West in general and to France in particular, a point 
which has been addressed in detail in the first chapter. Bourguiba was 
adamant even during the difficult period of the colonial era that the 
fight for independence was not against France per se\
In trying to put an end to the colonial regime, my ac­
tions have no other goal but the extermination of the 
germs of hatred between two brotherly peoples who, if
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this condition is met, will inevitably be involved in 
close cooperation, on the bases of solidarity and human 
fraternity. 18
In fact, Bourguiba lived up to his ideas and promises. Under his 
leadership, independent Tunisia maintained a special and close rela­
tionship with France in the political, economic and cultural aspects. 
Many of his supporters agree that Tunisian francophony is “insepara­
ble from its Arabism and Islamism. These three factors, along with 
three others, Mediterraneanism, Africanism and Maghrebism, make up 
the six basic reckonings of Tunisia’s identity.”19
In a general sense, Tunisia has always seemed to be more interest­
ed in the West than in her Arab neighbours, while the main goal that 
Bourguiba identified for his country was to catch up with the “civil­
ised” nations, by which he meant those of the West. As a conse­
quence, the Tunisian Islamic movement has challenged the Bourgui- 
ban regime on all three of the main issues mentioned herein: the 
relation between religion and politics (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), Tunisian identity and relations with the West.
Islam, Arabism and Tunisian identity
According to al-Najjar, the fundamentalist approach to the question of 
Tunisia’s identity derives from the fundamentalists’ interpretation of 
Islam in accordance with the model of the first Islamic state led by the 
Prophet Muhammad. This implies that Islam comes first, in the sense 
of a wider Islam which covers and rules over everything.20 Therefore, 
belief in Allah and the basic teachings of Islam is not merely a person­
al matter, as with other religions, but may only be fulfilled in its social 
context, whereby Islamic values become the basis for social relations 
and public life, an issue which is of prime importance when defining
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Tunisia’s identity.21
Al-Najjar also asserts that the second defining factor of Tunisia’s 
identity is that it be based on the moral system of Islam, which pro­
vides the Tunisian people with their own correct set of values. The Tu­
nisian nation, he says, is still deeply committed to Islamic moral rules 
despite Western attacks, a fact which has enabled her to reject foreign 
customs.22
Third is the social and and economic dimension to Tunisia’s Is­
lamic identity, which must also reflect those rules stipulated in the 
Qur’an, especially those of justice, equality, equal opportunities, and 
political freedoms. As an Islamic nation, Tunisia should obey the rule 
of Islam in all of these affairs, including family and criminal law.23
We may see from the above, therefore, that if Bourguiba argued 
that Tunisia could not have a religious government, the Islamists take 
precisely the opposite view. The government, says al-Najjar, is respon­
sible for implementing the teachings embraced by the Islamic nation 
and adopting them as a basis for its public life. The nation should only 
chose its president to rule by Islamic teachings; if he fails to do so, 
then he must be deposed 24
According to al-Najjar, the final essential element in defining Tu­
nisia’s identity is Arabism ( ‘uruba). He argues that Tunisia is essen­
tially an Arab country, which adopted Arabic as its language in the 
early stages of Islam, thus becoming an assimilated part of the Arab 
nation.25 The main consequence of this therefore is that Tunisia must 
be proud of the Arabic language, using it for education and administra­
tion, and adopting Arab customs which are essentially Islamic. It 
should be noted here however that this attitude does not suggest that 
the Islamists speak the language of Arab nationalists, in fact al-Najjar
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rejects “all forms of fanaticism” in defining the Arab identity, caution­
ing that one cannot boast of his race because the sharVa forbids this, 
and has made it clear that only good deeds make a difference between 
people.26
In conclusion, al-Najjar argues that the Tunisian nation is a his­
torical continuity of the Islamic nation, founded in that country in the 
first century after the hijra. Because of this, it possesses a theological 
and social heritage, being the comprehensive Islamic model trans­
ferred across the generations from the time of the Prophet. This heri­
tage has remained alive in the nation’s consciousness, despite all diffi­
culties, which explains the popular appeal of Islamic renaissance 
movements.27
All of al-Najjar’s ideas are embodied in the first major objective 
adopted by the Tunisian Islamic movement in its 1981 manifesto, 
which consists in the revival of the Islamic identity of Tunisia so that 
it may resume its traditional role as a major centre of Islamic civilisa­
tion and culture. The last of the manifesto’s five total objectives also 
touched on the same subject: it discussed contributing to the revival of 
the political and civilisational unity of Islam nationally, regionally 
(that is, within the Maghreb), within the Arab world and international­
ly.
As the Tunisian Islamists were not able to take the opportunity to 
govern or to be part of a government, their main battles remained on 
the level of principles, general aims and policies. This goes some way 
towards explaining why the identity issue was of such major signifi­
cance in their campaign against Bourguiba’s regime. Indeed, in some 
of Ghannouchi’s statements, the identity question may be seen to have 
reached the level of personal revenge against a government that had
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shut its doors in the face of those educated in Arabic, yet supported a 
Westernised education system.28 The contradiction he highlights is be­
tween two camps: those educated as Muslims and Arabs, and those fa­
vouring a Westernised education.
Ghannouchi argues that Arabism and Islam together are in oppo­
sition to the foreign culture and identity as propagated by Bourguiba. 
However, as is the case with al-Najjar, Ghannouchi’s attachment to 
Arabism is only on the condition that it must not contradict Islam. In 
another statement, he argues that the relationship between Islam and 
Arabism is very special and strong, as Islam is the founding element of 
the Arab nation. What is alien to ‘uruba however is secularism, and 
the view which does not only reject Islam as the project of Arab unity, 
but ignores Islam and even makes war against it.29
This is not a simple academic differentiation, but an issue of great 
importance in contemporary Islamic and Arabic thought and in the po­
litical debates of independent Tunisia. As we have seen, Arab nation­
alism as proclaimed in the Middle East was essentially secularist with 
a strong socialist inclination: such was the case with the policies of 
Nasser in Egypt, and later with the Ba‘th parties in Iraq and Syria. The 
political mood of the sixties put socialism forward as a progressive 
ideology by which to fight against Western imperialism and Israel, 
and thus the Soviet Union became Nasser’s main ally against the 
Western powers.
The secularisation of Arab nationalism was also seen as a means 
by which to unite all the Arabs of the Middle East, including sizeable 
Christian minorities in Egypt and Lebanon who, Arab nationalists 
argue, could not be mobilised under a strictly Islamic banner. In this 
context, ‘uruba is viewed as an alternative to the classic Islamic alli­
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ance which used to hold Muslim Arabs together with non-Muslim Ar­
abs.
Generally speaking, however, a different approach has been taken 
in North Africa, as almost all the peoples of the region are Malikite 
Muslims. In this respect, Arab and Muslim have always been two 
close, non-conflicting, descriptions; indeed as we have seen, even dur­
ing the short phase of his affiliation to Arab nationalism Ghannouchi 
claims to have “understood being an Arab and being a Muslim as in­
separable realities.”30
As has been the case with almost all major political ideologies, 
the secular concept of Arab nationalism moved from the Middle East 
to North Africa, where various small parties and groups of supporters 
became established; some supported Nasser while others supported the 
B a‘th ideology of Iraq. As with most other Tunisian political groups, 
the university campus was their main free space in which to express 
their views and to seek support from students. It was in this manner 
that the Islamists came to be involved in their bitter disputes with the 
Arab nationalists, despite their common cause against Bourguiba. The 
reality was that the two trends were competing for support among the 
students, and the nationalists generally found themselves closer to the 
secular leftist groups. The two trends seemed unable to find any com­
mon ground, not even regarding the Palestinian question, which osten­
sibly united all Arabs: the nationalists were known by their slogan 
“Falas tin ‘Arabiyya”, in opposition to the Islamists1 “Falastin 
Isldmiyya”.
It is perhaps for this reason that the leaders of the Tunisian Islam­
ic movement appeared to be somewhat cautious when, on presenting 
their manifesto in 1981, they were asked about their views regarding
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‘uruba :
If we mean ‘uruba as a matter of fact, meaning that we 
are Arabs and that Arabic is our language, then that is an 
objective reality. If some people mean ‘uruba as a so­
cial, political and economic philosophy, then they have 
to produce their versions and clarifications, because 
there are many conflicting views on that. We disagree 
with them, of course, and we do have our special under­
standing of 'uruba. 31
It was only after a decade that Ghannouchi began to show more 
enthusiasm towards Arab nationalism, and became an active preacher 
for a closer rapprochement between all Islamists and Arab nationalists, 
albeit still with the request that the nationalists abandon secularism. 
His argument was as follows:
I have heard no Islamist object to the basic strategy of 
the idea of Arab nationalism. Every strategy is based 
upon a starting point, and I believe that the starting point 
for Arabist thinking is the unification of the Arab world. 
Political unity is the main idea behind nationalist 
thinking, and what came later was merely additions 
influenced by international trends of thought, such as 
claiming that socialism is essential to ‘uruba— this 
supposedly essential element has helped to divide the 
Arab world instead of unifying it — or such as claiming 
that secularism is a basic element of 'uruba, a claim that 
has deepened our divisions. 32
Hence, whatever affiliation to 'uruba the Tunisian Islamists may 
have shown, it should be understood only in the context of their battle 
against what they considered the secular and Western-orientated poli­
cies of Bourguiba. It was this approach that placed them in the same 
cultural camp as one of the most famous of Bourguiba’s Prime Minis­
ters, Mohammed Mzali, who in fact led the first political and security 
campaign against them in 1981.
Mzali had little in common with the main ideas of the Tunisian 
Islamists, but was a well known defender of the Arabic language and
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culture within the ruling Destour party, viewing them as fundamental 
components of the Tunisian identity. The most significant achieve­
ment of his long ministerial career was to Arabise most text books at 
all levels of education; a process he hailed in as early as 1971 as a fun­
damental basis of Tunisian-ness.33 In a speech he delivered to directors 
o f primary school teachers’ institutions in the same year, Mzali insist­
ed that they become more attached to their Tunisian roots and Arab- 
Islamic personality.34
Mzali was never an Islamic activist, he speaks excellent French 
and knows a great deal about French literature from his studies at the 
Sorbonne. Nonetheless, through his Arabisation policies he may turn 
out to be the most important player in the history of independent Tuni­
sia with regard to the country’s Arab identity. He defended his ap­
proach even after becoming a political refugee in France in 1986, a 
country known to defend strongly the presence of French in its former 
colonies.
A studious pupil, I was aware of the benefits of the edu­
cation I was receiving. For this reason, I did not reject it.
But I continued to feel Arab and Muslim. I wanted to be 
a Tunisian and not second-class French. In a word, I 
wanted to be myself. My country existed before French 
colonisation, and will exist in the future, reinvigorated 
and back to its former self, when colonisation will have 
ended. 35
This approach was also reflected in Mzali’s political career, as he 
describes in his own words:
As chief of the minister of national education’s cabinet 
from April 1956 till May 1958 (under Mr Lamine Cheb- 
bi), ana later as minister of national education myself, I 
was always a partisan of one clear option: Arabisation. 
Arabisation never meant xenophobia for me and my 
friends, or to retire within oneself, or a sort of return to 
the past. What I wanted — what we wanted — was that 
the Arab language would cease to be in exile within us,
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i.e. within itself, in an Arab and a Muslim country; and 
that it restores itself to its normal rank: number one.
We also wanted Arabic, adopted as the official lan­
guage of independent Tunisia, to be capable of fulfilling 
its mission and to occupy the ground progressively in all 
domains of life: thought, the sciences and technology. 36
Gradually, Mzali used his influence within the state to succeed in 
having most of his ideas implemented and goals achieved. By the time 
he was appointed Prime Minister in 1980, Arabic had come to the fore 
in the educational system in primary and secondary education, and its 
influence in the universities had augmented. Ironically, it was the 
emergence of the Islamists as a viable political force which complicat­
ed things for his policies of Arabisation. Some of those in the extreme 
secular groups around Bourguiba and the far left began to view Arabi­
sation as a source of the Islamists’ threat, referring to the close intel­
lectual relationship between Arabic and Islam, as Arabic is the main 
key to the original texts of Islam. For some of his opponents, Mzali 
was even seen to be conspiring with the Islamists:
The movement had its old relations with Mohammed 
Mzali. Articles in al-Ma(rifa gave him a lot of praise 
and applause, and he himself was very generous, work­
ing hard and being very dedicated during his time in the 
Ministry of Education to marking out those educational 
programmes marked by poor ideas and mediocrity. He 
gave prominence to metaphysical thought and chased 
out every methodology or text that opened the mind and 
helped one to understand. 37
Mzali was not one of Tunisia’s most successful Prime Ministers, 
especially with regard to running the economic affairs of the country 
and the oppressive manner in which he dealt with the trade unions. 
However, the main reason Bourguiba cited on sacking him in 1986 
was that he had gone too far along the path of Arabisation.38 It was a 
demonstration of the prominence that had been given to the Arab lan­
guage, a helping factor in the cause of the Islamists. This dangerous
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connection become increasingly important for some, as the political 
presence of the Islamists grew.
The argument was also used in a pan-Arab context, to discourage 
the use of Arabic in education; indeed Mohammed Arkoun argued 
passionately that critical thought becomes paralysed because of the 
holy connection between Arabic and the revelation. This, he ex­
plained, is why the Arab language had not participated in the debate 
about intellectual modernity, secularism, human rights and the study 
of religious phenomena. He also argued that this is why the political 
protests of the advancing Islamic movements exploited to the utmost 
all of the religious connections with Arabic.39
By putting the identity question at the top of their political agen­
da, the Islamists have drawn the attention of their opponents to the role 
of education in deciding the final outcome of the battle between their 
two different visions. This helps to explain why reforms for education­
al programmes were widely used in the campaign of Ben Ali’s govern­
ment against the Islamists. Mohammed al-Sharfi, an ex-communist se­
lected to be minister of education, made it clear that education had 
been “used for many years as a propaganda tool for religious extrem­
ism and for the political manipulation of religion, and this is not the 
role of the school.”40 As a result, the national political charter adopted 
by the new regime became the deciding reference for religious educa­
tion, and French regained some ground in the primary schools. The Is­
lamists were frustrated by these reforms, which they described as be­
ing “hostile to the Arab-Islamic identity of the people” and as 
“enforcing Westernisation and secularisation.”41
These verbal accusations were part of an all-out confrontation 
which soon took place between the regime and the Islamists, and
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which reinforced the polarisation between the two main approaches to­
wards the issue of Tunisia’s identity. In one camp was the government 
and almost all the other political groups, opposed to all kinds of inter­
ference on the part of religion in public life, and worried by the Islam­
ic movement’s influence and ambitions. All of these parties stood to­
gether in defending the reforms in education and denouncing the 
protests of the Islamists as unjustified, and similar to those Christian 
clerics responsible for the inquisitions of medieval times.42
In the other camp were the Islamists, who saw themselves, in the 
words of Ghannouchi, as “the true inheritors of their country’s culture 
and glory”. Similarly, they denounced those “who do not carry the 
message of Islam, as though strangers to this country,” accusing them 
of being “the remains left by the colonialists after their withdrawal.”43
Once again, we see how the issue of identity is raised in the con­
text of opposition to the West and its “remains”. It would be useful, 
therefore, to consider how the West is in fact perceived by the Tuni­
sian Islamists.
The fight against Westernisation
The West has never been a secondary issue to the Tunisian Islamists, 
in their fight to reinstate what they perceive to be their country’s Is­
lamic identity. In their view, President Bourguiba was leading Tunisia 
towards becoming a “Western” nation, a process which they were de­
termined to put a stop to. Indeed, this may be considered the major 
thrust of the Islamists’ struggle.
The question of Westernisation is of course not bound to Tunisia 
alone, but to almost the whole of the Muslim world. Even after most 
Islamic countries gained independence in the fifties and sixties, the
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legacy of Western colonialism remained extremely potent in the minds 
of leading politicians and thinkers, and was equally evident in the life­
styles of the people in the street. Elites were generally divided be­
tween those who wanted to imitate the West as a means by which to 
“move forward”, and those who wanted to affirm traditional and Is­
lamic values, so as to resist Westernisation and bring about the rebirth 
of the “Islamic golden age”. Those who were sensitive to the changes 
underway between the West and Islamic world chose to highlight this 
fact for a number of different reasons, although they all reinforced the 
notion of incompatibility.
There are those, however, who have always maintained the possi­
bility of mixing the good things of Islam with those of the West, but 
the political contexts of economic and political disputes between 
Western and Islamic countries have tended to give impetus to the 
more direct approach of portraying relations between the two blocs as 
a struggle between two civilisations. One Western proponent of such a 
view is Bernard Lewis, who argues that “when civilisations clash, 
there is one that prevails, and one that is shattered. Idealists and ideo­
logues may talk glibly of ‘a marriage of the best elements’ from both 
sides, but the usual result of such an encounter is a cohabitation of the 
worst”.44
From the Muslim side, most thinkers have acknowledged the im­
pact of the clash between the Western and Islamic civilisations, al­
though some of them — especially the Islamists — have insisted that 
their civilisation is not shattered and need never be, because the real 
problem lies with Western civilisation. Such was the argument of 
Sayyid Qutb:
The age of the white man’s supremacy is over, because
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the white man’s civilisation has accomplished its limited 
and short-term aims, and has nothing left to give to hu­
manity in terms of the beliefs, concepts, principles and 
values necessary to lead humanity, and to allow for the 
progress and prosperity of the human race, human val­
ues and human life. 45
In Tunisia, Islamists have accepted that it is Muslims, and not Is­
lamic principles, that have failed during the last few centuries, and 
have insisted, like Qutb, that Western civilisation has nothing substan­
tive to offer the Islamic world in terms of its progress and prosperity.
During the first few years of da‘wa activity in the seventies, the 
Islamists criticised various aspects of Westernisation, especially with 
respect to education. In as early as 1973, Ghannouchi expressed his 
fury concerning the philosophy textbook he was teaching at his secon­
dary school:
How can we present Sartre’s theory on moral values and 
freedom as a general rule, without linking it to a specific 
historical period which the West went through follow­
ing the destruction of its moral values, the weakness of 
its spiritual credentials and the disappearance of its su­
preme ideals of life — to the extent that he merely sees 
life in terms of stupidity, anxiety and dullness. One has 
to ask — in whose interest are we destroying this genera­
tion, uprooting it from its cultural roots, cutting it off 
from its environment and leaving it lost, unable to de­
fine either the nation to which it belongs, or the culture 
to which it relates, or the values by which to judge 
things? 46
Ghannouchi’s criticism here concerns the crisis of identity which 
independent Tunisia has undergone, and the uprooting of traditions by 
the likes of Sartre, and Western values in general. This is a problem 
that many others have also been able to discern, even from the side of 
Western analysts. Indeed, Bernard Lewis had articulated a number of 
complaints comparable to Ghannouchi’s some ten years earlier, when 
analysing the impact of the West on the peoples of the Middle East.
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He recognized that, among other things,
the people of the Middle E as t. . .  lost their ancient cor­
porate identity. Instead of being members of a millenni­
al Islamic imperial polity, they found themselves citi­
zens of a string of dependencies and then nation-states, 
most of them entities new to history, and only now be­
ginning to strike roots in the consciousness and loyalties 
of their peoples. 47
With regard to the social and cultural aspects, he also noted the 
following:
The old patterns were destroyed, the old values derided 
and abandoned; in their place a new set of institutions, 
laws, and standards were imported from the West, 
which for long remained alien and irrelevant to the 
needs, feelings and aspirations of the Muslim peoples of 
the Middle East. It may well be that these changes were 
‘necessary’ and ‘inevitable’, as these words are used by 
historians. The fact remains that they brought a period 
of formlessness and irresponsibility deeply damaging to 
Middle Eastern polity and society. 48
While some sections of Muslim society have been willing to ac­
commodate these changes, and even defend them as the only means by 
which to progress, the Islamists have remained unimpressed. They 
argue that economic failures will not be addressed by merely adopting 
Western modes of living, but, on the contrary, by asserting Islamic 
values. As Ghannouchi argues: “The economic problem cannot be 
solved other than by a humanistic approach to the issue. We must 
know: who are we? And to which culture do we belong?”,49 thereby 
giving clear reference to the religious approach.
Islamists have answered Ghannouchi’s above questions in two 
ways: directly, by asserting the Islamic nature of Tunisia’s identity and 
culture, and indirectly, by discrediting Western values and culture, and 
insisting on its incompatibility with the values and culture of an Islam­
ic country. This may in fact be the most prominent theme in Islamist
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literature since the early seventies — and although political considera­
tions have determined the tone of the Islamists’ negative attitude to­
wards the West in the late eighties and in the nineties, the essence of 
this attitude remains unchanged, as is reflected by the way in which 
Ghannouchi has portrayed the West to his followers over the last 
twenty-five years.
In 1973 he wrote that the turning point in the history of Western 
civilisation occurred when it came into contact with Islamic civilisa­
tion via Andalusia, and through the Crusades against the Islamic Mid­
dle East. Although the West was willing to learn from the scientific 
knowledge of the Muslims, it was also determined not to be influenced 
by their values, literature, language and concepts concerning the uni­
verse, life and the human being. Thus, Westerners insulted Muslims, 
their Prophet and their religion “to safeguard their civilisational per­
sonality from being dominated by Islamic culture”.50
Four years later, Ghannouchi devoted three long articles in al- 
M a‘rifa magazine discussing this same issue under the title, “Once 
again, We and the West”. His starting point in these articles is that in­
creasing numbers of Islamists were calling for renewal and modernism 
at that time, an issue closely linked to the West as the main power, 
thereby making it imperative that a clear position on this point be giv­
en, so as to guarantee the correct direction for the Islamic movement 
to take.51
First, he rejects Albert Hourani’s assertion that the Muslims’ 
problems with the West are easing. Indeed, he asserts, the emerging 
Islamist movements are both an expression of their rejection of the 
West, and an indication of the awakening of Islamic civilisation as a 
means to solve the world’s problems. He also argues that the industrial
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revolution, led by reason alone, has ended with the dragging of the 
“rebellious Western world against Allah to a failure more dangerous 
for the human being and civilisation than the previous one”,52 by 
which he refers to the influence and the dominance of the Church.
Quoting Socrates, Pavlov, Descartes, William James, Thomas 
Ben, Sartre, Marx, Kant, Nietzsche and others, Ghannouchi propounds 
a theory concerning the central idea of Western civilisation: “the belief 
in the human being as a master of the universe through his will, mind 
and technology”.53 While this philosophy has brought about positive 
results, freeing the Western man from his fears about nature, enabling 
him to rule over it and to explore new avenues for progress, to value 
freedom, to revolt against all dictatorships and to develop a democrat­
ic political system, he argues that its negative consequences have al­
most annulled the positive.
Ghannouchi also asserts in these articles that the West has mis­
used scientific methodology by applying it to the human being and re­
fusing to recognise its spiritual nature. As a result, science has failed 
to provide a meaning for the existence of the human being or its pur­
pose in life, or to be a constant standard for its values. This has result­
ed in intense anxiety, listlessness, loneliness, confusion, and the feel­
ing that life is frivolous, leaving the human being with the only option 
of seeking refuge “in dancing, drugs, or suicide to express his anger — 
or by joining one of the terrorist gangs”.54
He goes on to argue that the supremacy of the principles of he­
donism and utilitarianism have made society a theatre for the struggle 
for pleasure between the strong and the weak, between a minority 
which controls wealth and an exploited majority struggling to survive, 
thus destroying the principle of justice for the sake of freedom. This
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problem has expanded from Europe to the world, giving birth to colo­
nialism, which also means that democracy has become a slogan by 
which to control the weak and to justify exploitation by the rich. In 
short: “the rebellion of the human being against his Creator in the 
name of freedom and independence has resulted in his giving away his 
soul and freedom”.55
In an article written in 1979, addressed to local politicians fearful 
of the Islamic movement, Ghannouchi returns to the same subject. He 
attempts to posit the argument that the West is the only party with a 
real interest in fighting the Islamists, and that they in turn should not 
adopt this agenda. He argues that the West, driven by its heritage of a 
“crusade-complex” and its capitalist greed, with no concern for justice 
or freedom, is doing “all that is in its capacity to deepen elements of 
decadence in the Muslim world, to strip it of its identity, and dilute its 
values to thwart all chances of its renaissance and of regaining its glo­
ry, thus reinforcing its dependence on Europe”.56
Part of this radical stance may be explained by the anti-Western 
mood created at that time by the success of the Iranian revolution. In­
deed, according to Ghannouchi, these same reasons were behind the 
hostile attitude shown by the West towards Khomeini’s revolution in 
that same year.57 What is more, when commenting on the shared views 
among those whom he regards as the three main leaders of the contem­
porary Islamic movement — al-Banna, al-Mawdudi and Khomeini (not 
including Qutb or al-Turabi) — he mentions their liberation from 
Western culture, quoting Khomeini as saying:
Culture is the basis of the happiness or unhappiness of 
the people. If culture is not suitable, then the youth edu­
cated within that framework will be misguided. Colonial 
culture produces a younger generation that can be colon­
ised. It is more dangerous than the weapons of these ty­
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rants. Our culture today is colonial, and it is not con­
trolled by good people. 58
In yet another article, Ghannouchi likens the West to a pharaoh 
who wishes to make all peoples of the world submit to his will, and, in 
the way that the Biblical Pharaoh used magicians to try to discredit 
Moses, the West is using new charms — the media, interference with 
the news, facts and personalities — in its attempt to preserve its domin­
ion over and exploitation of humanity’s fortunes. In order to enjoy this 
status for as long as possible, the West also plans and works to “keep 
peoples in the position of the honest servant to his master, especially 
those in the Muslim world, who believe in a set of civilisational and 
human values which do not allow them to accept humiliation, defeat 
and dependency”.59
In 1980, Ghannouchi formulated one of his main theses concern­
ing the impact of Westernisation in an article entitled “Westernisation 
and the Determinism of Dictatorship” (al-Taghrib wa Hatmiyat al- 
Diktaturiya). He began by reaffirming the failures of those ruling Mus­
lim elites attracted to Western values and institutions in solving the so­
cial and economic problems of Muslim countries, arguing that this is 
because those alien values are in fact incompatible with the culture of 
the masses. Thus, this represents a failure which has incited people to 
support all calls for change and revolution. However, in order to avoid 
being overthrown, and to safeguard their positions and interests, the 
Westernised elites have became isolated from the masses, and have 
found no alternative but to display the same disregard for their
Western culture, which considers freedom sacred, and 
to opt for means of repression — to confiscate civil lib­
erties, to form repressive military and police services 
supported by other militia to protect themselves from 
the revolting masses, to prevent them from exercising 
their rights in political organisations, and to deny them
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the freedom of press. 60
According to Ghannouchi, this means that there are three main 
prongs to the policies of Westernised elites: first, to confiscate civil 
liberties and to install a dictatorial regime, and second, to form a new 
class that both benefits from the regime and is committed to it, living 
in small, closed societies in a totally Western manner, including the 
celebration of the West’s religious festivals such as Christmas. These 
constitute small islands within the larger society, wherein the elites try 
to overcome their fears of the people’s revolution by drinking and 
dancing. The third prong consists in ensuring strong and close ties 
with the West, receiving from it economic and military protection in 
return for protecting the process of Westernisation in their Muslim 
countries, and protecting the political and economic interests of the 
West in the region.61
By locating this theory in its Tunisian context, we may see that 
Bourguiba and his supporters represent the isolated, Westernised 
elites, and the Islamists are the expression of the oppressed masses. As 
for the repeated references to revolution, it is easy to make a connec­
tion with the Iranian model, which Ghannouchi supported unreserved­
ly. It is difficult not to recognise the internal logic of this theory, with 
many examples in the Muslim world standing in testimony to it. The 
real difficulty, however, is in accepting that Bourguiba and his party 
were, at the end of the eighties, an “isolated minority” in Tunisia, or in 
accepting that the Islamists were anywhere near to a majority at this 
time, or ready to lead a revolution. A more accurate analysis would be 
that Ghannouchi was alluding to Bourguiba in the context of the Shah 
of Iran, the Destour party in the context of the Iranian secret police or 
Savak, whereas Khomeini and his supporters where shown to repre­
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sent himself and his followers.
This is a common problem with Arab Islamic movements, in that 
they often attempt to present subjective judgments in more objective 
terms. Another example of this could be the failure of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood to influence the standing of Nasser in the minds 
of most Egyptians and Arabs, even up to the present day. For them he 
represented little more than a dictator, an American agent, and even 
one of the enemies of Allah, who “accused the Brotherhood of extrem­
ism, terrorism and manipulating religion to attain power; they fabricat­
ed events to legitimise the oppression of the Brotherhood, such as the 
plot of trying to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria”.62 For most Arabs, 
however, Nasser was and still is seen as a nationalist leader and a cru­
sader against Western imperialism.
Equally, although Bourguiba was always Western-oriented, he 
was primarily a Tunisian leader, and was seen by many as the most 
successful Tunisian politician of the twentieth century. His legitimacy 
was not built on Western protection, but, more importantly, on his 
leadership of the national independence movement and his party, 
which was active in almost every part of the country even before inde­
pendence. This may even go some way towards explaining the drastic 
manner in which he dealt with certain religious issues, such as his call 
for workers to stop fasting in Ramadan. At this time, he was not count­
ing on Western protection, but on his popularity as the leader of the 
nation, and on his claim to act as a Muslim leader exercising ijtihad.
The problem with Ghannouchi’s assessment therefore is that it ig­
nores this connection — however weak — between the government 
and what he calls “the culture of the masses”. Other analysts have 
been able to identify this point, as we may see from the following
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quotation:
The governments that were formed after liberation were 
mostly secular, and even the Moroccan King, 
Muhammad V, promoted an image of himself as both a 
religious leader and head of a modem state. Algeria and 
Tunisia used very pronounced Western models for their 
political systems. All these regimes professed Islam as a 
reformist frame of reference rather than as the basis of a 
political order, and this position was widely accepted. 63
Within this logic, the problem for these ruling elites therefore is 
not only Westernisation, but also
the fact that they were all firmly entrenched and have re­
mained in power for more than a generation, [which] 
eventually led to some forms of dissent, and the use of 
Islamic terminology to express it, an imitation of a 
growing trend throughout much of the Islamic world.64
Ghannouchi’s logic is different, however, and was articulated 
once more on behalf of the whole Tunisian Islamic movement in the 
1981 manifesto. Its main goal was the rebirth of the Islamic identity in 
Tunisia, so as to combat the prevailing situation of dependency, alien­
ation and disorientation. Another goal was to purge the effects of 
Westernisation from Islamic thought. One suggested method by which 
to bring about this goal was to “liberate the Islamic conscience from 
civilisational defeat by the West”.65
However, it is remarkable to note that in the 1988 manifesto for 
the new al-Nahda party (see appendix I I ) , the movement dropped eve­
ry reference to the words "West" or "Western" from the entire docu­
ment, despite its being much longer and more detailed. Instead, there 
was a more realistic political rhetoric in place, concerning the opera­
tion of a balanced foreign policy, based on mutual respect with other 
nations.66 It is evident that direct references to the West had been 
dropped here for political considerations, as the leadership tried to
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present a more moderate case to both the government and Western ob­
servers in Tunisia. Later, Ghannouchi also softened his attitude; the 
most significant expression of this mood came after going into exile in 
France, and later in Britain. In this instance, Ghannouchi accuses those 
who view the West as merely an imperialistic power in the following 
terms:
The West is not only that. The West is liberating 
thought, the experience of a liberating revolution, scien­
tific progress, improvement to health and to the human 
being’s information concerning the universe and people.
In the West too there were true, progressive forces that 
stood by the Algerian revolution and stand currently 
with the Palestinian revolution. There are also in the 
West human organisations from whom oppressed Mus­
lims can only find support. The West too has traditions 
of freedom, to the extent that oppressed Muslims who 
cannot find refuge in the vast Muslim countries seek 
asylum in Western countries. 67
With Ghannouchi still to apply for political asylum in Britain, the 
personal dimension of this account is obvious. He goes on to suggest 
that a future war between Islamic and Western civilisation is not nec­
essary because, among other things, both are based on “common relig­
ious roots, the belief in the unitarianism of Allah, the hereafter and the 
unity of the Prophets”.68 He also suggests that “the two closest civilisa­
tions in history are that of Islam and that of the West”.69
Speaking to a number of American Muslims in the United States 
in 1989, Ghannouchi seemed no longer to believe in the total bank­
ruptcy of Western civilisation, as the following quotation illustrates:
We are asking you, as Muslims living in a society that 
has reached the highest scientific level, not to imitate 
and reproduce the religious practices nurtured in under­
developed environments. We ask you to be a new con­
tribution to the Muslim notion, to reform Muslim 
thought, and to produce an evolved form of religious 
practice that will favour the evolution of underdevel­
oped Muslim populations. You are living in a country
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closer to Islam than underdeveloped countries, because 
here a set of norms, divine in the universe and in socie­
ty, is well respected. 70
This is a change of emphasis — to say the least — in Ghannou­
chi’s views vis-a-vis the West. His negative rhetoric has given way to 
a more positive and conciliatory approach, with political aims in mind: 
to secure the safety of Islamists seeking asylum in France and Britain 
in particular, and to gain a certain degree of support for the movement 
in the then-looming confrontation with Ben Ah’s regime. With the 
possibility of seizing power stronger than ever before, Islamists might 
have also found it necessary to start allaying the fears of Western poli­
ticians, and to get them to listen to what they would hopefully deem to 
be a modem and moderate Islamic party.
The problem with this change is that it was purely superficial, 
and was only undertaken for tactical political considerations, permit­
ting Ghannouchi’s inconsistencies to emerge in a very pronounced 
manner. Just two years after his visit to the States, he was to speak his 
mind about the West once more — not in the way in which he had been 
doing since the seventies, but rather in a manner never displayed be­
fore. The occasion was also unusual, for it was February 1991, a time 
at which the States and its allies were preparing for the final assault to 
drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Ghannouchi, who then sided with what he 
called “the brotherly people of Iraq, its strong army and courageous 
leadership”,71 opted to appeal to the basic religious sentiments of Ar­
abs and Muslims. He denounced those who rejected the faith as “the 
camp of kufr ”, a term he had rarely used publicly before in discussing 
the West or indeed any non-Muslim nations. His theory is as follows:
The world is going through a phase in which conflicts 
have moved from being inside the camp of kufr, after 
the collapse of the socialist bloc, to a phase of battling
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against Islam and its umma. The army of kufr assemble 
under the flag of America and Zionism, and shoot us 
with the same arrow, to enforce their total domination 
over our fortunes, and to put an end to our revival and 
hopes for progress. The camp of kufr, led by the United 
States, was angered by Iraq purely because of the lat­
ter’s decision to go beyond the limits forced on Arabs 
and Muslims in the fields of power, industry and inde­
pendence of will and decisions. Our acceptance of the 
Western plan, which uses the slender cause of liberating 
Kuwait to destroy an Islamic country that has tried to 
rebel against Western lordship, would be tantamount to 
a clear-cut recognition of the kafirm’s sovereignty. 72
By using the religious terms kufr and kafirin, used in the Qur’an 
to define those who reject the Islamic faith, Ghannouchi is appealing 
to the religious sensibilities of the Muslim masses, and trying to lend a 
religious dimension to the second Gulf War. Gone here are Ghannou­
chi’s political or intellectual interpretations of the West as either ally 
or imperial aggressor, or as either a progressive or disoriented civilisa­
tion; rather we see the words of a politician, aiming to play the relig­
ious card by the most powerful means possible, perhaps in the knowl­
edge that many Muslims, and non-Muslims too, were convinced that 
the war was primarily about oil. Oil was the main motive behind Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, and was the same motive for the West in liberat­
ing Kuwait.
While Ghannouchi may be seen to be too politically driven — to 
the point of contradicting himself — al-Najjar has always been more 
academic in his approach, and faithful to the main ideas of the Isla­
mists concerning the West, albeit initially and essentially formulated 
by Ghannouchi himself. Al-Najjar has observed that leftist and secu­
larist approaches to the issue of Tunisian identity have aimed at pro­
ducing a materialistic society, purely interested in fulfilling the materi­
al needs of its members, and ignoring the religious question as a 
matter for individuals. This vision, he argues, has been appropriated
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from a model of philosophy and civilisation that is foreign to the cultu­
ral system of the Arab-Islamic nation, that is to say the Western mod­
el, whether of the Western or Eastern blocs.73
According to al-Najjar, the problem with Western civilisation is 
that it is based on one dimension only — that is the material dimension 
— while the human being also possesses a spiritual dimension. This, he 
argues, fundamentally contradicts the nature of the human being, and 
with disastrous consequences, as it preaches death as the end of exis­
tence: “This colours life with gloom, as hope retreats to the moment of 
death, resulting in a bitterness which the human being feels whenever 
he finds the chance to think amidst his daily engagements”.74
Like Ghannouchi before him, al-Najjar insists that life in the 
West is dull, hopeless, driving people to drugs or suicide, and implies 
that there are no goals left in life according to Western philosophy. 
This, he affirms, is the model which Westerners have adopted and 
grown used to, and which is now being forced on the Tunisian nation, 
despite being alien and far removed from its nature.75
Al-Najjar is unwilling to acknowledge any positive achievements 
of what he labels “the representatives of Westernisation” in Tunisia or 
elsewhere in the Muslim world, referring to those secular elites who 
took power on independence, only to imitate the West and serve its in­
terests. The rule for him is that secularism is tantamount to a total po­
litical and social failure, and that one of the strongest examples of this 
is the Tunisian case:
The Bourguiban regime adopted a secular identity in 
ruling the country, from which he formulated all of his 
programmes for politics, culture, education and the 
economy, making it the only ideological reference for 
every programme and action taken by the state, in a fla­
grant and unjust manner. After a third of a century of
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putting the Bourguiban project into practice, the results 
came close to an all-out disaster: an economy that had 
gone through many setbacks and ended in bankruptcy; 
an education system from which generations graduated, 
altered in their identity, their personality tom between 
an appeal rooted in their hearts in the heritage of the Is­
lamic-Arab identity, and that which had been forced on 
them from Western culture; a society which forced hun­
dreds of thousands of its unemployed youth beyond its 
borders to fall prey to all kinds of international crime, to 
the point that Tunisian youth are now included on the 
lists of criminals in all European countries; and social 
fragmentation, which has increased over the years and 
resulted in civil war, solved only moments before explo­
sion.76
Two main points emerge from the Islamists’ views on Westerni­
sation and its impact on the Tunisian identity: first is their negative 
stereotyping of Western civilisation as hopeless and driving people to 
despair, drugs and suicide; second is their extremely negative evalua­
tion of the work of the Bourguiban regime, as an “enemy” of what 
they view as the historic identity of Tunisia. Due to the manner in 
which they understand Islam as a comprehensive system, Islamist lit­
erature reveals how cultural and political judgments are combined re­
garding this subject, amongst many others. There are, of course, what 
may be described as more moderate or balanced assessments of the 
West in some of the political statements issued by al-Nahda over the 
last few years, or in some of Ghannouchi’s articles and speeches, espe­
cially those he has written since he became an exiled politician, resi­
dent in London. But these assessments are few, and are not sustained, 
often seeming too politically motivated. What is more, as mentioned 
earlier, many are easily contradicted by extreme rhetoric, depending 
on the audience.
Assessments such as those forwarded by al-Najjar and Ghannou­
chi may seem somewhat oversimplified, notably those concerning the 
West and Bourguiba. For example, for many Westerners and indeed
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also for many Muslims, the idea that Western philosophy is leading 
Westerners to hopelessness is exaggerated, and reflects an inadequate 
understanding of Western societies. It appears to be a view based on 
the accounts of court-hearings published in the media, although these 
do not differ greatly from those news-stories published concerning 
cases in Arab and Islamic courts. Further, although secularism has tak­
en root in the West, one should not underestimate the continuing im­
portance of religion in society. People still attend church, and many 
more who are not church-goers still believe in God.
Indeed the issue of secularism in particular is much more nu- 
anced than Ghannouchi and al-Najjar have suggested, and many West­
ern nations are quite ambivalent or ambiguous concerning the role 
played by religion in their societies. For example, some nations have 
established churches or state-sponsored religious schools, whereas in 
others, such as in France, where the state is apparently more overtly 
secularist in its ideology, there is a higher rate of religious observance 
than exists in Britain. In short, there are so many different indicators to 
be taken into account, and the issue is not as clear-cut as it appears in 
the Islamists’ literature.
This does not imply, however, that the West does not face serious 
social problems — especially with regard to the instability of the fami­
ly and the widespread use of drugs among the youth, but these prob­
lems, like numerous others, are not confined to the West alone. In 
many Arab countries, the problem with drug abuse is as serious as in 
the West.
There are two factors which may go some way towards explain­
ing the Tunisian Islamists’ categorical rejection of the West: the first 
is religious, in that the Islamists view Tunisia’s real identity as being
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purely Islamic, regarding Western influences as a serious threat. The 
second is connected to the Islamists’ religious and political fight 
against Bourguiba: presenting Bourguiba as a Western agent was seen 
to be an effective method of discrediting him as a Muslim ruler. There­
fore everything that was a product of Bourguiba’s rule was rejected by 
the Islamists, even if Islamic in nature, as we see below:
The struggle of the Islamic movement, rather than being 
against paganism in the individual, is against paganism 
in the society. Their most visible opponent has been the 
Tunisian (Bourguiban) regime, as the force held respon­
sible for the de-Islamization of the Tunisian society. The 
Islam of the Tunisian government is referred to as offi­
cial Islam, as opposed to the jihad  of the Islamic move­
ment. The former, which is taught in the schools and 
communicated through newspaper, radio, and television 
applies only to the individual’s religious life. For exam­
ple it concerns prayer, fasting, ritual washing, family re­
lationships and laws of inheritance. Struggling (militant)
Islam, on the other hand, is based on the concept of 
comprehensiveness, a rejection of the separation of re­
ligion and politics in Islam and an insistence that Islam 
presents a program for all areas of the society’s life. 
Struggling Islam, therefore, is in direct conflict with the 
regime, which is represented as the cause of various so­
cietal problems through its neglect of true Islam. 77
This extreme hatred of Bourguiba, as a symbol of secularism and 
Westernisation, may also explain why the Islamists later accepted and 
signed what amounted to a “collective response” to the question of Tu­
nisia’s identity under the supervision of President Ben Ali in 1988 — 
two years before they were pitched in battle against him. This reponse 
was embodied in the National Pact, which was signed by all major Tu­
nisian political parties, including a representative of al-Nahda, on the 
first anniversary of the 1987 overthrow of the leadership. The first 
item in the document addressed Tunisia’s identity, providing a formu­
la which appeared to reconcile all parties, even though it would appear 
— certainly from the rhetoric mentioned in this chapter — that this is
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an impossibility.
Nonetheless, all parties agreed from the outset that the identity of 
the Tunisian people “is specifically Arab and Islamic, rooted in a glo­
rious, remote past, which aspires to face up to the challenges this 
epoch offers”.78 This in turn is immediately linked to other aspects of 
Tunisia’s identity, as the document asserts: “The fact that our country 
is situated in a region which was the cradle of many great human civil­
isations, has enabled our people to contribute to human civilisation 
over the centuries and has fitted it for renovation and creativity”.79
The text of the National Pact is a reflection of the difference in 
emphasis between the Islamists’ insistence on the priority of the Islam­
ic dimension of Tunsian identity, and those insisting on Arabism, and 
those leftists and members of the ruling party who were unwilling to 
give in to the arguments of the Arab nationalists and, more particular­
ly, the Islamists. It is also on account of these differences that the doc­
ument elaborates on its main themes by giving reference to Tunisia’s 
pre-Islamic history, when
Carthage was one of the two greatest powers of the an­
cient world. Our people are proud of Hannibal’s genius 
and Jugurtha’s heroism. Tunisia is proud of having been 
the starting point for conquests which brought the mes­
sage of Arab Islamic civilisation to the Arab Maghreb, 
to the North of the Mediterranean and to Africa. Tunisia 
is also proud of the geniuses it has produced, such as 
Imam Sahnun, Ibn Khaldun the scholar and Khayr al- 
Din the reformer. 80
In the same delicate way in which it balances Jugurtha with Imam 
Sahnun, the document goes on to explain the main implications in con­
sidering Tunisia’s Arab and Islamic identity: Arabism is portrayed as 
being prior to Islamism, despite the fact that the first was a conse­
quence of the second. Further, it is carefully explained that there will
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be no attempt to undermine foreign languages, seen by secularists and 
leftists as the gate to the modem sciences, thus declaring:
The national community is required to strengthen the 
Arabic language, by making it the language of commu­
nication, administration and teaching. Of course, we 
must be open to other civilisations and languages, par­
ticularly those used in science and technology, although 
obviously the national culture can only evolve in and 
through the national language. Here we must avoid any 
split between the elite and the masses, because this may 
well emasculate the elite, and isolate the masses from 
modem life. 81
The discourse of this text reveals that the views of the secularists 
were stronger than those of both the Arab nationalists and the Isla­
mists, in that emphasis was not given to Arabic as a historical lan­
guage of the sciences. On the contrary, the need for foreign languages 
was mentioned specifically in the context of being a tool for the study 
of science and technology, meaning that the Arabic language could 
not, and could never, play such a role. Interestingly, “foreign languag­
es ” continue to be used in the fields of sciences in Tunisia.
For many who compare this to other nations, who are content to 
use their national languages to both teach and learn the sciences, the 
argument against Arabic seems absurd, and to be motivated essentially 
by an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West. Furthermore, the use of 
“foreign languages” in the plural form here is misleading, because the 
language referred to is French alone and no other. The problem with 
this lies in the fact that the use of French has been forced by purely po­
litical considerations, linked to France’s historical influence over Tuni­
sia. If the issue merely rested on the study of the sciences, or a means 
by which to communicate with the rest of the world, English would 
have been a far more useful language for Tunisians to use. Pre­
empting this line of criticism, the document also promises: “We must
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work to develop the national language to make it a language of science 
and technology, able to handle contemporary thought, whether innova­
tive or creative, and to contribute — and rightly so — to human civili­
sation”.82 For the nationalists and Islamists however, the inevitable 
problem with Arabic is that it has no chance of becoming the language 
of the sciences in Tunisia unless it is used as such with full commit­
ment from the state.
With regard to Islam, the Islamists were compelled to add their 
names to a document that does not preach the comprehensiveness of 
the faith, nor the rule of the sharVa, and which specifies that looking 
after Islam is the role of the state:
The Tunisian state will watch over the noble values of 
Islam, as the touchstones by which Islam may constitute 
a source of inspiration and pride, and be open to the 
concerns of mankind, the problems of this day and age 
and modem life, and for Tunisia to remain what it has 
always been — one of the centres of Islamic influence 
and a focus of science and ijtihad, thus perpetuating the 
avant-garde role once played by Kairouan and by the 
Zeitouna University. 83
The final part of the document constitutes the most blatant point 
scored by the government and its allies against the Islamists concern­
ing the issue of Tunisia’s identity. In the light of “the deviation from 
Islam” which the Islamists had been used to seeing under Bourguiba, 
they were convinced — or were forced — to accept one of the most 
significant examples of Islamic ijtihad, only one year after the changes 
of November 1987. As a result, the Islamists added their names to a 
document which asserted the following:
The Code of Personal Status and the laws that complete 
it came after independence, introducing a package of re­
forms. The most important were the abolition of polyga­
my, the granting to women the right to marry without a 
guardian once the age of reason had been reached, and
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the ushering in of equality between men and women as 
regards divorce and its procedures. These reforms aimed 
at freeing and emancipating women, in line with the 
age-old hope that existed in Tunisia, based on the solid 
rule of ijtihad and on the aims of the sharVa\ they prove 
that Islam is vital and open to the requirements of the 
modem ages and of evolution. 84
As if to assure the opponents of the Islamists and Western ob­
servers that the state had not made any kind of concessions to the Isla­
mists, the document then concludes by stressing that “the Tunisian 
state strengthens this rational orientation, which springs from ijtihad, 
and works to help ijtihad and reason, having a clear impact on teach­
ing, religious institutions and the means of information”.85
An overall assessment of the National Pact’s response to the 
question of identity shows that it was more interested in laying down 
safeguards against the Islamists’ influence than in explaining how the 
Islamic identity of the country should be expressed. Further, it did not 
make any apology to the Islamists for Bourguiba’s policies, and al­
though the former president was not mentioned in name in the docu­
ment, his legacy was represented in the text as being the embodiment 
of progressive, Islamic ijtihad.
Despite all this, the Islamists accepted the pact and signed it. 
However, it is obvious that their acceptance of the document stems 
from over-riding political considerations. At that time, they were con­
cerned mostly with giving whatever guarantees were necessary to the 
government in order to be recognised as a political party, even if this 
meant making concessions regarding matters that were at the very 
heart of their campaign against Bourguiba. They may also have argued 
that they were merely putting their signatures to a document that could 
be later amended, a move which could also prevent the restriction of 
their political activities, if they later managed to gain legal
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recognition.
The signing by the Islamists of the National Pact also marked the 
decline in the value of charters and commitments in Tunisian political 
life. It was to prove that the Islamists were not alone in their way of 
thinking when, only three years later, the text of the National Pact con­
cerning democracy, human rights, freedom of the press and the multi­
party system had been all but ignored by almost all of Tunisia’s politi­
cal parties, in the midst of the confrontation between the government 
and al-Nahda.
All that now remains are hollow words, void of any serious com­
mitment, responsibility or obligations, and what seems to be in store is 
merely a bitter and continuous war between the state and the Islamists, 
over the unresolved question of Tunisia’s true identity.
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Conclusion
On attempting a retrospective analysis of the history and discourse of 
al-Nahda, one finds oneself necessarily addressing two fundamental 
questions, both of which at first sight may have been deemed 
irrelevant. The first question asks, “What is Islaml”, while the second 
is “What is an Islamic movementl”
Many would argue that attempting a definition of Islam should 
not be problematic. Nonetheless, it has proven to be a major source of 
contention to those movements that have dedicated their efforts to 
defending Islam and implementing it. That is essentially because they 
are talking about Islam as a political remedy for the crises of the 
Islamic world. Indeed, as one former member of al-Nahda has noted, 
“you will grow tired of looking for a clear and comprehensive answer 
to this question within the abundant literature of the Islamists . . . 
generally speaking, Islamic discourse today has no clear outlines even 
to its defenders, let alone to the elites and to the public”.1
In the context of the Tunisian Islamists, possibly the most 
prudent way in which to address the above question is to concede that 
almost all aspects of the “Islam” dealt with in this thesis have had 
political associations. Whether under the banner of the call for an 
identity independent of the West, or for the “enforcement of liberties” 
and the overthrowing of the Bourguiban regime, Islam has always 
been presented within a theoretical framework for political solutions, 
and as a mode for articulating anger and demanding change.
The intellectual project of al-Afghani and ‘Abduh at the turn of 
the century seemed irrelevant to the new activists of Islam. It was
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people such as al-Banna, al-Mawdudl, Qutb and Khomeini who, at a 
later stage, offered the guiding models for the Tunisian Islamist. Thus 
they favoured the activist approach to Islam, rather than the reformist 
and cultural approach of ‘Abduh, or even the pan-Islamism of 
al-Afghani, based on mobilising the whole Islamic community, rather 
than dividing it up into “good” and “bad” Muslims. If ‘Abduh, the 
grand Imam of al-Azhar meant little to the Tunisian Islamists, it is to 
be expected that Khayr al-DIn al-Tunisi, even more inclined to the 
West, should get very little attention from the the activists in the 
Tunisian Islamic movement.
It is also interesting to note that, in spite of all of its claims, the 
Tunisian Islamic movement has rarely concerned itself with the 
classical model of Islam, as represented in classical Islamic literature. 
It may also be argued that, even if the movement had genuinely 
wished to have reference to the classical Islamic model, it would have 
been incapable of doing so, as there was no single reputable scholar 
among the movement’s leadership. It is fair to say that during the 
formative years of the movement there were hints of an exclusively 
religious philosophy, but since 1979 the movement as a whole has 
pursued a one-way route to the heart of politics.
According to the Islamists, politics is an integral component of 
Islam, thus there is nothing wrong in placing politics high on their 
agenda. Hence we see that, even when dealing with the very rudiments 
of Islam, they are interpreted within a political context. In an attempt 
to summarise his movement’s understanding of Islam, Ghannouchi 
argues that Islam embodies a comprehensive methodology for 
liberation: “it liberates humanity from the tyranny of dictatorship and 
exploitation; it is a call to unitarianism and its attendant values of 
equality, fraternity, freedom and the love of justice”.2
246
It should nonetheless be observed that Islam does not exclusively 
concern itself with politics. Indeed, it may be argued that politics is a 
“grey area” in Islam, and that specific political forms have been left 
broadly to Muslims to define for themselves within a set of general 
values, as Ghannouchi himself admitted in his attempt to define the 
model of an Islamic state. For the sake of political expediency, 
however, al-Nahda chose not to concentrate on the fact that Islam is 
also a human appeal to mankind and a source of social legislation. 
Indeed, since applying for legal permission to operate as a political 
party, al-Nahda 's non-political concerns concerning morality, faith 
and social harmony have almost totally disappeared from their agenda, 
with the aims of the organisation geared largely towards taking 
political power.
It would appear that this problem may not only be confined to the
Tunisian Islamic movement; rather, it is a reflection of a wider and a
more general mood among the majority of contemporary political
Islamic movements, who tend to be inclined towards a primarily
political mission. In Islamic terms, this has been an unbalanced
approach, as many observers have noted:
Though they enjoyed greater political support, the 
resurgence organisations had a unidimensional approach 
to Islam that in most cases had little humanistic content 
and emphasized the importance of political solutions. 
Attempts to develop hybrid doctrines combining 
neofundamentalist principles and a number of other 
concepts of proper order proved to be chimerical in 
terms of implementation. The situation that finally 
emerged as Islamic resurgence and which became part 
of the political equation in the Middle East was one in 
which ideology became more an instrument in the 
struggle for power than a blueprint for genuine change 
in the future. 3
This leads us to our second question concerning the definition of 
an Islamic movement. Ghannouchi’s response is that its main 
characteristics are
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its comprehensive understanding of Islam, and its active 
approach to building an Islamic society based both on 
that comprehensive understanding and the establishment 
of an organisation working towards the building of an 
Islamic state.4
His explanation asserts that the belief in a comprehensive Islam is the 
essence of an Islamic movement, otherwise an “active approach” and 
the establishment of an organisation are little more than the human 
choices of a group of individuals.
There are a number of problems implicit in Ghannouchi’s 
definition. Above all, what he describes as a “comprehensive 
understanding” of Islam is dismissed by many as being narrowly 
political; second, what he describes as an “active organisation” is 
essentially a political party that may, in the opinion of other Muslims, 
sometimes bring more harm than good to the Islamic cause. What is 
more, if one puts their claims to Islamic identity aside, there is nothing 
particularly religious about the organisational features and tactics of 
al-Nahda.
For instance, one could cite several examples of political 
opportunism. There was the occasion when, probably for internal 
reasons, to keep both its secret and public leaders satisfied, al-Nahda 
declared that Ghannouchi was still its president, when in fact this was 
not the case; there was also the fact that it presented itself to the public 
as a peaceful civilian movement, while at the same time building a 
secret military wing which made two unsuccessful attempts to topple 
the Tunisian regime. There was also the instance, during Ben Ali’s 
era, when they opposed the changes Bourguiba had made to the 
Personal Status Code, later to sign their names to these changes, 
accepting them as Islamic ijtihad; one may also mention their support 
for Saddam Hussein, as leader of a legitimate jihad  against the West
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and their subsequent retreat and attempts to appease the Gulf states. 
Finally, one could also mention the period when rivalling factions of 
the movement published opposing publications in Paris, with each 
claiming to represent the party and discrediting the other; and when 
Morou described Ghannouchi as a man of violence and a persona non 
grata in his party. It is difficult to identify any specifically religious 
dimension to any of these adopted actions and positions.
It would seem that the movement’s attitude is that, for as long as 
the movement continues to present itself as Islamic, then it is to be 
regarded as Islamic, irrespective of its deeds. This is perhaps more 
flagrantly obvious in other countries such as Afghanistan and Algeria 
however, where Islamic movements are involved in killings, 
assassinations, and the bombarding of cities, yet are still viewed as and 
identified as “Islamists”.
Further, the main claim of the Tunisian Islamists to a 
comprehensive Islam and the dedication to building an Islamic state 
was founded on one very important assumption, which is the absence 
of an Islamic state among Muslim countries, at least until the Iranian 
revolution. It is from this that other specific concepts have been 
derived, such as that of jahiliyya in the society and the difference 
between the Muslim and the Islamist, claims that are very disputable 
in the majority of Muslim societies, as one observer notes:
If the sharVa was about a specific political system, then 
it would have disappeared with Islam itself at the end of 
the Ottoman era. The heart of the matter concerns 
society and its source of legitimacy, and the fact that 
Islam still occupies that place. If we claim otherwise, 
then that would mean that Islam has ceased to exist, 
despite the hundreds of millions of those fasting and 
praying, and the dozens of millions of pilgrims and 
worshippers, and despite the declarations of hundreds of 
millions of people that they believe in Islam. 5
It was partly as a consequence of such objections as those
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expressed above, along with other political considerations, that 
al-Nahda dropped its “Islamic” tag in 1988, and that it was compelled 
to stress on a number of occasions that it did not claim to be the 
official voice of Islam. But if the Muslim society is already in 
existence, then the Islamists’ insistence on an Islamic state is rather 
along the lines of a partisan political programme that may appeal to 
some Muslims but not to all of them. This may imply also that when 
some Islamic movements speak of an Islamic state, they are in fact 
speaking of their aim to come to power, and do not mean that Islam is 
the monopoly of their members and supporters.
This in itself begs the question as to whether one may really 
speak of an “Islamic movement”, or a political organisation that 
claims to be Islamic within an Islamic or Muslim society. Indeed this 
is a very delicate issue, and concerns the relation of religion to politics 
in Islam in general. Nonetheless, despite conflicting statements 
concerning the rejection of a monopoly of Islam, neither al-Nahda nor 
most other Islamic movements have been able to resist the temptation 
to present themselves as the true defenders of Islam, so as to gain 
sympathy and support from the public.
It was argued in the foregoing chapters that the history of the 
Tunisian Islamic movement is to a large extent the fruit of its 
founder’s experiments, trials and errors. They have also been 
influenced by the ideas of al-Tabligh movement, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Iranian revolution and even extreme leftist groups in 
the university. The Islamic allegiance was so wide and vague as to 
accommodate the non-political preachers of al-Tabligh and even the 
unbelievers among young Tunisian communists. Even major turning 
points in the movement’s history appear to have been somewhat 
precarious and unplanned: foremost here is the fact that the
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announcement of the formation of Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami in 1981 
was essentially in response to the arrest of Salah Karkar and Ben Tssa 
al-Dimni in December 1980.
This in turn may emphasise the need to re-examine the “Islamic” 
appellation of the Tunisian Islamic movement, because it places Islam 
at the mercy of the successes and failures of a secret political 
organisation. This does not seek, however, to undermine the 
significance of al-Nahda as a political group that has succeeded in 
raising a number of issues of particular importance to a sizable section 
of Tunisian society. Indeed, their success was illustrated in the 1989 
elections, when, according to official statistics, the independent 
candidates supported by al-Nahda gained up to 17.5 per cent of the 
total vote, a figure which was probably higher according to the 
movement’s leaders.
In brief, it would seem that there is more than one reasonable 
argument to suggest that the Islamic appellation does not in fact reflect 
the true nature of the Tunisian Islamic movement, as a political group 
attached to the notion of an Islamic state. In essence, it operates as a 
political group, and as such people will inevitably differ about the 
religious nature of the movement’s actions: for example, is it 
acceptable, from a religious point of view, to do something in secret 
and announce something different to the public? Some may call this 
simply lies, but others may argue that it is a permissible manoeuvre 
necessary for political considerations. As a purely political party 
attached to the principle of the Islamic state, however, al-Nahda 
should be judged by its deeds, successes and failures.
Mohamed Abid al-Jabri’s remarks concerning Islamic groups in 
Morocco may apply equally to most other Islamic movements, 
including al-Nahda:
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Islamic groups that aim to bring about the “Islamic 
state” in Morocco, meaning that they want to acquire 
political power in it, will only succeed in establishing 
themselves among the masses as a force able to 
influence history when they adopt political and social 
goals which reflect the yearnings of the people and their 
spiritual and material needs. If a group does so, it will 
definitely change to a political movement, and thus its 
success will depend on its ability to achieve 
compatibility between religion and politics, meaning its 
ability to innovate in the field of religion according to 
the needs of the time, in such a way as to produce a 
religious discourse of contemporary social ana political 
content. 6
To a great extent, al-Nahda aimed to achieve the above, by
listening to the needs of the youth and the trade unions, and by
opposing what it saw as the Westernisation of society and the political
system, and, most importantly, by giving priority to the
implementation of a liberal democracy in their declared political
agenda. In this context, there is evidence that many of the movement’s
slogans effectively expressed the mood of those large numbers of
Tunisians who had become disenchanted with the status quo. The
Islamists’ successes may also be viewed within a wider Arab trend in
support of the Islamists’ cause:
The Islamic resurgence is a response to the confusion 
and anxiety of modernity and a challenge to repressive 
and corrupt regimes. Like Christians during the 
Reformation, the Islamists attempt to reach directly the 
literal world of God and provide legitimacy to popular 
demands to transform their societies. Indeed the political 
clout the Islamists now have is due not to the desire of 
Arabs and others to live under strict Islamic rule, but to 
the perceived failure of Western models of political and 
economic order, including nationalism and socialism, to 
solve the Middle East’s problems. 7
It should also be noted, however, that making a sound academic 
connection between the Islamic reference and the grievances and 
aspirations of the people has proven to be very difficult, not only for 
al-Nahda but for most contemporary Islamist groups. With the
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exception of Ghannouchi’s work on the issue of the Islamic state, 
al-Nahda's  literature on innovation and ijtihad is very poor indeed. 
During more than twenty years of existence, the movement has failed 
to make any substantive contribution towards a theoretical formula for 
one of its main goals: the reformulation of Islamic thought, taking into 
account the fundamental principles of Islam and the requirements of 
man’s continuous evolution and changing circumstances, as 
mentioned in the 1981 manifesto.
In reality, it is inconceivable that the movement could have 
offered a work of this nature, when it cannot boast one major scholar 
among its ranks. Not one of the leaders of the movement may be 
described as an academic expert on Islamic affairs, with the exception 
of al-Najjar, who was always a peripheral figure and was never 
regarded as one of al-Nahda's leaders, to the point that he withdrew 
his membership in 1995. Another obvious reason for the movement’s 
failure in this area is the increasing prominence of political issues on 
the leadership’s agenda since 1981.
An obvious question here is whether the movement has
compensated for its failures on the intellectual side by succeeding in
its prime concern: politics. One possible response is that the
movement has in fact risen to become the most influential opposition
party in Tunisia, and that, one way or another, it was instrumental in
bringing about Bourguiba’s downfall. Before becoming embroiled in
their confrontation with Ben Ali’s regime, this role played by the
Islamists was hailed by Ghannouchi:
The movement made friends with those who defended 
it, so it managed to isolate Bourguiba even within the 
secular circles in Tunisia, to the point that no party, 
syndicate or association hesitated to side with the 
Islamic movement. The movement also isolated 
Bourguiba on a large scale outside the country. This
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bloody struggle ended with the fall of Bourguiba, and 
that was not at at all easy for a man who had led a nation 
within a national movement, had led it in the battle for 
independence and in the building of the state. [In spite 
of this] . . . the day of his fall became a day of 
celebration. “La ilaha ilia Allah; Bourguiba (adu Allah ”
[there is no god but Allah; Bourguiba is the enemy of 
Allah] was the most important slogan heard on the 
streets of Tunis during those seven months, in a bloodv 
confrontation between the Islamists and the regime . . .
Not all observers would agree however that the Islamic 
movement was the main factor in bringing about the end of the 
Bourguiban era. It would be fairer to agree with Hermassi, who asserts 
that al-Nahda was “the first opposition movement to stand up to 
Bourguiba”, and that “there were many Tunisians during that fatal 
summer who began to feel that something had changed, and that 
Tunisia would never be the same again”.9 Indeed, one should not 
forget that it was in fact Ben Ali who evicted Bourguiba and 
succeeded him to power, bringing an end not only to the confrontation 
between Bourguiba and the Islamists, but to a succession problem that 
had lasted for ten years. One should not forget either the fact that the 
1987 political changes were faithful to the main Bourguiban values, 
indeed the new regime showed a more concerted and vigorous attempt 
to improve Tunisia’s relations with the West, and to combat all 
sources that could have been of help to the Islamists’ cause.
Many now think that Ben Ali’s crackdown on the Islamists has 
driven them out from the Tunisian political arena for a long time to 
come. For the government at least, the problem of what it calls 
“religious extremism” has been solved for good: repression against all 
members and supporters of al-Nahda is fierce, and even for those who 
flee overseas, the government does not spare any effort in having them 
extradited. But there are still reasons to be cautious in dealing with 
these claims and these have to do with the shortcomings of repression
254
everywhere. Hermassi described Bourguiba’s policy against the 
Islamists as a failure, because, as he put it "repression was worse than 
a crime, it was a mistake (in Tallyrand’s formula); it did more to 
reinforce than to weaken the Islamicist organization".10 For many 
Islamists at least the rule is still valid, and Ben Ali’s repression may be 
counterproductive in the long term.
It is in fact widely accepted that Ben Ali’s regime has dismantled 
the whole Islamist organisation inside Tunisia, and has criminalised 
any kind of support for their cause. In spite of this, however, no one 
can claim with any certainty that support for the movement has been 
uprooted from the hearts of its former supporters, and it is still 
conceivable that the Islamists could function as a strong political 
party, should the Tunisian government permit them to work legally.
Predictions aside, however, the experiments of the Tunisian 
Islamists have given further reason to call into question the strategies 
of many of those other Arab Islamic movements who have opted to 
employ double-speak and to pursue a double agenda, and who count 
on gaining power with the support of the military. For despite all 
precautions taken, the Tunisian government’s intelligence services 
consistently succeeded in discovering al-Nahda's secret organisations, 
their hidden strategies and, most important of all, their military wing. 
In such circumstances, such a movement should recognise that 
infiltrating the army is a high-risk strategy in any part of the Arab 
world, with the most common punishments on discovery being the 
death penalty and the total dismantling of the movement.
Long before any initial confrontation with the Bourguiban regime 
had occurred, the Tunisian Islamic movement had set up the first cell 
of its military wing, imitating the actions of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood before them. On the one hand, it sought members for a
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reformist civilian movement, and presented itself to society as such, 
whereas on the other it was preparing for a potential military coup. For 
many leading Islamists, it was only through police and court records 
that they discovered that they were members of an organisation that 
actually possessed a military wing. Some may argue that this was 
dishonest behaviour on the part of the organisation towards its 
members and towards society as a whole, whereas for others, it was 
seen to be the only feasible method by which to topple the regime and 
bring about an Islamic state.
Unfortunately for the Tunisian Islamist movement, as with the 
Muslim Brotherhood previously, the military wing brought little more 
than disastrous consequences. While in Tunisia it provided the regime 
with an excuse to forcibly disband the entire operation, in Egypt also 
this wing was responsible for “placing the organisation [i.e. the 
Muslim Brotherhood] in a number of political crises, for providing the 
excuse for the dismantling of the movement, and for being hunted and 
chased away because of the irresponsible acts in which it had become 
involved”.11
One other important point that should be made pertaining to the 
experiments of al-Nahda, is the great risk taken by the movement in 
having only one real leader speaking out on all issues and dealing with 
all of the movement’s affairs. Throughout the entirety of the 
movement’s history, Ghannouchi managed to remain its indisputable 
leader, even when he was not its de facto  president. With Ghannouchi 
as the sole authority on almost all issues, the movement shared some 
of his limited successes, but also suffered from his unsuccessful 
political maneuvering and found itself finally in an impasse when, 
after leaving Tunisia in 1989, Ghannouchi declared war against the 
Tunisian regime and sided with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war.
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As neither a professional politician nor a professional religious 
scholar, Ghannouchi constantly experimented with new political 
tactics according to Tunisia’s changing circumstances. What is more, 
in making the movement and the leadership one and the same thing, 
we may see that, in the nineties, the two continue to be unified, and 
indivisibly so. Once again, the Tunisian Islamists are not alone in this, 
as most of their Arab colleagues have placed their destinies in the 
hands of one undisputed leader who controls the movement until his 
death. Perhaps ironically, such behaviour is imitative of that of current 
Arab rulers, who only leave office by either death or military coup.
By being so closely tied to Ghannouchi, the intellectual 
contribution of the movement comes largely from him alone. An 
evaluation of his contribution is open to different interpretations: most 
of those in other Arab Islamic movements as well as some Western 
observers appear to acknowledge his keen interest in democracy, 
identifying it as one subject that is absent from other Islamist 
movements’ discourse. For others, however, Ghannouchi’s 
Islamisation of Western democracy does not stand alone as an original 
contribution to contemporary Islamic thought, as it has been addressed 
before by other scholars, although generally with only a limited degree 
of success.
In all cases, a major question that arises from this study remains: 
was the politicisation of Islam beneficial to the cause of Islam in Tuni­
sia? Did it make people more attached to its teachings and more obser­
vant of its orders? Did it increase its influence as the main frame of 
reference for the whole population? It is difficult to give a clear yes or 
no answer, but one can still argue that using religious motives and slo­
gans to reach power, even by planning twice for a military coup, may
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end up by making Islam itself a subject of polarisation and conflicting 
arguments between political players within the society. From being the 
unifying religion of almost the whole population, which was the role 
of Islam during the struggle for independence, the politicisation of re­
ligion may end up in dividing the nation along religious lines, on the 
assumption that good Islamists were fighting bad, or secularist, Mus­
lims. The reaction of the Islamists’ opponents in Tunisia offers an in­
dication as to what may happen as a result of this approach: religious 
behaviour may become a cause of suspicion, and going to fa jr  at the 
mosque might be interpreted as meaning that the person concerned is a 
member of an “illegal” opposition party. Thus religion has become a 
major problem for the whole nation, because the opponents of the Isla­
mists still believe in their own adherence to Islam but regard their ac­
tions as necessary, to stop what they see as a manipulation of religion.
Will this dividing path convince the Islamists or their opponents 
to change their tactics? This seems very unlikely, unless Tunisia and 
other similar Muslim societies find their own peaceful way of han­
dling political and social differences, and of making political changes 
at the top possible without monopolising religion or staging military 
coups.
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Appendix I 
The Founding Manifesto of 
H arakat  a l-I t t i jah  a l-Is lam i  (1981) 
In troduct ion
The Islamic world, of which Tunisia is a part, is currently witnessing 
the worst forms of distortion (istilab) and alienation regarding its iden­
tity and interests. Since the Middle Ages, degenerating influences have 
been active in eating away at the state of our nation (umma), compel­
ling it to relinquish its pioneering and influential mission. At times this 
has been for the benefit of the colonising West, while at others for in­
ternal ruling minorities, separating it [the umma ] from its roots and 
contradicting the interests of its people.
Throughout this entire period the primary target has been Islam, 
which is the centre of our identity as a civilisation and the basis of our 
collective conscience. It has been gradually and slowly marginalised 
— at times brutally and publicly — from its position of orienting and 
actively ruling over our lives. Despite being the decisive factor behind 
the most brilliant achievements of our civilisation, and the vital role it 
has played in the struggle to evict the coloniser, Islam today is almost 
no more than a symbol, beset by cultural, moral and political dangers. 
This is the result of all it has been subjected to, and of negligence of 
and attacks on its values, institutions and men of distinction, particu­
larly in more recent times.
In addition to these civilisational facts (which we share with all 
other countries of the Islamic world), despite gaining independence on 
paper, Tunisia witnessed particular circumstances in the late fifties and
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during the sixties and seventies that were marked by crises, an increase 
in social confrontation, and the suspension of its overall development. 
This situation was further exacerbated by the Unitarian nature of the 
ruling political movement (the Destour Party), and its continued and 
gradual domination over the authorities, institutions and popular or­
ganisations on the one hand; and also as a result of hasty and changea­
ble economic and social policies dependent on international interests, 
as opposed to the national interests of our people, on the other .
Amid such a climate, the Islamic Trend in Tunisia emerged in the 
early seventies, once all the reasons for its existence were in place and 
its necessity had become apparent. This movement has contributed to 
restoring respect for Islam as a way of thought, culture and behaviour, 
as well as re-establishing respect for the mosque. It has also participat­
ed in reactivating cultural and political life, and has breathed new life 
into it, by emphasising our identity, increasing awareness of [our na­
tional] interests, and asserting pluralism by making it a reality.
Through its actions and numerous declarations, the Islamic Trend 
has shown its adherence to the nation’s identity and representation of 
its people’s hopes and aspirations, thereby attracting the support of 
vast sections of the have-nots, youths and intellectuals. Its rapid 
growth has been a source of concern for observers, and it has been 
closely monitored by forces and governments both inside and outside 
[the country]. Despite its rational and composed efforts to seek out the 
most effective means of achieving evolution and change, the Trend 
has been the subject of various unfounded accusations and negative 
publicity campaigns, orchestrated by the ruling authorities and the of­
ficial and semi-official media. In an attempt to suppress its voice, 
these campaigns reached a level of unjustified aggression against the
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Trend’s media , and increased levels of oppression by putting its mem­
bers on trial, widening police supervision and investigations, and by 
opening up prisons and detention centres for its young [supporters] — 
places of beatings, torture and vilification.
The persistence of the reasons behind the declining political, eco­
nomic and cultural situation in our society vindicates the Islamists’ le­
gitimate sense of their divine, national and human responsibility to 
continue and improve their efforts — out of necessity, for the sake of 
the country’s true liberation and for its development, founded on the 
just principles of Islam and adherence to its correct path.
Some may interpret these actions as mixing religion with the 
world of politics, and as a gateway leading to the monopolisation of 
the Islamic notion (sifa), thereby denying it to others. This understand­
ing is not only the expression of a foreign ecclesiastical concept alien 
to our indigenous culture, but also helps to sustain, in the contempo­
rary context, the sense of a loss of direction which our nation has his­
torically undergone.
However, the Islamic Trend Movement does not present itself as 
the official voice of Islam in Tunisia and does not wish to be assigned 
that label in the future. While recognising the right of all Tunisians to 
honest and responsible dealings with religion, the movement believes 
that it has the right to adopt a comprehensive interpretation of Islam, 
representative of the theological base from which all those intellectual 
views and political, economic and social policies defining the identity 
of this movement and directing its strategic orientations and tactical 
positions are derived. In this context, the Islamic Trend Movement 
clearly defines the boundaries which limit its areas of responsibility. It 
is not, then, accountable for the various actions and positions [taken by
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other groups] which arise from time to time, other than in what the 
movement officially adopts, regardless of the religious claims of those 
behind these actions or their Islamic banners.
To confirm this position on the one hand, and to meet the serious­
ness of the responsibility and the needs of this era on the other, it is 
obligatory for the Islamists to enter a new era of action and organisa­
tion, so as to enable them to bring together their supporters, and to en­
lighten, educate and use them to serve the causes of their people and 
the nation. This work must be carried out within a movement that has 
clear objectives, specified methods, defined institutions and represen­
tative leaders.
The Islamic Trend Movement, which was cut off from the broad 
support of the Muslim peoples on account of oppression and terrorism, 
hopes that the contribution of its supporters will be more original and 
comprehensive in the future.
M a jo r  ob jec t ives :
a) To revive the Islamic personality of Tunisia so that she may re­
sume her traditional role as a major centre of Islamic civilisation and 
culture. This would necessarily entail putting an end to the wastage of 
national resources, the progressive alienation of the population by the 
government, and the practice of slavish imitation of the West.
b) To reformulate Islamic thought, taking into account the funda­
mental principles of Islam, the requirements of man’s continuous evo­
lution and changing circumstances.
c) To reassert popular will as a political force and, in so doing, to 
reject local paternalism and foreign influence.
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d) To establish a system of social justice based on the principle 
that, although everyone should have the right to benefit from his own 
endeavours, subject to the public interest, everyone should also enjoy 
the right to receive what he needs — “to each according to his efforts 
and to each according to his needs” — so that the masses attain their 
legitimate rights to live in dignity, removed from all kinds of exploita­
tion and submission to international economic powers.
e) To contribute to the revival of the political and civilisational 
unity of Islam nationally, regionally, within the Arab world, and inter­
nationally, thus saving our people and the whole of humanity from 
psychological alienation, social injustices and international imperial­
ism.
M ethods  o f  act ion:
To achieve the above objectives the movement will undertake the fol­
lowing meaures:
— to revive the mosque as a centre for worship and comprehen­
sive popular mobilisation, as was the case in the time of the Prophet, 
and as an extension of the role that the biggest mosque, Jami‘ al- 
Zaytuna, used to play in protecting Tunisian identity and reinforcing 
the status of our country as a leading international centre of civilisa­
tion.
— to invigorate intellectual and cultural life, by, for example, or­
ganising conferences; encouraging writing and publishing; consolidat­
ing and elaborating on Islamic principles and values in the domains of 
literature and culture in general; encouraging scientific research; and 
supporting a responsible, rather than immoral and hypocritical, media.
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—  to support Arabisation in the fields of education and adminis­
tration, whilst remaining positive towards foreign languages.
—  to reject violence as a means of bringing about change, and to 
base this struggle on the principles of shura, as a mechanism for solv­
ing differences in the fields of thought, culture and politics.
—  to reject the one-party system because of its implications, i.e. 
its denial of the human being’s will, its incapacitation of people’s ca­
pabilities, and its steering the country down the path of violence. The 
rejection of the one-party system must be coupled with the recognition 
of the rights of all popular forces to exercise freedom of expression, 
organisation and all other legitimate rights. We shall co-operate in this 
regard with all national forces.
— to crystallise Islamic social principles by devising contempo­
rary practical applications; to analyse the current situation of the Tuni­
sian economy in order to define the problems of injustice and its caus­
es; and to elaborate alternative solutions.
— to side with the mustad'aftn [the impoverished] masses of 
workers, labourers and all deprived people, in their struggle against 
the mustakbirin and the rich.
— to support the trade union movement, in order to safeguard its 
independence and its capability to achieve national liberation, in all its 
social, political and cultural dimensions.
— to adopt a comprehensive understanding of Islam, and a com­
mitment to political action unaffected by secularism and opportunism.
— to liberate the Muslim conscience from [the complex of] civil- 
isational defeat by the West.
— to crystallise and implement the contemporary form of the Is-
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lamic political system; to ensure that all national issues are debated ob­
jectively, within the theological and historical contexts of the Magh­
reb, the Arab and Islamic world, and within the context of the world of 
the mustad ‘afin in general.
— to strengthen relations of fraternity and co-operation among all 
Muslims: in Tunisia, the Maghreb and Islamic world as a whole.
— to gain the support and assistance of liberation movements 
from around the world.
Tunis, 6th June 1981
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Appendix II
The Manifesto of al-Nahda  Movement of Tunisia (1988) 
Part One: Foundations and Aims
Article 1
Among those Tunisian citizens who have agreed or will agree on this 
charter and who believe in its goals, which will be stated for an indefi­
nite period, a party has been created under the name Harakat al- 
Nahda, which is subject to the law of 3 May 1988 and the following 
articles mentioned therein.
Article 2: Aims
Al-Nahda will endeavour to effectuate the following goals:
a) the p o l i t i c a l  domain
i) to consolidate the republican regime and its foundations,-to 
safeguard civil society, to implement the principle of popular sove­
reignty and to establish shura.
ii) to implement freedom, as the basic value embodying the digni­
ty that God has conferred upon the human being, by enhancing civil 
and personal liberties and human rights, and by promoting the princi­
ple of the independence of the judiciary and the neutrality of the ad­
ministration.
iii) to operate a foreign policy founded on the country’s sove­
reignty, its unity and independence from interference at all levels, and 
to operate international relations on the bases of positive non- 
alignment, mutual respect and the right of the people to self- 
determination, justice and equality.
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iv) to promote cooperation among Arab and Islamic countries, 
and to enhance solidarity and unity.
v) to promote the spirit of Arabic and Islamic unity and aware­
ness of the fundamental issues of the umma, so as to put an end to the 
situation of hostilities, divisions and secession; to concentrate all ef­
forts on our most decisive issues; to strive to bring about comprehen­
sive unity and to support all serious steps towards this; and to give su­
preme importance to the unity of the countries of the Arab Maghreb.
vi) to strive to liberate Palestine, and to consider this a central 
mission and duty implicit in the necessity of standing up to colonial 
Zionist aggression, which has planted an alien entity at the heart of our 
Arab nation so that it might be an obstacle to its unity, and in reflec­
tion of the civilisational struggle between our nation and its enemies.
vii) to support liberation causes in the Arabo-Islamic world and 
in the world as a whole; to struggle against colonial and segregationist 
policies in Afghanistan, Eritrea, South Africa and others; to express 
solidarity with all oppressed people in their fight for liberation, and to 
oppose all situations founded on injustice and tyranny.
viii) to work for the development of cooperation with African 
countries and to ensure a strategic orientation for our country; to work 
to neutralise the Mediterranean basin from the struggle between the 
forces of hegemony, and to eliminate all factors of tension in the re­
gion; to help consolidate relations of mutual understanding and coop­
eration between all peoples; and to promote world peace founded on 
justice.
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b) the econom ic  domain
ix) to build a strong, integrated national economy, which will rely 
essentially on our resources, lead to self-sufficiency, and fulfil our ba­
sic needs; to ensure a balance among the regions [of the country]; to 
help effectuate integration and close cooperation in the Maghreb, and 
with the Arabo-Islamic world.
x) to achieve complementarity and balance among the national 
sectors, i.e. the public, the private and the cooperative, in such a way 
that serves the public interest.
xi) to emphasise that work is the basis of any gain and the condi­
tion for progress, and that it is a right and a duty; to work to build an 
economic system based on human principles; to distribute the coun­
try’s wealth according to the principle of “to each according to his ef­
forts and to each according to his needs”, (i.e. although everyone 
should have the right to benefit from his own endeavours — subject to 
the public interest —  everyone should also enjoy the right to receive 
what he needs); and to eradicate all social distinctions based on exploi­
tation, the accumulation of wealth, monopolies and other illegitimate 
means.
c) the so c ia l  domain
xii) to ensure social services that guarantee the essentials for all 
—  their rights to food, health, education, housing and all other basic 
requirements for a dignified life — so as to safeguard social cohesion 
and development, and to free the potential for spirituality, beauty and 
innovation by combining the guarantee of rights with the execution of 
duty.
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xiii) to support all popular organisations and protect their unity, 
existence and the democratisation of their internal decisions; to respect 
their independence so that they may express the needs of their mem­
bers and defend their interests; and to assist in offering guarantees or 
protection against all forms of dictatorship.
xiv) to safeguard the entity of the family, which is the basis of a 
healthy society, and to ensure that relations within it are based upon 
affection, mercy, cohesion and mutual respect; to safeguard the sancti­
ty of marital relations; and to ensure the correct and necessary environ­
ment for the proper raising and nurturing of children.
xv) to raise the status of women and reinforce their positive role 
on the social, cultural, economic and political scenes, so that they may 
contribute effectively to the development of society without imitation 
or degradation, and that they may realise their own identity; and to 
protect their dignity by rejecting all expressions of immorality.
xvi) to protect the youth, the very heart of the nation, and to pre­
pare them well for the challenges of progress and development with a 
sound education; to open up prospects for their effective contribution 
towards [the country’s] overall development; to facilitate their integra­
tion into society; to guarantee employment for them; and to encourage 
and facilitate marriage.
xvii) to base social relations on the civilisational principles of our 
countries by promoting moral values, so that this may ensure a spirit 
of fraternity and mercy within society and protect it from harm.
d) the cultural  domain
xviii) to assert and reinforce the Islamo-Arabic identity as one of
271
the conditions for its revival; and to accord it the status it deserves by 
implementing the requirements of the country’s constitution and laws, 
in respect of the fact that Islam is both a set of values for civilisation 
and a way of life, and that Arabic is the language of national culture.
xix) to ensure the required environment for a comprehensive sci­
entific and intellectual revival, based upon both what is well- 
established among the teachings of Islam and the requirements of 
changing times, so as to bring an end to the state of backwardness, 
decadence, dependence and alienation; and to bring about intellectual 
and cultural activities that will enlighten the mind, refine tastes and be­
haviour, and enhance Tunisia’s civilisational role.
xx) to adopt the Arabic language in the educational, administra­
tive and cultural domains, and to raise it to the extent that it may be a 
tool for a civilisational revival that will help in uniting the Islamic 
umma; and to facilitate positive interaction with world cultures with­
out a sense of defeatism, self-deprecation or isolation.
xxi) to ensure the conditions necessary for the encouragement of 
scientific research and its promotion; to respect scholars, researchers 
and inventors, and to accord to them the status they deserve. This is in 
accordance with our belief in the important role that science can play 
in developing the country, supporting its independence, and in seeking 
an intellectual and scientific revival, so as to make the actions of the 
human being compatible with the laws of nature and the course of his­
tory.
xxii) to implement a media policy based on respect for freedom 
of thought and expression; to promote the spirit of originality and in­
novation; and to guarantee the conditions necessary for an indepen­
dent, honest and responsible media that contributes to the progress of
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the country and fosters its identity.
xxiii) to encourage literature, the arts, and the practising of sports, 
so that they may fulfil their role in promoting morality and safeguard­
ing fitness, the advancement of spirituality, and supporting the basis of 
revival.
Tunis, June 1988
Appendix III 
The Islamic Basis of our Foreign Policy*
* Extract from an internal Nahda memo regarding foreign relations
The foreign policy of an Islamic group regarding its relations with oth­
er groups, states and individuals is governed, like all other relations, 
by the principles of the Islamic sharVa. Believers must always ascer­
tain God’s ruling on any issue before taking action. The sharVa princi­
ples in this regard are as follows:
1. Allegiance and friendship: A Muslim’s allegiance must be to 
God alone, that is to say, to [the principles and the rulings outlined in] 
His book [the Qur’an], and to His Prophet (the sunna), and to fellow 
Muslims. “Your ally is God, His messenger and the believers.”(a/- 
M a'ida : 55) In cases where a Muslim is permitted to lend support to a 
non-Muslim or form an alliance with one, this must not under any cir­
cumstances be done against [the interests of] another believer. “Be­
lievers, do not take the unbelievers as allies instead of the believers”, 
(al-Nisa’ :144) and “Whoever does that shall have nothing to do with 
God.” (A/- 'Imran: 28)
2. Other than the above, there are no restrictions on establishing 
relations of co-operation or agreements between Muslims and non- 
Muslims, as long as the latter are not in a state of open war against Is­
lam or the Muslims. The Qur’an says: “God does not forbid you to be 
kind and equitable to those who have neither made war on your relig­
ion nor driven you from your homes. God loves the equitable. But He 
forbids you to show friendship towards those who have fought against
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you on account of your religion and driven you out of your homes and 
abetted others to do so. Those who make friends with them are trans- 
gressors ”(al-Mumtahina: 8-9) God also says in the Qur’an: “You 
shall not find any people who believe in God and the Last Day who 
would be on friendly terms with those who oppose God and His mes­
senger, even if they were their fathers, their sons, their brothers or 
their kindred. God has inscribed faith in their hearts, and strengthened 
them with a spirit of His own ”(al-Mujadala: 22)
3. The blood and possessions of those who are not in a state of 
war with the Muslims or against whom we have declared no war, are 
safe with us (see: al-Mumtahina: 8).
4. All Muslims are one nation: “This nation of yours is one na­
tion, and I am your Lord, so worship Mo ”(al-Anbiyd’: 92) Our duty, 
therefore, would be to support the believers and work for their unity, 
solidarity and integrity as much as possible. In principle, all believers 
should form one unit in times of peace or in war.
5. Muslims today are not united under one leader. Rather, they 
operate in groups or as individuals. As a consequence, they cannot 
give any unified commitments; rather, they may be diverse. The prin­
ciples governing the relations of Muslims should be in all circumstanc­
es based on the saying, “A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim; he does 
not oppress him, nor does he fail him, nor does he betray him”; and on 
the principle “There shall be no harming [of one man by another] in 
the first instance, nor in requital [in Islam]”.
If the interests of a Muslim group require that they establish rela­
tions with a non-Islamic regime which is persecuting [another] Islamic 
group, then is such a relationship permissible? It is preferable not to 
associate with such a regime. However, if it is unavoidable, in order to
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protect the lives and honour of other Muslim groups, then it is permis­
sible, providing it will not be at the expense of other Muslims, causing 
them to be let down or aggression to be committed against them. For a 
Muslim should not fail another Muslim; rather, he should protect him, 
he should, try to intervene to deter his enemy, and he should strive to 
rescue him. He must never, under any circumstances, side against him.
6. The status of a Muslim living in a non-Muslim country is gov­
erned by a treaty in the form of the entry visa he is granted. This repre­
sents a statement of mutual agreement between two sides, which binds 
him to respect the law of the land in return for receiving a promise of 
protection from the state.
Tunis, 1988
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Appendix IV 
Memorandum 
Tunisia: On the Path to Change
The following extracts are from a long memorandum issued by al- 
Nahda on January 7 1991, three years after the removal o f former 
President Bourguiba from power. It was addressed to a large gather­
ing o f observers concerned with Tunisia's political situation.
The memo begins by mentioning the Islamic orientations o f the 
movement, and reminds us that, after his taking power in November 
1987, it had been willing to co-operate with President Zein al-Abidine 
ben Ali and his regime. The document points to the widespread rig­
ging o f elections o f 1989 as a turning point in the relations between 
the movement and the government, and accuses the latter o f starting a 
new campaign o f oppression against al-Nahda's members and its sup­
porters.
The memo continues as follows:
The rea l  causes o f  the confrontation
a) The regime’s policy of inventing charges against al-Nahda on 
the grounds of [national] security to justify cracking down on it, there­
by avoiding political confrontation and intellectual debate. This is part 
of the Democratic Constitutional Rassemblement’s (RCD) secret plan, 
which was exposed by certain sectors of the Arab media (see al-Amal 
magazine, issue 153, Sept 1990). This may be further illustrated in the
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light of the following factors:
—  The total failure of Ben ‘Ali’s policies in all areas, particularly 
the political. The country has returned to one-man rule with the state, 
the party and the ruler merging into one and taking full control of all 
aspects of society. Political life has become devoid of all democratic 
competition and of a balance between state and society. The regime 
has taken control of all cultural and social institutions and has inter­
fered directly in the administration of the media, the judiciary and leg­
islative bodies, adopting a carrot-and-stick policy. The opposition has 
been eliminated and prevented from participation in political life, ei­
ther by not granting it legal recognition or by adopting police-state and 
terror tactics (such as those against al-Nahda and the Popular Unity 
movement). The state has also impeded the work of recognised par­
ties, or has banned their public activities and contact with the people 
through the media. Pressure has been brought to bear against their 
leaders to maintain a facade of democracy, so as to hide the dictatorial 
reality of the one-party state.
—  The election of April 2nd, in which most of the opposition 
parties participated and in which we fielded independent candidates 
(on account of the authorities preventing thousands of our members 
from taking part), is evidence of the total failure of any so-called 
“change”, and the inability of the Constitutional party, led by Ben 
‘Ali, to handle the situation and maintain a nationwide political bal­
ance. The results of the elections, which were widely rigged, gave the 
ruling party 80 per cent of the vote, Nahda-supported independents 17 
per cent, and the remaining opposition parties 3 per cent. Thus parlia­
ment was dominated by one political party, the Democratic Constitu­
tional party, which monopolised all of its seats. We believe however
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that the candidates we supported won more than 50 per cent of the 
vote.
b) Our belief in democracy and the right to free self- 
determination dictates that any falsification of the will of the people is 
a political crime which we can never condone or forgive. Indeed, we 
and all democratic and national forces must stand up to such behaviour 
and expose the illegitimacy of those responsible. Our struggle for gen­
uine democracy and respect for the will and political rights of our peo­
ple has met and continues to meet with security clamp-downs and po­
lice-state methods.
c) There is now a huge gap between the non-democratic nature of 
the Tunisian regime and the level of our people’s political awareness 
of the need for democracy and intellectual, social and political free­
dom. A rift between the state-party-ruler and the intellectual, political 
and social consciousness of the civilian population has arisen, thereby 
constituting a rift between the police and military state and the multi­
cultural, multi-institutional society. With democracy crippled under 
Ben ‘Ali’s regime, the real clash today is between the state of the Con­
stitutional party and Tunisian society, with all its institutions.
Having falsified the popular will and driven the national opposi­
tion forces out of the political arena, the regime now rules Tunisia 
with a minority even smaller than that held by Bourguiba. Security 
and police considerations have become the two main pillars of the re­
gime, upon which state policies and the behaviour of all government 
departments towards the major national political, social and economic 
issues are built. This rule of the minority and the state has led inevita­
bly to despotism and the re-invention of despotism.
d) The popularity of the Islamic movement’s political and intel­
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lectual ideas within society was demonstrated in the April 1989 legis­
lative elections and by the democratic growth of the movement within 
the trade unions, organisations and national bodies. It was also popular 
among the Tunisian youth and at the universities where, according to 
university election results, in recent years the Islamic trend has come 
to represent over 80 per cent of the student population. The movement 
is now poised to become the main political force of the future.
Another major factor behind the regime’s hostility towards al- 
Nahda is the positive response and respect it has received abroad, and 
the constructive international links it has forged with political parties, 
governments, organisations and personalities throughout the Arab and 
Islamic world and beyond. It has come to be seen as a moderate and 
responsible movement. Having failed intellectually and politically to 
dent the movement’s reputation, the regime has now begun to accuse 
it of using violence and terrorism and to strip it of its political identity, 
in order to remove the struggle from its proper intellectual, political 
and social context, and to divert public opinion both inside and outside 
Tunisia away from the main issue, which is the absence of democracy.
e) The current concerted attack waged by the regime against de­
mocracy and against the Islamic movement may be understood within 
the context of the power struggle within the regime itself. Certain am­
bitious elements have come to believe that [fostering] an atmosphere 
of instability and [engaging in] violent clashes with the Islamists is the 
best way to destabilise other contenders’ positions and force changes 
at the leadership level, since elections and stability are no guarantee of 
gaining power. Our belief, however, is that the Tunisian people’s fight 
for freedom and democracy is not a fight against particular individuals 
within the regime, but a fight against the entire Destour party-state,
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which is opposed to democracy and aims to sidestep the people.
The reg im e's  aims
After three years, the aims of Ben ‘Ali’s regime may be summarised 
as the preservation of power under a false facade of democracy. This 
balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, as a result 
of internal pressures and the worldwide drive towards democracy and 
national liberation from the hegemony of dictatorships and one-party 
governments (as in Algeria, Jordan, Eastern and Central Europe). In 
addition to this is the intrinsic weakness of the regime and its political 
bankruptcy.
In theory, a way out of this would have been to either strengthen 
democracy and take a gamble on popular support, or to hold on to 
power by any means possible, even if that leads to confrontation with 
the people. Ben ‘ Ali has chosen the latter course.
We believe that the current systematic clamp-down against the Is­
lamic movement is intended to cripple all resistance within the civilian 
population, stage by stage, commencing with the most challenging. 
The target, however, is the democratic process as a whole. Hitting the 
strong terrorises the weaker elements of resistance and deprives them 
of help and support. Furthermore, the campaign being waged against 
al-Nahda is using all intellectual and material means in order to uproot 
it, eradicate it and remove it completely from the political arena, there­
by leaving the field clear for the regime to remain in control.
Tunisian national forces, including political parties, groups, in­
dividuals and organisations have shown great awareness of this 
scheme and have refused to give in to government pressure to condone
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and support this policy. They have expressed their basic demands for 
establishing a real democracy which would encompass all sectors of 
Tunisian political society, especially the Nahda movement. This com­
mon awareness of the nature, background and dimensions of the con­
flict will form the foundation upon which Tunisia’s future national al­
ternative government will be established.
D im ensions  o f  the conflic t
The Tunisian regime’s use of violence in suppressing the people’s as­
pirations for freedom and change has a number of important implica­
tions, including the following:
—  This policy will force our people and their national forces to 
seek change outside the Destour party-state, since the regime has 
killed all hope of change. Dictatorships cannot produce democracy, 
nor can security tactics bring about development, social harmony or a 
consistent foreign policy.
— Violence breeds violence. The regime’s persistent use of.per­
secution is bound, we fear, to close all political avenues for change 
and cripple the political process, isolating the main players and leaving 
the door wide open for violent reactions and risk-taking beyond the ac­
cepted margins of normal political behaviour.
—  The situation in the Arab Maghreb, poised for certain political 
developments towards freedom, democracy and strategic relations 
with African and Mediterranean countries, based on constructive ex­
change and solidarity between countries with a common geography 
and strategy, will not be able to accept the Tunisian model. Lagging 
behind in democratic change and reform, Tunisia may jeopardise the
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future stability and security of the whole region. The Islamic move­
ment is keen that Tunisia and the Maghreb play their rightful construc­
tive role in developing Arab relations with Mediterranean and Europe­
an countries, on the basis of fruitful co-operation, the exchange of 
economic and strategic interests, and the cultural openness which has 
been a hallmark of our country throughout its history.
The main pro b le m
The Nahda movement sees the Tunisian crisis as essentially political, 
manifesting itself as a result of the absence of democracy and the heg­
emony of the Destour party over the people, which has thwarted their 
progress and exacerbated their problems at all levels, whether social, 
economic or cultural.
The solution, according to al-Nahda, must begin with the draw­
ing up of a national political framework that will remove hegemony 
and allow the people their right to self-determination and to freely 
choose the social system, political regime, and the cultural and intel­
lectual identity they desire. Democracy is the only way to progress 
along these lines. Give the people control and authority and let them 
decide. This proposal shall be the solid common political foundation 
for all active political and social forces in the national arena, working 
for the good and salvation of the country.
Main p r io r i t i e s  o f  the current phase
These may be listed as follows:
a) The bringing together of all democratic, national, human, cul­
tural, social and political forces, parties, groups and individuals, to
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conduct serious dialogue for a consensus over the future political pro­
gramme, within a wide national democratic front for the enforcing of 
liberties and the basis of a democratic state.
b) The dissolution of the unconstitutional parliament elected dur­
ing the rigged elections of April 2, 1989.
c) The organisation of general and free legislative elections, to 
produce a truly representative body based on democratic election pro­
cedures, to be agreed upon by all national democratic forces and under 
independent supervision. All official laws and regulations governing 
political and constitutional life must be fundamentally reviewed, 
[thereby] introducing greater democracy and openness.
Our reques t
The Nahda movement submits this historic document with a great deal 
of optimism for Tunisia’s future, and a strong determination to supple­
ment the struggle of our people and all sincere forces for the establish­
ment of a genuinely democratic civil and progressive society. We call 
upon you to respond in the following manner:
— Improve your awareness of the Tunisian situation. Study it 
closely and continuously in the light of future developments and with­
in the local, regional and international context, giving full respect to 
the Tunisian people’s right to freedom, democracy and independence. 
This will enable the Tunisian people to build and develop their rela­
tions with their brothers and neighbours on the basis of co-operation, 
for the good of the region, for peace and for common economic and 
strategic interests.
—  Take all political steps necessary to deal with the serious situa­
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tion now developing in Tunisia regarding freedom and respect for hu­
man rights, as a contribution towards lifting the burden of hegemony 
and political despotism.
—  Lend the maximum possible political and media support to the 
Tunisian people and all their patriotic forces, so as to bolster their de­
sire for change and to contribute towards the formation of strong inter­
national support for the causes of freedom, democracy and political 
liberation for the Tunisian people; and to help form organised pressure 
groups in support of this cause.
Al-Nahda 
7 January 1991
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Appendix V
“This is the Day on which the Truthful will Profit from their
Truthfulness”
“This is the Day which you were Promised”
The following extracts are from a long statement issued by the leader 
o f al-Nahda in January 1991, about the Gulf war. It has been distrib­
uted within Islamic circles but has not been officially published in a 
magazine or a book.
From Rashid al-Ghannushi to the learned people of Islam and all Mus­
lim peoples:
In these very difficult times, please allow me to address you with 
these words and with my sincere prayers that they may, with God’s 
will, enlighten some hearts and inspire others and help in uniting our 
ranks in the path of jihad  and good work, especially in the aftermath 
of the Gulf crisis, or issue of Kuwait. While we understandably suf­
fered some disorientation in the early days of the crisis, the situation 
has changed now that certain facts have emerged and the truth has be­
come plain to all, with the outbreak of international, crusader-Zionist 
aggression against the people of Iraq and the Islamic nation as a 
whole.
There is no longer an excuse for division or argument regarding 
the nature of the Western military strategy, which is intent on destroy­
ing the Iraqi military capacity, in terms of its missile systems, nuclear
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research institutes, biological and chemical weapons industry, airports, 
army installations and its general infrastructure. This strategy aims at 
maintaining the absolute military superiority of the Zionist enemy in 
all fields of advanced war industries. Statements from [President 
George] Bush, the leader of the crusader-Zionist camp, have made it 
very clear that by destroying Iraq, his intentions are to redraw the map 
of the Muslim world for the next hundred years, thereby guaranteeing 
the security of Israel and ensuring that it will never be threatened 
again. This is what is meant by the “new world order”, which also 
means that the liberation of Kuwait is no more than a convenient cover 
by which to achieve the following objectives: to abort Iraq’s techno­
logical progress and our nation’s religious awakening, and to gain ab­
solute control over our will and resources, as the Cold War comes to 
an end and as the United States and its Israeli surrogate assume unri­
valled leadership of the world. The only threat to this superiority is the 
Arab-Islamic civilisation, whose leaders must therefore be destroyed 
and its aspirations frustrated. For the same reasons, Arab revolutions 
in Egypt and Libya and the Islamic revolution in Iran were crushed, 
and here is Iraq, being crushed using Gulf money and Western weap­
ons. The hostile Western crusade against our nation goes on relentless-
i y .
1) United aga ins t  Western aggress ion
By uncovering the truth about these aims, we can no longer support 
the arguments of those who say that the crisis is limited to the annexa­
tion of Kuwait by Iraq. Nor is it any longer sufficient to claim that the 
arrival of American forces was necessary for the defence of Saudi Ara­
bia against a potential Iraqi attack. It might have been possible to find
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excuses for such a stand at the beginning of the crisis, but now that the 
truth is plain, the intellectual and religious leaders of our nation, as 
well as our people as a whole, must stand united against American ag­
gression while at the same time preserving our different views towards 
the Kuwaiti issue.
To support this aggression, or even to be neutral, renders whoev­
er accepts this view a partner to the international American-Zionist- 
crusader alliance and an enemy, not only to Iraq, but also to the whole 
Islamic nation. The fact that Israeli forces have not as yet taken part in 
the fighting, despite Iraqi scud missile attacks on Israel, is a clear indi­
cation of Israel’s complicity in facilitating the aggression. From a re­
ligious point of view, how can we possibly justify supporting the 
American-Israeli-crusader-Zionist side in this war of attrition against 
Iraq, which aims eventually to frustrate the scientific and religious re­
vival of our nation, and reinforce American-Zionist hegemony over 
our people?
This is why I call on all scholars and religious and intellectual 
leaders to rise for the sake of truth, and resist this dangerous conspira­
cy against Islam and the Muslim nation — not only against Iraq and its 
President. I call upon you to unite in order to defeat the aggressors. 
How can we achieve victory, or establish justice, or preserve our na­
tion’s honour and integrity if we do not prove our total allegiance to 
God, His messenger and to our fellow Muslims? How can we hope to 
develop and become strong when America, supported by international 
Zionism, is controlling our destiny, wealth and military forces, occu­
pying our lands and water resources, ruling over our skies, and while 
her media is guiding all our policies?
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2) D o  not le t  the “D ays  o f  G o d ” p a s s  you by
Dear scholars and people of the umma:
The steadfastness of the Iraqi people, their brave armed forces 
and valiant leadership in the face of aggression, and the support they 
have received from the people of the Islamic nation: men, women and 
esteemed scholars, make these sacred days. The “mother of all battles” 
has revived in our people a new spirit of self-esteem, which had hither­
to been submitted to Israeli hegemony and the disgrace of the Arab or­
der. It has made us experience the taste of glory, on seeing an Arab 
country challenging Israel and striking out against it, and standing up 
to America and its allies. Thank God for the honour of being able to 
witness this historical moment and this most notable of God’s days.
3) A new , open aggress ion  aga ins t  Islam: Beware!
Dear scholars and people of the umma:
With the fall of the socialist camp, the world is now moving from 
a period of infighting within the camp of kufr, towards an onslaught 
directed towards Islam and Muslims. The camp of kufr has come to­
gether under the banner of America and Zionism to strike us with a 
single blow, so that they may impose their authority over our wealth 
and terminate all our aspirations for revival and progress. The camp of 
infidels, led by the United States, has only hit out at Iraq because it has 
overstepped the limits of progress allowed for Arab and Muslim peo­
ples, with respect to military power, industrialisation, and indepen­
dence of will and decision-making.
To succumb to Western intrigues under the single pretext of the
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liberation of Kuwait, and to allow the destruction of a Muslim country 
that has decided to rebel against Western hegemony, is open recogni­
tion of the infidels’ authority over us. It is a negation of our nation’s 
aspirations to recover its integrity, unity and superiority, and the liber­
ation of its lands that are suffering the encroachment of crusaders, Zi­
onists and pagans in Palestine, Eritrea and Kashmir. By remaining si­
lent towards the destruction of Iraq, its technological progress and 
unyielding leadership, we are surrendering to the Americans and Zion­
ists what they believe is their right: to have full control over our region 
and to rearrange its governments and values as they wish. This would 
be one of the greatest religious violations and political mistakes.
I implore you to fear God in your nation and religion. Look again 
at the danger threatening our nation, and you will find it is the crusad- 
er-Zionist invasion of our heartlands. This makes it our immediate and 
greatest duty to defer all other disputes and mobilise the nation’s forc­
es towards our jihad , to expel the aggressors from our lands.
This is a great historic opportunity for our nation to unite its 
ranks, shake off its apathy and despondence, expose the traitors work­
ing from inside, and to push the wheels of history forward, so as to de­
part totally from the days of backwardness. It is in roaring oceans that 
we find precious pearls, and it was during the times of jihad  that our 
nation was created and was thus able to enter civilisation and history. 
This is Allah’s destiny — offering us civilisation, unity and progress 
at one opportunity, by facing our enemy and expelling them, defeated 
and humiliated, as we did their ancestors in Khaybar, Qadisiyya, 
Hittin, Algeria and Afghanistan.
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4) In a g lo b a l  war, Iraq f ig h ts  alone f o r  the nation and  
humanity
Dear scholars and people of the umma:
The war in the Gulf is not Iraq’s war alone. It is a war for the 
whole nation and for humanity, which is being exploited by interna­
tional brokers. Our enemies have thrown all their forces into this war, 
using the latest technological and military arsenals; it would not be 
surprising if they were also to use nuclear weapons. They have mobil­
ised their huge media machine, economic institutions, and internation­
al law bodies. They have taken control of energy distribution, and are 
even using civil airlines and humanitarian organisations such as the 
Red Cross and environmental bodies to achieve their aims. They have 
deployed all their influence on the widest possible scale over Muslim 
wealth, governments and armed forces.
How can it be possible or acceptable for us to allow Iraq to face 
such a global war on its own? Our duty in fact is to mobilise all re­
sources in support of Iraq, because, whether we like it or not, the reali­
ty is that the battle is a battle for Islam against its enemies. Jihad in Is­
lam is incumbent upon us until the end of time; against all enemies of 
Islam in order to resist aggression and protect our people and our 
lands; under good or dissolute leaders, as long as they direct their 
swords against Islam’s enemies so as to defeat them and defend the 
land of Islam. No effort must be spared in this fight which, as Bush 
says, will “decide the future of the world for the next century”. Let this 
be the battle to liberate Palestine, the will of our nation and its wealth 
from the hegemony of the West. Let us not weaken or surrender, until 
we break the power of our enemies and until they seek peace.
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5) D o  not  weaken or  g ive  in
The Islamic ruling is clear: when unbelievers invade a Muslim land, 
the Muslims shall have no alternative but to fight to drive them out of 
it through all available means. This is the duty of the inhabitants of 
that land, and their closest neighbours, and the closest to them in turn. 
Otherwise they would all be in violation of Islam. For five months 
now, the forces of kufr have been amassing in Arabia and the Gulf in 
order to use it as a base for aggression against another Muslim land, 
Iraq. This aggression has been in preparation by America and the Jews 
for well over twenty years.
In these circumstances, is there any excuse left for the Muslims 
of Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan and 
all other Muslim countries? The aims of the aggression are now clear: 
to destroy the military and industrial power of Iraq and take control of 
the region’s resources in order to deprive the Muslims of their means 
to achieve progress and development. In addition, the real target is Is­
lam itself and the revival of Islam, be it in the shape of the Islamic re­
publics of Iran or Sudan, or other emerging Islamic movements. Is 
there any alternative for Muslim peoples and governments other than 
the declaration of total jihad  against the aggressors and the kafirin; to 
stand behind heroic Iraq with all they possess; to boycott Western 
economies and interests generally; and to bring pressure to bear on 
Muslim governments to join the battle as part of an Islamic Arab coali­
tion against Jewish America, the greatest enemy of Islam and Mus­
lims? If these governments refuse, or give only lip service to this 
cause, or choose to become mercenaries in the crusader armies, as did 
the sectarian kings of Andalusia or those who fought with the allies in 
the two world wars, the only proper action would then be to remove
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them from power and give the leadership to sincere and loyal people, 
who fear God rather than America, so that they may fight on the side 
of Iraq and under the banner of the Qur’an.
January 1991
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Appendix VI 
Dedication*
*From Ghannushi's Civil Liberties in the Islamic State (1993)
I dedicate this book to all those who, after Allah, have favoured my­
self, the Islamic nation and all humanity, by serving Islam and the 
causes of rightness and justice worldwide, whether listed here or not. I 
dedicate it even to those I do not know, in recognition of their deserv­
ing praise for their efforts.
I dedicate it to the spirit of my beloved mother Zayna al-Zaribi 
and to my beloved father Imhammad al-Ghannushi; to the spirit of my 
dear brother, Professor Mukhtar al-Ghannushi; to my beloved wife 
Fatima, and to my beautiful children Tasnlm, M u‘adh, Sumayya, 
Yusra, al-Bara’ and Intisar. They are Allah’s gift to me, and have em­
braced me with love and warmth and spurred me on in the fight.
I dedicate it to the city of Damascus which, with the help of an 
unknown soldier, the Damascene pharmacist Brother Muhammad 
Amin al-Mujtahid, witnessed my second birth; also to all my teachers 
at Damascus University, and to my other teachers both in my country 
and abroad, among whom I give special mention to my late master al- 
Shaykh Muhammad Salih Al-Nayfar, my master al-Shaykh ‘Abd al- 
Qadir Salama, and my master al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ikhwa.
Also to my spiritual fathers, led by the martyr Hasan al-Banna, 
Mawlanu Abu al-ATa al-Mawdudi, the martyr Sayyid Qutb, and our 
teacher Malik ibn NabI; to the innovator and leader al-Shaykh Hasan 
al-Turabi, and to the leader of the contemporary Islamic revolution al- 
Imam al-Khumayni; to the renowned scholar [Muhammad Baqir] al-
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Sadr; to the martyr ‘All Shari‘atl; to the poet of Islam Muhammad 
Iqbal, and to the Shaykh, renowned scholar and symbol of the Islamic 
d a ‘wa in North Africa [‘Abd al-Hamld] ibn Badis; to al-Shaykh 
‘Uthman Fudi; to the Mahdl of Sudan; to ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri; 
and to ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khatabi and to ‘Umar al-Mukhtar, all sym­
bols of the Islamic jihad  against colonialism in Africa; to the mujtahid 
and intellectual, the Islamic President Ali Izebegovitch; and to Profes­
sor Roger Garaudy, among the vanguard of Western Islam; and to 
Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, the forerunner of Islamic modernisation.
To the leaders of the Islamic Alliance, led by Jamal al-Din al- 
Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida, Shakib Arsalan, al- 
Shaykh [‘Abd al-‘Aziz] al-Tha‘alibi, and al-Shaykh [Muhi al-Din] al- 
Qalibi; to the renowned scholar Muhammad al-Tahir ibn ‘Ashur; and 
to the symbol of God’s unity, al-Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- 
Wahhab.
Also to the martyrs of Islam everywhere, led by the dear Brother 
‘Abd Allah al-‘Azzam, martyr of Islam in the jihad  against communist 
colonialism; the renowned scholar Isma‘Il al-Faruql, martyr of Islam 
in the West; to Malcolm X, martyr of Islam in the jihad  against racial 
segregation; to the Bosnian martyrs, and others who have paved the 
future path of Islam with their pure bodies, including the Islamic mar­
tyrs in North Africa, beginning with the great conqueror ‘Uqba ibn 
Nafi; to the martyrs of the National Movement, led by Farhat Hashad, 
followed by the martyrs of the second war of liberation, led by 
Mustafa Abu Ya‘la; to ‘Uthman ibn Mahmud, ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-‘Aribi 
and Muhammad al-Mansuri; and all who have followed on the path of 
martyrdom and light.
And to the Islamic prisoners in Tunisia, led by Dr. al-Sadiq
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Shuru, ‘All al-‘Aridh, al-Habib al-Luz, Dr. Ziyad al-Dulatli, Hammadl 
al-Jabali and all current and former victims of oppression.
And to Islamic prisoners all over the world, led by the mujtahids 
al-Shaykh ‘Abbasi Madam and ‘All Belhaj, to the pious al-Shaykh 
‘Abd al-Salam Yasin, to the mujtahid prisoner Ghulam A ‘zam, amir 
of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Bangladesh; and to al-Shaykh Ahmad 
Yasin in the land of isra’ and m i‘raj, and his Muslim Brothers who 
were exiled to Lebanon, all symbols of heroism, resistance, and mar­
tyrdom, exposing the values of hypocrisy, injustice and ignorance 
dominating the world.
To the leaders of the Islamic women’s liberation movement, led 
by Shaykha Zaynab al-Ghazzall in Egypt and Shaykha Su‘ad al-Fatih 
in Sudan; to the young women of Bosnia, through whom the whole Is­
lamic nation and every honest, free man was raped; to their Tunisian 
Sister Zahra al-Tis, martyr of the student movement; and to the mother 
of four Sister Jalila al-Khumsi, steadfast behind bars after her leg was 
broken under torture; all of them witnesses to the oppressive nature 
and moral bankruptcy of the new world order.
To the prisoners of conscience and freedom of all faiths, and in 
every place. To the fighters against local and international tyranny, led 
by Mr. Gonzalo, leader of the Shining Path movement, fighter against 
the symbols of the military junta in Peru.
To those organisations, personalities and forces fighting for jus­
tice, peace, dialogue and cooperation among peoples and civilisations, 
especially the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights and 
Amnesty International; to those in the vanguard of Western thought, 
fighting for a better understanding and for better dealings with Islam, 
its preachers and its nation. From among them I especially mention the
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French professor Francois Burgat, the American professor John Espo­
sito, the Englishman Ernest Gellner and the German Mr. Hoffman.
To those holding the embers of Islam, to those carrying its light 
everywhere, in dignity and moderation, reacting to humankind’s con­
cern for a world that will be purified from kufr, poverty, oppression, 
injustice and tyranny.
To every person who has taught me a letter, or guided me to 
write, or deterred me from doing wrong, or who has offered any kind 
of help in the catastrophes enforced on the umma and all struggling na­
tions, if only in the form of a pleasant word.
To all those mentioned and to all of those like them I dedicate my 
book, in acknowledgement of their favours towards me — after Al­
lah’s. Also, that it may be a fighting tool in their hands; that it may as­
sert the relationship of kinship; that it may facilitate meetings, dia­
logue, love and cooperation among them and those following their 
path —  for the sake of humanity, which deserves to receive this digni­
fied and divine call:
O Mankind! We created you from a single [pair] of a 
male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes 
that you may know each other [Not that you may de­
spise each other]. Verily the most honoured of you in 
the sight of God is [he who is] the most righteous of 
you. (Sura 49: verse 13)
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